THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE POLITICS OF THE RIGHT-WING 'WELFARE STATE'

by

© LESLIE BELLA

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ABSTRACT

The Welfare State was created in Alberta in the mid-sixties, when the provincial government introduced welfare reforms, including expansion and centralization of statutory programs, and the introduction of a new cost-shared program of municipal preventive services. The party in power (Social Credit) opposed the welfare state, so political ideology does not explain this expansion of provincial welfare programs. Competition to Social Credit was not yet evident, so government reactions to political competition and interest group activity did not produce the provincial welfare state. Social Credit strength was in rural rather than urban areas, so pressure from urban municipalities was not a major influence in social welfare expansion. Also, the provincial government was prosperous, so offers made by the federal government under the Canada Assistance Plan were not incentives of any significance in provincial policy making. Social Credit had a long tenure in power, and their senior officials had become very influential. The impetus for change came from these officials, and was based in their experience serving the clients of provincial programs. To obtain consent for expansion of the welfare state, public officials had to convince their minister and his cabinet that the new policies were not introducing but *preventing* the welfare state. The result was the reversal of the direction of the relationships in the policy process, with policy makers manipulating both pressure groups and intergovernmental relations in order to acheive their own objectives.

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[1] (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1978).

[2] *The Development of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1980).

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I. EXPLAINING PUBLIC POLICY

This study applies a number of explanations to the development of the welfare state in Alberta, under a Social Credit government to which the welfare state was abhorrent. In this chapter these various theoretical approaches are introduced, and their applicability to this case study is suggested. Subsequent chapters apply each of the approaches to the case under study, leading to conclusions about their explanatory value and about the nature of Alberta's version of the right-wing welfare state.

The case study approach has had limited application in theory development. As stated by Simeon, case studies have tended:

> ...to be isolated, each looking at different issues, and asking different questions. This makes comparison difficult. Their focus tends to be on the details of the policy itself, rather than on using the policy to generalize about politics. Cumulative knowledge and theory cannot grow automatically by piling case studies on top of each other. Case studies have also a tendency not to focus on the 'normal' but on the unique, exotic, or important, so insights gained from them may actually be misleading. Moreover, in focussing on a specific decision or piece of legislation, case studies tend to ignore those issues or alternatives which simply do not come up for debate. It is easy to get submerged in the minutiae of the issue itself, and therefore to miss what might be much broader factors influencing the outcome[3]

This study, although not comparative, attempts to overcome many of these problems. The focus is not the unusual or unique, but the pattern of welfare policies developed over a decade, with particular attention to a crucial package of decisions in the mid-sixties. Also, the study has been structured to apply a variety of explanations to the same phenomenon, so that the relationship between these various explanations can be investigated.

A wide variety of explanations purport to account for the form and extent of public policy. Most of these have been presented within an Eastonian framework, consisting of various "inputs" to the government system producing policy as an "output". These have included macro-level explanations, such as those of political economy, policy analysis and political culture.

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[3] R. Simeon, "Studying Public Policy", *C. J. P. S.*, Vol. IX, No. 4, (1976), pp. 548 - 580. For full titles of periodicals common to this subject area please refer to the bibliography.

Diagram 1.1: A Simplified Eastonian System



"Micro-level" process explanations have also been studied, particularly by those concerned with administrative and decision making theory. Political explanations have been proposed as links between social and economic change and micro-level decision processes. The primary focus in this thesis is on these political explanations. Social and economic change sets the context, which is linked to the micro-processes by the political or linkage explanations. These three forms of explanation are not competing but are nested, one level setting the parameters within which the next must operate. Within one level the theories can be compared and contrasted for their explanatory value.

In this thesis a series of political or linkage theories are applied in an analysis of one set of closely related policy decisions – the social welfare reforms introduced in Alberta in the sixties. The linkage processes to be studied include political parties and their competition (chapter III); interest group activities (chapter IV); provincial/ municipal relations (chapter V); provincial/federal relations (chapter VI); and the administrative policy process (chapter VII). This last process, the reaction of a public service to direct interaction with its clientele, is not usually emphasized as a form of political linkage in the area of social policy. However, studies of the regulation of industry have shown that relations between business representatives and public employees have influenced regulatory policy[4], and a comparable process is suggested in the case of Alberta's welfare state. The administrative policy process will be revealed as the most influential of all the political linkage processes. Public servants in the province's department of welfare

[4] G. B. Doern, *The Regulatory Process in Canada*, (Institute for Research in Public Policy, 1980).

experienced the changing character of Alberta through changing demands on their Department's services. They developed proposals in response to these changes, and succeeded in having them accepted as government policy. The result was a right-wing welfare state in Alberta.

A. Macro-processes

A relationship has been demonstrated between policy and social and economic change. Dye et al.[5], for example, show that public policy in terms of spending is positively related to certain socioeconomic variables such as urbanization and income. Others have accounted for variations in public policy between polities as associated with different mass orientations to politics - i. e., with differences in mass ideology and political culture[6]. Economic structure has also been shown to relate to the nature of the state, including its policies. Social and economic variables are the context for policy making setting the permissible boundaries of policy in terms of economic feasibility, social necessity, redistributive character and political acceptance of the growth of state intervention.

The period under study in Alberta was one of major socioeconomic change. The 1960's were the watershed years, when Alberta became more urban than rural and increased in prosperity. These were the years, also, of social policy innovation and social service expansion, when Alberta finally became a right-wing welfare state. In this province in the 1960's a right-of-centre government consolidated the social security, health and social service programs generally recognised as the essential core of the welfare state. The first task in studying the expansion of Alberta's welfare state is the description of the province's shifting social and economic character, class structure and mass political culture during this period. Available census data and various secondary sources, including public opinion polls and other studies, have been used to construct this portrait of Alberta in the 1960's. This allows some suggestion of the implications of the social character of Alberta for changes in social policy (see chapter II). The chapters that

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[5] T. R. Dye, *Policy Analysis*, (Alabama Press, 1976).
[6] A. King, "Ideas, Institutions and Policies of Governments; A Comparative Analysis" Parts I and II, *B.J.P.S.*, III, No's. 3 and 4,(1973), pp. 291 - 313 and pp. 409 - 423.

follow this introductory analysis look at the various linkage processes, to identify those linking macro-social processes to the micro-level decision processes of elected and appointed policy makers.

B. Linkage Processes: Political Parties and their Competition

One of the major functions expected of political parties has been to gather the concerns of the electorate and to express them to government. This traditional role is now diluted, as parties share it with the media, with pressure groups and (in the case of a government party) with the civil service[7]. Social policy initiatives of the Social Credit government during the mid-sixties, were not influenced by the process of interest aggregation and articulation within the Social Credit party[8]. Members, in turn, were more concerned with organizational and political problems than with policy[9]. However, the nature of Social Credit ideology at the level of membership and caucus was to set some limits on the policy making initiatives of cabinet(see chapter III).

The second important consideration concerning party activity is related to party competition. The social policy initiatives of the mid-sixties occurred in Alberta alongside changes in urbanization, industrialization and prosperity. These social changes produced shifts in the major cleavages of Alberta society which could have increased competition to Social Credit. The response of a government to the policy ideas of a strengthened opposition has been called "policy contagion" and is generally expected as a response from a right-wing government to competition from the left (i. e. "contagion from the left")[10]. However, the response to increased competition has also been noted in situations where competition was not from the left[11].

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[7] F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, *Canadian Political Parties*, (Prentice Hall, 1975) pp. 149 - 166.
[8] The Social Credit membership indicated considerable concern with the lack of communication between themselves and the parliamentary wing of the party (O. Anderson, "Party Politics in Alberta, 1905 - 75", Symposium on Society and Politics in Alberta, Edmonton, 1977.)
[9] O. Anderson, "The Alberta Social Credit Party: An Empirical Analysis of Membership, Characteristics, Participation and Opinions", unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1972.
[10] W. Chandler, "Canadian Socialism and Policy Impact", *C.J.P.S.*, X, No. 4, (1977), pp. 755 - 780.
[11] R. E. Dawson, "Social Development, Party Competition and Policy", W. N. Chambers and W. D. Burnham (eds.), *The American Party System*, (Oxford Press, 1969), pp. 203 - 237.

The possibility that the social policy initiatives of the mid-sixties were a response to political competition is explored in two ways. First an attempt is made to quantify party competition as it shifted through the period of Social Credit's power. Such measures include the proportion of the electoral vote gained by opposition parties and the number of seats gained by the opposition in the legislature. Shifts in these measures over time may indicate that opposition was increasing in the mid-sixties, and could have been experienced by Social Credit as a threat.

However, although objective measures of competition may indicate a threat (or the absence of a threat) to Social Credit, *perception* of competition was more important in explaining policy initiatives. Such events as byelection results, for example, might influence party policy choices. Objective measures of party competition did not increase through the early '60's[12], but Social Credit ideology led the government to be oversensistive to byelections which suggested the possibility of a threat from the left. This perception of a threat from the left produced policy shifts in 1967, but was not a factor in the reforms of 1966. These analyses (see chapter III) involve the study of caucus and convention records, of platforms proposed by all parties, of proceedings in the Legislature as indicated by the press clippings of the "Scrap Book Hansard", and of personal interviews.

C. Interest Group Activities

While pressure groups have been shown to be influential in certain instances of public policy making in Canada[13], our experience has not been as decisive as that of the United States. In the more pluralistic political system of the United States multiple veto points allow many opportunities for pressure groups to oppose successfully public policy innovations. In the Canadian system decisions are taken within cabinet (except for areas in which crown corporations have been established), and to be successful pressure

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[12] In the 1963 election the Social Credit party's percentage of the vote declined to 55% from 56% in 1959, and the size of the opposition increased from 2 to 3 members. In the 1967 election the Social Credit strength decline was more marked, as their share of the vote declined to 45% and the size of the opposition increased to 10 (Caldarola, *Ibid.*, p. 314).

[13] A. P. Pross, *Pressure Group Behaviour and Canadian Politics*, (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1973).

groups must reach the members of the federal or provincial cabinet. The prime minister, or provincial premier, and his cabinet act as brokers between competing interests.

Chapter IV suggests that pressure groups in Alberta were not as significant to the policy process as the pressure group literature might indicate. The Canadian literature includes both "successful" and "unsuccessful" pressure groups. Some of those who have succeeded have been surprisingly weak, and a few of those who have failed had appeared very powerful[14]. The pressure group literature emphasises action upon government by the pressure groups, giving credit to pressure groups for a "success" that may actually result from internal policy choices. The government is often more of a protagonist in the process than the pressure group literature would have us believe. For example, the pressure groups themselves may be established, in Canada at least, as a government initiative, and be the *result* rather than the cause of public policy[15].

Alberta's welfare reforms of the mid-sixties did not result from pressure group activity. Pressure from urban elites and from developing professional associations was evident, but these groups did not have the "ear" of the rural-based Social Credit cabinet. Pressure groups' concerns reached cabinet only indirectly through administrators. The influence of pressure groups on the social policy initiatives of the mid-sixties is traced through interviews, newspapers, and the records of interest groups (such as the Alberta Association of Social Workers, various social agencies, service clubs and Chambers of Commerce).

D. Intergovernmental Relations: The Municipalities

Public health and welfare have traditionally been municipally administered[16]. But by the Social Credit era in Alberta the municipalities were clearly unable to bear full responsibility for relief. In the Great Depression both provincial and federal governments assumed more of the financial burden for relief. In some provinces municipalities were relieved of all social welfare functions, but in Alberta the Social Credit party's belief in

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[14] Pross, *Ibid.*, pp. 148 - 171.
[15] L. Bella, "The Liberal Parks Renaissance", *Park News*, XV, No. 3, (1979), pp. 6 - 13.
[16] J. S. Morgan, "The Contribution of the Municipality to the Administration of Public Welfare", *C.P.A.*, VII, No. 2, (1964), pp. 137 - 146; A. Leigh, "Municipalities and Public Welfare", *Canadian Welfare*, XL, No. 1, (1968), pp. 16 - 22.

local autonomy led to some reluctance to reduce municipal responsibilities[17]. By the end of the nineteen fifties the municipalities still provided child welfare services and most financial assistance programs.

Increased urbanization and industrialization in the province produced a dilemma for the Social Credit government. The smaller municipalities, particularly, were increasingly incapable of providing adequate welfare services. The provincial government could decide to take over the programs, but this would decrease the "local autonomy" valued by Social Credit. Chapter V traces the attempt by Social Credit to resolve this dilemma. The municipalities pressured the province either to take over their services (from the rural municipalities) or to fund more generously municipal social service expansion (the two major metropolitan areas). Information was obtained from interviews and newspaper records, from the records of the Alberta Union of Mayors and Municipalities, and from records of and correspondence with certain Alberta municipalities.

E. Intergovernmental Relations: Federal-Provincial Relations

The constitutional responsibility for health and welfare in Canada has generally been recognised as provincial. However, in the Great Depression of the 1930's the financial demands on the provinces were too great for provincial resources, and federal government involvement has since increased. The federal government made a number of proposals at the Reconstruction Conference of 1945, suggesting that subsidies could be provided to the provinces for use in health and welfare, in return for continuation of war-time centralization of taxing power. Ontario and Quebec, realizing that such arrangements would have resulted in a net loss to their residents, rejected the federal proposals[18]

In the years after 1945 the federal government introduced a series of shared-cost health and welfare programs. The conventional wisdom is that the provinces responded to each new program by expanding their own programs to take advantage of

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[17] L. Bella, *The Origins of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1978), chapter 3.
[18] D. Guest, *The Emergence of Social Security in Canada*, (University of British Columbia Press, 1980), p. 40.

the new federal offers[19]. Chapter VI shows, however, that social welfare initiatives of the mid-sixties in Alberta were not a response to the federal government's welfare programs, but rather that Alberta was generally ahead of Ottawa, moving into new areas of social services before the federal government had programs which would share part of the provincial cost.

Two approaches are taken to testing this hypothesis. The first involves the comparison of spending on social services by the two levels of government in the sixties. This analysis consists of visual inspection of the relation between spending in Ottawa and Alberta in this program area. If spending in Alberta "takes off" before that of Ottawa, then the province can be said to be leading. If on the other hand rapid increases in Alberta follow a change in the rate of increase of spending in Ottawa then the federal government can be said to be leading.

The second approach involves the analysis of the context in which the initiatives were introduced in Ottawa and in Edmonton, to identify the influence of one level of government on the other. The sources for this analysis include personal interviews, the public records of federal provincial negotiations, and federal and provincial documents made available to me by public officials of the two levels of government[20].

F. The Administrative Policy Process

While all the links described above influenced the policy process, the most significant input to the process was the service experience of public officials in the welfare department. The Department of Welfare caseloads were increasing, due to the stress of social change. Problems of marriage and family breakdown, illegitimacy and transient unemployment accompanied rapid urbanization and industrialization. Administrators' concerns about these changes, and their awareness of the inadequacy of existing services, resulted in new policy initiatives.

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[19] R. Dyck "The Canada Assistance Plan: The Ultimate in Cooperative Federalism", *C.P.A.*, IXX, No. 4, (1976), pp. 587 - 602. R. Splane, "Social Policy Making in the Federal Government: Some Aspects of Policy Making in Health and Welfare Canada", S. A. Yelega, (ed.), *Canadian Social Policy*, (Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1978), pp. 209 - 226.

[20] The core of the second part of this analysis has been published as "The Provincial Role in the Canadian Welfare State", C. P. A., XXII, No. 3, (1979), pp. 439 - 452.

Service records of the Alberta Department of Social Services and Community Health were studied, and senior administrators were asked about the rationale for welfare reform. The strategy used by these administrators to convince their minister and his cabinet that the reforms were necessary is outlined and interpreted.

This interface of administrators and politicians is the crucial core of the policy process. Several theories account for the nature of this decision process. The incremental theories of Braybrooke and Lindblom[21] and the scientific theories of Dror[22] are well known, and a brief discussion of the case study in terms of these two theories provides the framework for chapter VII.

Alberta's Welfare State

A complete or ideal welfare state would provide cradle to grave security for its citizens. Income security would protect people from the misfortunes of poverty. Health services would be universally available. Social services would replace the church and extended family in supporting individuals and the nuclear family through various crises. While there is no consensus on a precise meaning for either "welfare" or the "welfare state"[23], there is agreement that in such a state the government would meet most of the income security, social and health needs of the population[24].

Elements of this ideal welfare state have been introduced by both right and left-of-centre political regimes, and in both unitary and federal states. In Germany, for example, Chancellor Bismarck introduced medical services for workers and their families, with the costs met jointly by workers and employers; and various provisions for accident benefits, pensions for the aged or disabled, and a code of factory legislation[25]. In the example of New Zealand elements of the welfare state, including old age pensions and labour legislation, were first introduced in the depressed decades of the late nineteenth century. In the 1930's further advances included a general Social Security Act, consolidated pensions, free hospital care for the mentally ill and maternity benefits[26].

Canada was later to develop these basic elements of a welfare state. The division of powers under the B. N. A. Act left primary responsibility for health and for relief of

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[21] *The Strategy of Decision*, (Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).
[22] "Muddling Through: Science or Intertia", *P.A.R.*, XXIV, (1964), pp. 153 - 158.
[23] A. W. Dobelstein, *Politics, Economics and Public Welfare*, (Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 16.
[24] B. Q. Madison, *The Meaning of Social Policy*, (Croom Helm, 1980), Chapter 2.
[25] W. Carr, *A History of Germany: 1914 - 1945*, (Arnold, 1969), pp. 157 - 159.
[26] J. B. Condliffe, *The Welfare State in New Zealand*, (Unwin, 1959), pp. 289 - 290.

the indigent to the provincial governments, and through them to the municipalities. The federal government did not assume a major role, therefore, until after the fiscal incapacity of the provincial governments was evidenced in the Great Depression of the 1930's. The earliest federal old age pension program had been introduced in 1927, in response to pressure from Labour and Progressive members in the Canadian House of Commons. In the 1930's, however, a broader "New Deal" was proposed, only to be stalled by referral to the courts and by the second world war. The federal government's contribution to the Canadian welfare state, therefore, did not develop until the post-war period. National housing programs, family allowances, disability pensions, unemployment insurance and social assistance were all introduced in the 1940's and '50's[27].

Many of these federal programs, however, consisted of shared-cost programs for which provincial contribution and cooperation was essential. These arrangements, necessary to the development of a welfare state under a federal system, ensured that the provincial governments would continue to make significant contributions to ensuring the welfare of their citizens. This thesis focuses on the development of provincial contributions to the development of welfare programs in the province of Alberta, contributions that by the end of the 1960's had created a right-wing "welfare state" in the province.

By 1935, at the start of Social Credit's long tenure, Alberta had had a skeletal program of financial assistance to those in need. A pension program for the aged had been introduced following the federal pension initiative of 1927[28]. Although relief was still provided primarily by municipal governments, and work for relief was still required of many applicants, the principle of provincial cost-sharing in these programs was established. There was some child welfare legislation, but social services (where they existed) were provided by private agencies. The election of the Social Credit government in 1935 brought no radical change in this system. The government was in immediate economic difficulties, and expected a new social credit monetary system to eliminate both poverty and the need for relief.

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[27] A. Armitage, *Social Welfare in Canada*, (McClelland and Stewart, 1975), pp. 213 - 220.
[28] K. Bryden, *Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada*, (University of Toronto, 1974), p. 82.

The immediate problems of the unemployed, though, could not wait until the constitutionality of social credit doctrine and policy had been decided in the courts. The province had to relieve the municipalities, and yet the Alberta treasury was empty. In 1939 the Bureau of Public Welfare was set up, and residency requirements established for municipal relief. A new 3 mill social services tax in every city, town and village, and federal and provincial cost-sharing, paid the relief bills.

Before his death in 1943 Premier Aberhart had also added legislation for betterment of the Metis (1940) and pensions for the blind[29]. In 1943 the Alberta Human Rights Act was also passed, including a number of social rights for the citizens of the province; the right to employment, the right to a security pension if employment was not available and the right of every citizen under nineteen to the necessities of life, educational and medical benefits, together with the right to a pension for all those over sixty[30]. By this time, though, the Alberta government did not expect that the legislation would be accepted by the courts as "intra vires" the province. The legislation was never proclaimed[31].

After Aberhart's death in 1943, Ernest Manning became premier. In the first throne speech of his long tenure, Manning proposed free maternity care and a new child welfare act. He also created the province's first Department of Public Welfare:

> To ensure efficient administration of more extensive services related to public welfare, legislation will be introduced creating a department of public welfare under a responsible Minister[32].

The legislature's reaction to this new legislation reflects the Social Crediter's schizoid philosophy on social welfare issues. Free maternity care and the new welfare act were accepted (according to the press of the time) without question. Welfare had been subsumed under "health" but was growing in scope, warranting a separate

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[29] M. Lobb, "A Short History of Welfare in Alberta", unpublished undated mimeo, Alberta Department of Health and Social Development.

[30] The legislation appears similar in intent to Britain's Beveridge Report and the Canadian Marsh Report, and yet it was introduced by the same government that had condemned both reports as "socialistic".

[31] H. J. Whalen, "The Distinctive Legislation of the Government of Alberta, 1935-1950". Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Alberta, 1951, and W.D. Mcdougall, *The Bill of Rights: Alberta's Charter of Freedom*, (King's Printer, 1946).

[32] The new department of Public Welfare was responsible for the following Legislation : The Bureau of Public Welfare Act; The Relief Liability Act; The Unemployment Relief Act; The Improvement District Act; The Metis Population Settlement Act; The Child Welfare Act; The Children of Unmarried Parents Act; The Domestic Relation Act, Part V; The Juvenile Court Act; The Mother's Allowance Act (transferred in 1945); The Old Age Persons (and Blind Persons) Act; The Homes for the Aged and Infirm Act.

department. This welcoming attitude to sensible and humane legislation, however, was accompanied by virulent attacks on the developments in the social welfare field elsewhere.

In 1947, Charlotte Whitton (renowned for her welfare wisdom in Eastern Canada) was invited by the I.O.D.E. (Imperial Order of Daughters of the Empire)in Alberta to study the province's welfare system. The provincial government refused to cooperate in her study, in which she described a chaotic situation, with relief given arbitrarily by the municipalities, and a child welfare program without any social workers to help families or children in trouble. She also condemned the centralization in Alberta's social welfare legislation, implicitly comparing Alberta's provincially run system with the voluntary Children's Aid Societies operating in Ontario[33].

In 1948 an Alberta government inquiry sustained many of Whitton's charges. The Provincial Department of Public Welfare staff had neither the time or the training to do social casework, although it was a natural corollary of its statutory responsibilities[34]. In 1949 the province changed the Child Welfare Act, assuming "a substantial share of child welfare and relief costs", including hospital and medicare[35], from the municipalities. The provincial government also increased funding to the Department of Public Welfare by 65%, bringing total welfare spending to nearly $7 million[36].

Although the government claimed that this expansion was not a response to the Whitton study, the opposition was quick to give credit to the I.O.D.E. and the Calgary Herald for the improvements. Liberal M. L. A. Harper Prowse alleged that the government had pretended that all was smooth in the Department of Welfare until "the I.O.D.E. and the Calgary Herald set a fire under the government"[37].

Throughout the 1950's the Alberta government continued to expand slowly the province's welfare programs. Various new assistance programs took advantage of new federal cost-sharing programs. These included the Old Age Assistance Act, the Blind

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[33] She was reflecting, I suspect, some dissatisfaction in the private social agencies with the "one man band" child welfare branch of C. B. Hill. She claimed the Alberta superintendent of child welfare had powers "without parallel in any enactment in the study's knowledge, except one in Hitler's Germany" C. Whitton, *Ibid*, p.14.
[34] W. R. Howson and J. W. MacDonald, & E. B. Feir, "Report on the Child Welfare Branch, Department of Welfare", (Alberta, 1948).
[35] *Calgary Herald*, February 17th., 1949.
[36] "Welfare Costs Up", *Calgary Herald*, Feb 17th, 1949. The budget for the Dept. of Welfare in 1948/49 was $4,080,720; in 1949/50 it was $6,726,326.
[37] *Calgary Herald*, March 16th, 1949.

Person's Pension Act of 1952, and the Disabled Person's Allowance of 1955[38]. The province also extended its own cost-sharing arrangements with Alberta municipalities. The province assumed more financial responsibility for relief and child protection, although the municipal administration of these programs continued[39]. The Provincial Department of Welfare remained small, with only 145 staff by 1959, and without any professional social workers. The Department had no regional offices, and operated from Edmonton. In municipalities too small to offer child welfare services the R.C.M.P. assumed the responsibility. In smaller centres, relief was granted by town clerks, who were on occasion both arbitrary and punitive[40].

The situation did not improve until after a much publicized child welfare case in 1958. A twelve year old boy was beaten to death by his father. Since the incident took place on military land, the case was a provincial rather than municipal responsibilty. A public inquiry revealed that legislation was adequate, but that services were not. This publicity coincided with a new wave within the Department of Welfare. In the late 1950's all the senior staff in the department were reaching retirement age, and as described by D. W. Rogers, the field was "wide open". Rogers became Deputy Minister in 1959, and proceeded to introduce a series of reforms.

The reforms of the decade that followed, the decade of the 1960's, are the focus of this study. A new social allowance program was introduced, based on need rather than program category. A program of rehabilitation was introduced to restore to independence those on assistance[41]. In the mid-sixties a Preventive Social Service Act and a new Child Welfare Act were passed. The former provided provincial cost-sharing for preventive social services administered by the municipalities. This new legislation was accompanied by the takeover by the province of all municipal child welfare responsibilities. By the early seventies the province had also assumed responsibility for remaining municipal statutory welfare programs. This process had taken over ten years.

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[38] Speech from the Throne, Feb 21st, 1952, Alberta Legislature Journals, and Lobb, Ibid, p.7.
[39] Speech from the Throne, Feb 20th, 1958, Alberta Legislature Journals, and Lobb, Ibid., P.7.
[40] Description confirmed in interviews with D. W. Rogers (Deputy Minister, from 1959-71), and D. Stolee.
[41] L. C. Halmrast, Alberta Legislature Speeches, Feb 26, 1965, p. 195.

This expansion can be seen in changes in Alberta's health and welfare spending, which more than doubled during the decade. In 1961 Alberta was spending 22.7% of the provincial budget on health and welfare, compared with an average for all provinces of 26.7% and figure for Saskatchewan of 33.3%. By 1971 Alberta was spending 40% of the provincial budget on Health and Welfare, compared with 38% for all Canadian provinces[42].

Chapter VII describes how the social changes within Alberta in the 1960's reached the Alberta cabinet in such a way that they reformed and expanded social welfare programs, even though this expanded welfare state was abhorrent to them. The relative significance of various competing linkage explanations in explaining the growth of Alberta's welfare state is discussed in chapter VIII. In some instances the direction of these linkages was reversed, as policy makers manipulated "inputs" to government to produce preferred policies. This reversal, together with the significance of administrative policy making, suggests modifications to Eastonian assumptions that structure our thinking about the policy process[43].

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[42] L. Bella, *The Origins of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1978), pp. 31 – 32.

[43] Although explicit Eastonian theory has been modified by greater acknowledgement of "within–puts", his ideas still structure much current thinking about the political process. The policy analysis of the environmental school for example, is based on Eastonian assumptions. At least one popular text on Canadian government also has these roots. R. J. VanLoon and M. S. Whittington, *The Canadian Political System*, (McGraw–Hill Ryerson, 1976).

II. THE ENVIRONMENT

The social and economic state of Alberta under Social Credit is described below, setting the context for the analysis of political explanations in following chapters. Various demographic changes, the structure of Alberta's economy, and aspects of the province's political culture are all reviewed, and their implications for development of a provincial welfare state are suggested.

A. Demographic Patterns and the Welfare State

Several studies have identified socioeconomic variables that appear to be related to the development of the welfare state. A cross-national comparison by Harold Wilensky, for example, uses government spending on social security as a percentage of Gross National Product as a dependent variable, and the following as independent variables[44]:

1. Age of the social security system (log sum of years of operation of five social security programs).
2. Age of the population (percentage over 65).
3. Totalitarian state (presence or absence of totalitarian government).
4. Liberal democratic state (presence or absence of liberal democratic state).
5. Economic level (Gross National Product per capita).

Wilensky's initial regression analysis indicated that these independent variables "explained" 83% of the variance among nations in social security effort. Path analysis was used to unscramble significant causal sequences among these variables, and to construct a model that made theoretical sense. Wilensky's analysis suggests that although economic level and social security spending are closely correlated (r= .67), this relationship is mediated by the proportion of the population that is aged, and by the age of the social security system. Wilensky, who had earlier coauthored a classic study of the development of public welfare institutions in industrializing societies[45], now concluded that wealth rather than industrialization determined welfare spending, even though he had not included industrialization as an independent variable.

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[44] H. Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality*, (University of California Press, 1975).
[45] H. Wilensky and C. Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare*, (Free Press, 1965).

> For this sixty-country sample, the primacy of economic level and its demographic and bureaucratic correlates is support for a convergence hypothesis; economic growth makes countries with contrasting cultural and political traditions more alike in their strategy for constructing the floor below which no one sinks. Further evidence of convergence of rich countries is the finding that authoritarian polities have no significant effects net of economic level, while the other two types of political systems, liberal democracy and totalitarianism, have only small independent influence on social security effort. And insofar as they count, the two systems work in the same direction – increased welfare effort. Incidentally, the path diagram shows that the small influence of the two political systems is entirely indirect; liberal democracy makes its contribution through age of population and age of system and through its correlation with GNP; totalitarianism makes its contribution through age of population and age of system[46].

Wilensky finds political ideology (liberal democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism) to be unimportant[47]. Two socioeconomic variables therefore remain of particular interest in setting the context within which Alberta's welfare state developed. These are age structure (the proportion of the population over 65) and (most significantly) percapita gross provincial product.

Tompkins has applied policy analysis to welfare spending within a single federal system. The independent variables in his study include both political (voter turnout, interparty competition) and socioeconomic variables (industrialization, income and ethnicity)[48]. The model accounts for 69% of the variation among states in the level of aid to dependent children. Since political variables, the presence of blacks and immigrants and industrialization are all related to income, wealth again emerges as a key variable, modified by the others as intervening variables.

These two studies lead to the identification of four key socioeconomic variables generally associated with increased public welfare expenditures – that is, with the expansion of the welfare state:

1. Percapita Income
2. Gross National (Provincial) Product Percapita

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[46] Wilensky, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 42 – 49. Wilensky's study contains many of the difficulties associated with policy analysis. Certain of his selected variables are suspect as causal variables. With the knowledge we have of the tendencies of programs to expand, for example, age of the social security system seems likely to be reflected in present cost. The age of the system and current spending are both likely to be the product of other socioeconomic forces related to economic development.

[47] In contrast F. G. Castles and R. D. McKinlay challenge studies such as that of Wilensky. The "sociological orthodoxy" of the environmental approach is, according to Castles and McKinlay, methodologically and empirically unsound. They identify political variables associated with the unity and strength of the working class as of major importance. "Public Welfare Provision, Scandinavia and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics", *B. J. P. S.*, IX, (1979), pp. 157 – 71.

[48] G. Tompkins, "A Causal Model of State Welfare Expenditures", *Journal of Politics*, XXXVII, No. 2, (1975), pp. 322 – 416.

3. Industrialization.

4. Age Structure.

These four variables all shifted in Alberta during the period of social credit rule (1935 – 71), particularly in the 1960's when the welfare state was consolidated and expanded.

1. *Percapita Income*

From 1951 to 1977 per capita income in Alberta increased from $1,331 to $7,738[49], and the consumer the price index increased from 113.5 in 1951 to 158.95 in 1977 [50].

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[49] Canada, Statistics Canada, *National Income and Expenditure*, Cat. 13 – 531, pp. 48 – 49; pp. 148 – 149; pp. 248 – 249.

[50] This index is constructed from the weighted average of price indexes for Edmonton and Calgary, divided into percapita income to provide an index of the purchasing power of percapita incomes. A more realistic measure of changes in percapita spending power over the period 1951 to 1977 is therefore obtained by adjusting percapita income for the consumer price index. The measure of income change obtained from this calculation increased slowly through the 1950's, more rapidly in the 1960's, with further large increases in certain years since 1970 (see Diagram 2.1).

Diagram 2.1: Adjusted Per Capita Income for Alberta [31]



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[31]Canada, Statistics Canada, *National Income and Expenditure*, Cat 13 – 531, pp. 48 – 49; pp. 148 – 149; pp. 248 – 249.

Table 2.1: Domestic Product for Alberta

Year	G.D.P. in millions $'s	G.D.P. in 1961 $'s	Per Cap. Alberta Population	Annual % Change
1962	3,146	3,116	2,275	
1963	3,386	3,316	2,664	+17.0%
1964	3,624	3,532	2,469	−7.0%
1965	3,984	3,827	2,639	+6.9%
1966	4,565	4,247	2,901	+9.9%
1967	4,906	4,388	2,945	+1.5%
1968	5,421	4,645	3,048	+3.5%
1969	5,997	4,936	3,166	+3.9%
1970	6,538	5,223	3,275	+3.4%
1971	7,351	5,734	3,522	+7.0%
1972	8,350	6,269	3,783	+7.4%
1973	10,472	7,385	4,371	+15.5%
1974	13,591	8,707	5,055	+15.6%
1975	16,909	12,507	7,033	+39.1%
1976	19,701	13,329	7,252	+3.1%
1977	22,658	14,255	7,504	+3.5%
1978	26,302			
1979	32,532			

Alberta Treasury, Bureau of Statistics, *Economic Accounts*, (1979)., pp. 48 – 49.

2. *Gross Provincial Product*

Data on the gross provincial product for Alberta do not appear to be available for the period before 1962. However, between 1962 and 1979 the gross domestic product for Alberta increased from $3,146 million in 1962 to $32,532 million in 1979. When corrected for inflation[52] the increase over the fifteen year period 1962 – 1977 was 350%. When this figure is adjusted for population

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[52] The same correction method was used as in indexed percapita income above.

increase, and presented as percapita income, the increase over the fifteen year period is 230%. The bulk of this change has occurred since 1971, and is due to the increase in oil prices. However, there was also an increase in 1965 and 1966, terminating in 1967. This earlier peak coincides with the period in which major welfare reforms were introduced in Alberta. A new child welfare act, the preventive social service program, and the provincial takeover of municipal child welfare were all enacted in 1966.

3. *Industrialization*

The level of industrialization in Alberta can be assessed from a breakdown of the gross domestic product by industry. The proportion of the gross domestic product from the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, mining) provides one index; the relative size of the manfacturing sector provides another. Unfortunately such indexes for Alberta are distorted by the presence of natural resource royalties within the "finance" sector[53]. A measure of industrialization independent of this artificial increase in the finance sector is needed. Therefore, the gross domestic product for the manufacturing sector is used, corrected for inflation and for population increases (see Table 2.2) rather than given as a proportion of the total gross domestic product.

According to this measure the gross domestic product from manufacturing increased from $231 percapita in 1962 to $341 ten years later, and to $546 in 1978, all in 1961 dollars. This increase was not steady, with the rate of growth of the sector ranging from -4.7% (1969 - 70) to 9.0% in 1964 and 36% in 1974 - 75. As the rapid growth in 1974 - 75 was followed by a decline in 1976 and 1977, this spurt appears to have been related to the influx of petrodollars, rather than any permanent growth of the manufacturing sector. This shows that the growth of the manufacturing sector is not stable or consistent over the period under study.

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[53] As a result of this inclusion the finance sector increased fourteenfold from 1962 to 1979.

Table 2.2 Industrialization in Alberta

Year	Manufacturing G.D.P. in $ millions current $'s	1961 $'s	Manufacturing G.D.P. per capita $'s	% change	Manufacturing G.D.P./Primary G.D.P.	Service G.D.P./Primary G.D.P.
1962	319	316	231		0.43	0.61
1963	334	327	233	0.9	0.39	0.58
1964	373	363	254	9.0	0.43	0.62
1965	406	390	269	5.9	0.44	0.66
1966	447	416	284	5.6	0.39	0.62
1967	488	436	292	2.8	0.46	0.77
1968	522	467	306	4.8	0.43	0.77
1969	596	491	314	2.8	0.48	0.87
1970	600	477	299	-4.7	0.43	0.87
1971	661	516	317	6.0	0.40	0.81
1972	752	565	341	7.6	0.38	0.74
1973	885	624	371	8.8	0.31	0.57
1974	1,117	715	417	12.4	0.28	0.50
1975	1.362	1,007	566	35.7	0.29	0.52
1976	1,537	1,039	565	-0.1	0.31	0.57
1977	1,647	1,036	546	-3.4	0.27	0.55
1978	1,891				0.25	0.51
1979	2,396				0.25	0.43

When this less vigorous growth is contrasted with the buoyancy in other sectors of the provincial economy, industrialization in Alberta appears even weaker. The manufacturing sector was comparatively stable in relation to the primary sector in the 1960's, with a relative decline evident since 1970. This supports the suggestion of relative stagnation of the small manufacturing sector, which in 1970 provided only 9% of the total gross domestic product as compared with 10% in 1962.

The mark of a late industrial society is not the growth of manufacturing, but of the service sector. During the 1960's the service sector in Alberta expanded relative to the primary sector (60% in 1962 to 87% in 1969). However, since 1970 this trend has also reversed, with the service sector declining.

Although resource royalties have not been included in these calculations, the impact of the energy crisis and subsequent increases in the price of oil and gas is evident in the changes in other sectors of the economy. Although the manufacturing sector has expanded, it has been submerged by the boom in the primary sector oil and gas production. In the 1960's, when Alberta's provincial welfare state was expanded and consolidated by the Social Credit government, the province could have been described as an industrializing province. In the 1970's this is no longer the case, for the oil and gas boom has reduced the province to dependence on primary production. In 1962 the manufacturing sector contributed 10% of the gross domestic product, a figure which remained fairly stable through the 1960's and did not decline until the energy crises of the 1970's.

4. *Age Structure*

Wilensky focuses on the proportion of the population over 65 as a key variable explaining welfare commitment. This variable would give a measure of the proportion of the population both dependent upon others for services and income security, and able to participate politically to obtain those services from the state. The proportion of the elderly in the Alberta population increased steadily over the period of Social Credit government, from 3.5% in 1931, to 5.2% in 1941, 7.1% in 1951, 6.9% in 1961 and 7.3% in 1971[54]. The proportion of elderly in Alberta for 1961 and 1971 remained slightly below the average for Canada as a whole[55]. Alberta was evidently an aging society, and following from Wilensky's conclusion, is also a society likely to experience increased commitment to the welfare state.

This review of socioeconomic changes in Alberta shows that these changes were similar to those often associated with the expansion of welfare spending. The province was more prosperous, had an aging population, with modest growth (until 1970) of the

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[54] Government of Canada, Statistics Canada, Cat. no. 92 - 715, Vol. I, Part 2 (Bulletin 1.2-3) April, 1973, pp. 7.7 - 7.8.

[55] In Canada 7.6% of the population were 65 or over in 1961, for 1971 was 8.1%. *Perspectives Canada*, (Canada, Teasury Board, 1974), p. 13.

manufacturing and service sectors. This review, however, does not tell us how and why that association exists, or more specifically, how and why that association developed in Alberta. Later chapters of this thesis focus on the causal chain of political events linking social and economic macro-processes, such as industrialization and prosperity, with the micro-decision processes that produced the welfare state in Alberta.

B. Economic Structure and Alberta's Welfare State

Studies of Alberta's political economy have focussed on the province's external relations - the dependent relationship with the central Canadian metropole. The classic works in this genre are C. B. Macpherson's study of the rise of Social Credit in Alberta[56] and J. R. Mallory's study of the federal challenge to the constitutionality of Alberta's Social Credit legislation[57].

Macpherson describes Alberta in the depressed early 1930's as a quasi-colonial economy, with federal policies dominant and reflecting the interests of eastern capital[58]. Internally the Alberta society was comparatively homogeneous, with a very large proportion of independent producers[59]. These producers had farms mortgaged to eastern Canadian banks. Alberta's homogeneous class structure led the province to react unanimously to their quasi-colonial status by electing a government that would stand up to Ottawa and to eastern Canadian interests[60]. The new Social Credit government tried to ease the burden of debt upon the Alberta farmers[61]

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[56] C. B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta*,(University of Toronto Press, 1953).
[57] J. R. Mallory, *Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada*, (University of Toronto Press, 1954).
[58] Macpherson, *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[59] Agricultural occupations consisted of 53% of the total in 1931, with 80% of farms owner-operated in 1921, and 64% owner-operated in 1946. Macpherson, *Ibid.*, pp. 11 - 12.
[60] Flanagan suggests that this "homogeneity" was more myth than reality, with class structure becoming increasingly varied since 1930. Malapportionment and gerrymandering relegated certain regions (Edmonton, Calgary, the north, Rocky Mountain House) to electoral weakness. T. Flanagan, "Electoral Cleavages in Alberta during the Social Credit Reign, 1935 - 71", unpublished, University of Calgary, 1972, quoted in D. K. Elton and A. M. Goddard, "The Conservative Takeover, 1971", in C. Caldarola, (ed.), *Society and Politics in Alberta*, (Methuen, 1979), pp. 49 - 70.
[61] Sinclair supports Macpherson's interpretation of the class-based origins of the Social Credit movement in Alberta(P. R. Sinclair, "Class Structure and Populist Protest", C. Caldarola, *Ibid.*, p.. 73 - 86). This led him to de-emphasize political culture as an independent variable. Political culture, in this case "populist" Social Credit support in Alberta and C. C. F. support in neighbouring Saskatchewan, is an intermediary variable linking class variables and the political system. Naylor also perceives political culture as an

[61]. The federal government used the constitution to eliminate new Social Credit legislation and other legislative evidence of the positive state.

> Against the rise of new government functions there developed a steady litigous pressure which sought to exploit the federal division of legislative power in the constitutions as a means of minimizing the change which was taking place in the statute law.[62]

Many of the Social Credit bills, such as those providing debt adjustment for economically troubled farmers, were disallowed, or put before the courts to meet with ultimate rejection as "ultra vires" the province[63].

> At bottom the struggle was one of opposing legal principles; it was an attempt to modify the rules by shifting the balance of power in the community. The priority of desirable social ends had altered in western Canada but it was difficult to transmute this new scheme of social values into the law. Simply because these values were different they met resistance from the inanimate body of legal principles which already existed. This resistance was exploited by groups who stood to lose by a modification of the status quo. But in the memoranda of ministers of justice and in the opinions of judges the question was resolved on a plane of abstraction. To them it appeared simply as an attempt to introduce novel, inconsistent and illegitimate rules and remedies into the law[64].

During the 1960's, the period during which Alberta's welfare state expanded, the province's political economy shifted, both internally and in relations to central Canada. During the 1960's new elites, based in a new state middle class and a new bourgeoisie arose. These shifts coincided with the expansion of the province's welfare state. If this class shift was real, there could have been associated political shifts that pushed Social Credit to expand the welfare state. These new classes were to support Lougheed's Progressive Conservatives, who were to defeat Social Credit in 1971. The declared intention of this new government was to be to strengthen and diversify Alberta's internal economy and to reduce dependence on central Canada.

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[61](cont'd)intermediary variable, as the product of class relations. Both Alberta's Social Credit movement and the C. C. F. in Saskatchewan are shown as based in the entrepreneurial class, and as reformist, without any radical critique of the capitalist economic system (R. T. Naylor, "The Ideological Foundations of Social Democracy and Social Credit", *Capitalism and the National Question in Canada*, G. Teeple, (ed.), University of Toronto Press, 1972, pp. 251 - 256). While this section dicusses the origins and nature of Social Credit in the political economy of Alberta, a subsequent section of this chapter looks at the basis of Social Credit in political culture.

[62] Mallory, *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[63] This reaction in the courts was not solely directed at the activist Social Credit government in Alberta. Federal legislation, such as Bennett's "New Deal" met the same fate when referred to the courts by the new prime minister Mackenzie King.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

> The proposition is advanced that the powers and resources of an interventionist "positive" government are being employed to nurture the development and to defend the province-building interests of an ascendent class of indigenous business entrepreneurs, urban professionals, and state administrators. The objectives of this ascendent class are to strengthen its control over the Alberta economy, to reduce Alberta's dependence on outside economic and political forces and to diversify the provincial economy before depleting oil and natural gas reserves are exhausted[65].

This theme is developed further by Richards and Pratt[66], who described a new arriviste bourgoisie in power, driven by the vulnerability of the province's resource based economy.

> ...local entrepreneurial energy is being generated by the province's upwardly mobile urban middle class - a rising bourgeoisie of leading indigenous entrepreneurs, managers and upper class professionals and linking public and private sectors with a quasi-corporatist alliance of interests[67].

The nature of these shifts is reviewed below, and the possibility of party competition resulting from the shifts is explored in chapter III. These shifts would have been expressed in changes in the following indicators:

1. Urbanization,
2. Decline in Agricultural Occupations,
3. Increase in Managerial, Professional/Technical and Clerical Occupations.

1. Urbanization

Industrialization was discussed above. Urbanization is usually a correlate of industrialization, and as the growth of industry in Alberta was unsteady, one could expect a similar halting pattern in the process of urbanization. However, while industrialization did not make much headway in Alberta in the 1960's the process of urbanization continued steadily. In 1959 less than half Albertans were living in cities (47.18%)[68], but by 1969 this figure had risen to well over half (59.32%). Thus the sixties was a key decade in which Alberta became an urban rather than a rural society.

This affected the relative strength of urban and rural-based political parties in Alberta, and as is explored in chapter III, led in 1971 to the defeat of the rural-based Social Credit party by the urban-based Progressive Conservatives.

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[65] L. Pratt, "The State and Province Buidling: Alberta's Development Strategy", L. Panitch, (ed.), *The Canadian State*, (University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 133.
[66] J. Richards and L. Pratt, "Oil and Social Class in Alberta: the Bourgeoisie Take Power", *Canadian Forum*, LVIII, no. 685, (1978), pp. 6 - 15; and *Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West*, (McClelland and Stewart, 1979)
[67] J. Richards and L. Pratt, (1978), *ibid.*, pp. 6 - 15.
[68] Alberta, Department of Municipal Affairs, *Annual Report*, 1960 -.

However, the trend to city living has slowed since 1970, and by 1975 had not increased beyond 60%. This slowing is due to the increased preference for suburban living on the periphery to the major urban centres.

2. Decline in Agricultural Occupations

The proportion of the workforce in agricultural occupations has declined steadily since the 1930's. By 1961 21.2% of the Alberta workforce were involved in agriculture[69], down from 53% in 1931[70]. By the 1971 census this was further reduced, as 12.6% were involved in agriculture[71].

3. Increase in Managerial, Professional, Technical and Clerical Occupations

The growth of the bourgeoisie, as described by Richards and Pratt, should be reflected in expansion in the occupations associated with membership in an "urban bourgeoisie of leading indigenous entrepreneurs, managers and upper class professionals"[72]. This would include the managerial occupations traditionally associated with membership in either the bourgeoisie or petite-bourgeoisie; the professional and technical occupations associated with the growth of public and private sector bureaucracies, and in the clerical sector which serves those in managerial, technical and professional occupations.

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[69] Canada, Statistics Canada, Cat. No. 94 - 518, Vol. III, Part 2, Bulletin 3.2 - 1, (May 1963).
[70] Macpherson, *Ibid.*, pp. 11 - 12.
[71] Canada, Statistics Canada, Cat. No. 94 - 736, Vol III, Part 3, Bulletin 3.3 - 9, (May 1975).
[72] Pratt and Richards, *Op. Cit.*.

Table 2.3 Labour Force 15 Years and Over by Industry, 1961 and 1971

	1961		1971	
	No.	%	No.	%
All Industries	489,510	100.0	688,285	100.0
Agriculture	103,573	21.2	86,705	12.6
Forestry	2,784	0.6	2,070	0.3
Fishing/Trapping	839	0.2	210	0.0
Mines/Quarries/Oil Wells	17,350	3.5	26,595	3.9
Manufacturing	42,217	8.6	62,420	9.1
Construction	37,360	7.6	52,430	7.6
Transportation/Comm-unication/Utilities	47,435	9.7	54,540	7.9
Trade	80,096	16.3	104,200	15.6
Finance/Insurance/ Real Estate	14,705	3.0	25,265	3.7
Community/Business/ Personal Service	93,424	19.1	169,485	24.5
Public Administration/ Defence	38,627	7.9	54,135	7.7
Others	11,111	2.3	51,235	7.4

Table 2.4: Changes in Selected Occupations

Year	Managerial Occupns		Professional Technical		Clerical		Farmers & Farm Workers		All
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
1931	13,955	4.9	14,903	5.3	13,644	4.8	145,345	50.9	285,777
1941	16,047	5.6	16,541	5.7	14,214	4.9	141,052	49	287,831
1951	28,330	8.0	23,874	4.9	30,361	8.6	141,926	32.5	353,497
1961	41,691	8.5	46,597	9.5	55,317	11.2	104,162	21.3	489,511
1971	52,812	7.7	83,781	12.2	90,376	13.2	88,374	12.9	687,042

* Total number of categories 13, including in addition to those above : Sales; Service and recreation; Transport and Communication; Loggers and Related Workers; Fishermen, Trappers & Hunters; Miners, Quarrymen, & Related Workers; Craftsmen and Production Process and Related Workers; Labourers; and Others.

Primary sector occupations have declined, as those in the service sector (community, business and professional services) have increased (see Table 2.3). However, the relative size of the other sectors associated with the new middle class has not shifted markedly. The finance /insurance/real estate sector increased slightly from 1961 to 1971 (3.0% to 3.7%), and the public administration sector declined slightly as a proportion of the total over the decade (7.9% to 7.7%). The data do not support the proposition that the state middle class has grown significantly in Alberta.

However, information about specific occupational categories within these sectors is more revealing (see Table 2.4). Managerial occupations increased from 1931 to 1951, but have since remained relatively stable as a proportion of the total. Professional and technical occupations have increased steadily since 1951, and by 1971 were over 12% of the total. Clerical occupations, usually associated with service to managerial or professional/technical occupations, have increased along with the latter occupations, to 13% of the total in 1971.

This supports Richards and Pratt's contention that the 1960's was a period of shifting class structure. The rural and farm-based petite-bourgoisie that had supported Social Credit declined absolutely, and as a proportion of the total population. The service sector expanded in the 1960's, and there was some increase in the

professional/technical and associated clerical occupations. The growth period of the Progressive Conservative party coincided with that of the provincial welfare state.

The Social Credit party's experience of political competition resulting from this shift is analyzed in chapter III, to find out if welfare reforms were a response to electoral competition. Other linkage mechanisms between Alberta's changing class structure and Social Credit policy are also explored. Chapter V, for example, focusses on pressure group activity, often led by the urban middle class. Chapter V reviews the attempts by municipal government, including those of the major urban areas, to influence provincial welfare policy.

C. Political Culture and the Welfare State

The information presented below begins with the cultural correlates of political vlues (ethnic group, immigration, religion etc.) and then outlines present knowledge of the political values of Albertans, particularly as those values relate to the growth of the welfare state.

The study of Alberta's political culture presents problems because most of the studies prior to the 1970's included Alberta as part of "The Prairies". Because of differences between the prairie provinces, the utility of gross data for the Prairies for the study of a single province is questionable. However, some argue that as the prairie provinces have a common history in the Canadian hinterland, they are more alike than dissimilar in political culture[73]. By the 1960's, however, both Alberta and Saskatchewan would have had sufficient experience of right-of-centre and left-of-centre governments respectively to have become distinctive both from one another and from Manitoba. Therefore, an attempt has been made to discover Alberta material, particularly for the 1960 - 70 period.

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[73] Johnson and Naylor share a perception of the lack of distinctiveness of political culture in the two provinces (R. T. Naylor, "The Ideological Foundations of Social Democracy and Social Credit", G. Teeple, (ed.),*Capitalism and the National Question in Canada*, (University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 251 - 66. M. Johnson, "The Failure of the C. C. F. in Alberta: An Accident of History", C. Caldarola, (*Ibid.*, pp. 87 - 107.) However, unlike Naylor, Johnson does not extend this assertion of homogeneity to the C. C. F. and Social Credit parties. He suggests instead that the success of the two contrasting parties in the two adjacent provinces was an accident of history.

Immigration

In 1931 Alberta was still a society with many immigrants. In the census of 1911 38% of those living in Alberta had been born outside Canada, and even by the 1930's the percentage of foreign-born remained about 27%[74]. This heavy incidence of foreign-born was the result of large scale immigration in the 1901 - 11 decade[75] when Sir Clifford Sifton's policies settled the West and tripled the number of foreign-born living on the Prairies.

These newcomers to Alberta came almost equally from southeastern and central Europe and from the United States, with a smaller proportion from northwestern Europe. The proportion of American immigrants to Alberta was greater than in the other Canadian provinces[76]. The strength of American immigration during this period has been described by some as responsible for the populist values amongst Albertans - values with which the Social Credit movement was seen to be consonant. This suggestion is supported in Anderson's findings that the Social Credit party included more American born than the distribution within the general population[77]. The impact of immigration on political culture has also been identified by Elkins, who indicates that immigrants, particularly those arriving before 1946, were lower in efficacy than the general population[78].

This American and European immigration has left Alberta with a political culture distinct from that in Eastern Canada. The Hartzian fragment thesis accounts for Quebec political culture as a feudal fragment, and Ontario as a liberal fragment with a tory touch[79]. In Alberta the liberal fragment is purer, because of the relative strength of American immigration.

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[74] W. B. Hurd, *Ethnic Origin and Nativity of the Canadian People*, (Queen's Printer, 1941), p. 197.
[75] W. E. Kalbach, *The Impact of Immigration on Canada's Population*, (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1970), p. 73.
[76] Although still only around 8% of Alberta residents in 1941. Hurd, *Ibid.*, p. 9.
[77] O. Anderson, "The Alberta Social Credit Party", Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Alberta, 1972.
[78] D. J. Elkins, "The Horizontal Mosaic", D. J. Elkins and R. Simeon, (eds.), *Small Worlds*, (Methuen, 1980), pp. 106 - 130.
[79] L. Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies*, (Harcourt Brace and World, 1964); G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism", *C. J. E. P. S.*, XXXII, No. 2, (1966), pp. 78 - 96.

Ethnic Background[80]

By 1931 Alberta was about 50% of British origin, with a slight increase beyond this by 1941[81]. Franco-Albertans remained around 6% of the population, with most of the remainder classified as "other European"[82]. The proportion of Anglo-Albertans has declined slightly since 1931[83].

Table 2.5: Population of Alberta According to Ethnic Groups, 1971

Ethnic Group	Number	Percent
British	761,665	46.8
French	94,665	5.8
German	231,005	14.2
Dutch	58,570	3.6
Polish	44,325	2.7
Scandinavian	98,425	6.0
Ukranian	135,520	8.3
Native	44,545	2.7
Other	159,165	9.8
Total	1,627,875	99.9

Mother Tongue

Although many Albertans are not "British" according to their ethnic background, by 1976 most reported English as their mother tongue (80.7%)[84]. Only small minorities still spoke French (2.4%), German (4.3%), Ukrainian (3.5%) or other languages as their mother tongue. By the 1960's, therefore, the relative isolation of ethnic minorities would have broken down. In the 1930's the Social Credit party had developed working groups within these self-contained communities[85], and the Social Credit "basic dividend" had evidently

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[80] Those of American origin are not treated as a distinct ethnic group.
[81] Hurd, *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[82] Hurd, *Ibid.*, p. 194.
[83] 46.8% in 1971, Caldarola, *Ibid.*, p. 389.
[84] Caldarola, *Ibid.*, p. 390.
[85] J. A. Irving, *The Social Credit Movement in Alberta*, (University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 282.

appealed to them[86]. By the 1960's most would have had access to the English language media, and been less dependent upon ethnic organizations for political education.

Religion

Although there has been a movement towards homogeneity of language in Alberta, there is still considerable religious diversity. The largest denominations (Roman Catholic and United) together account for just over half the population. Another nine denominations each served between 5% and 10% of the population, with a number of other smaller sects[87]. These denominations include many fundamental sects (Pentecostal, Christian Reformed) to which Aberhart's teachings had appealed in the early days of Social Credit in Alberta[88].

Political Culture in Alberta

The result of these immigration patterns was a political culture that some have called "populist"[89], – a political culture that is associated with a frontier society, with the need for self–sufficiency and self–government, and with resentment of political and/or economic power based outside the community. When this concept of populism is applied to Alberta a specific range of political culture variables emerge. Gibbins describes Alberta's political culture as follows:

> A strong belief in the spirit if not necessarily the practice of free enterprise, a concomitant belief in the desirability if not the actuality of small fiscally conservative governments, a tolerance if not affection for one party government, and an intense commitment to provincial control of energy resources are all readily acknowledged components of the Alberta political culture. However, overriding all of these in providing a distinctive cast to the Alberta political culture stands western alienation[90].

When "cultural" attributes that can be identified only from the intermediary or dependent variables are excluded from this description, the aspects of Alberta political culture that can be treated as macro–level independent variables are:

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[86] Irving, *Ibid.*, p. 250.
[87] (Caldarola, *Ibid.*, p. 391).
[88] (Irving, *Ibid.*, pp. 259 – 263.)
[89] P. R. Sinclair, "Class Structure and Populist Potest: The Case of Western Canada", in C. Caldarola, *Ibid.*, pp. 73 – 86.
[90] R. Gibbins, "Western Alienation and Alberta Political Culture," C. Caldarola, *Ibid.*, p. 143.

1. Belief in the Free Enterprise System
2. Anti-Statism
3. Hostility to External Sources of Power (i.e., Western Alienation)[91].

1. Belief in the Free Enterprise System

Gibbins phrases this as "belief in the spirit, if not the practice of free enterprise". His study of political conservatism in the province supports his contention that Albertans continue to support free enterprise. Only one third of his Alberta respondents could agree that "the free enterprise system in Canada is obsolete"[92].

2. Anti-Statism

The preference among Albertans for small government was phrased by Gibbins as "belief in the desirability, if not the actuality, of small fiscally conservative governments." His own study confirms the strength of these values among Albertans. The level of agreement with statements such as "Governments in Canada are making the taxpayer pay for too many unnecessary services" or "able-bodied men who apply for welfare should be made to work for it" tends to confirm the anti-statism among Albertans.

However, fewer Albertans could agree that Canadian governments were too involved in the lives of Albertans, and nearly 75% agreed that governments should guarantee adequate food, clothing, housing and health care for Canadians[93]. Most Albertans believed the government should be involved in automobile insurance, mental health programs, low-cost housing, and limiting the incomes of doctors. In Alberta as a whole, therefore, there is still evidence of support for government action in a number of areas.

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[91] The theme of "toleration of one party government" identified by Gibbins as an attribute of Alberta political culture is excluded from this study, because the persistent serial monogamy characteristic of Alberta electoral behaviour is in this study a linkage rather than macro-level independent variable. Also, the presentation of "western alienation" as a cultural variable distinct from the hostility to external sources of power usually associated with populism seems mistaken. Therefore, in this discussion western alienation and hostility to external power sources are treated as aspects of the same cultural variable.

[92] Gibbins, *Ibid.*, p. 159.

[93] J. K. Masson and P. Blaikie, "Labour Politics in Alberta", C. Caldarola, *Ibid.*, pp. 271 - 283. The opinions of union members, as reported by masson and Blaikie, differ little from those of the general population.

The changing Alberta class structure described above suggests that a new class of middle managers is influential in Alberta politics. A study of the political values of this group suggests that their anti-statist values are not strong. There is a moderate level of support for government intervention in the private sector, and more than half the sample evidenced "high" support for the welfare state[94]. Therefore, in Alberta views favouring increased government involvement coexist with anti-statist values related to the perceived need to reduce the power of government over the lives of individuals.

3. Hostility to External Sources of Power

A characteristic supposedly associated with Social Credit success in 1935, and with persistent single party dominance in Alberta, has been hostility to public and private power based in Eastern Canada. Whether this cultural attribute is based in economic dependency, or has other cultural and psychological roots, can be debated. The sentiments, however, are strong, and are described as "western alienation"[95].

Actual measurement of the attitudes of Albertans to central Canada (i. e., measurements of "western alienation") were not taken in the period under study here, in the early 1960's. However, a study by David Elton conducted in the late sixties does assess attitudes of Albertans to federal and provincial governments. Albertans were found to have different perceptions of federal and provincial governments. They tended to overrate federal involvement, and underrate the extent of joint federal/provincial activity. Albertans cared about federal/provincial relations, even in this period prior to the energy crisis of the early seventies, but were not in favour of "balkanization". Over two-thirds of Albertans wanted inflation, banking, pensions and foreign affairs to remain a federal responsibility[96]. However, about 60% already felt the federal government was more concerned with

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[94] J. L. Sweeney and R. E. Schneck, "Political Attitudes of Middle Business Managers in Alberta", Caldarola, *Ibid.*, pp. 256 - 270.

[95] Works on economic and other origins of western alienation have been published by D. E. Smith, "Western Politics and National Unity", in D. Bercuson, (ed.)*Canada and the Burden of Unity*, (Macmillan, 1977), pp. 142 - 168; by K. Norrie, "Some Comments on Economic Alienation", Caldarola, *Ibid.*, pp. 131 - 142; and R. Gibbins, *Prairie Politics and Society: Regionalism in Decline*, (Butterworth, 1980).

[96] D. Elton, "Electoral Perception of Federalism: A Descriptive Analysis of the Alberta Electorate", D. Elton, (ed.), *One Prairie Province*, (University of Lethbridge, 1970), pp. 133 - 152.

eastern rather than western Canada.

At this time, also, a sense of provincial identity was already overriding federal values. On a composite national identity index based on 1968 data Elkins found that only 22% of Albertans had a high sense of national identity, placing Alberta last but one in federal orientation, with only Quebec being more provincially oriented[97]. Evidently, during this period before the energy crisis, and before the election of the Parti Québecois focussed federal attention more exclusively on Quebec, Albertans aleady had some feeling of alienation from the federal government.

D. Macro-Processes in Alberta

The state of Alberta in the sixties has been reviewed. Changes in the province included those found by policy analysts to be associated with growth of the welfare state. Increased incomes and economic growth coincided with less consistent industrialization, in a province with a young but aging population. Changes in economic structure were similar to those often associated with shifting patterns of political support, with the potential that created for competition to the governing party and for policy shifts in response to that competition. Existing information about Alberta's political culture during the period shows some ambivalence about the growth of provincial state activity, a popular belief that coexisted with a government ideology that condemned big government and the welfare state.

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[97] D. J. Elkins, "A Sense of Place", D. J. Elkins and R. Simeon, (eds.), *Small Worlds*, (Methuen, 1980), pp. 1 – 30.

III. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR COMPETITION

The political party is the first link between the social and economic change and policy making to be studied here. This link is usually described as consisting of interest articulation and aggregation, involving the gathering of the concerns of the electorate, organizing them, and channelling them through to policy makers. However, as this function is now shared with the media, with pressure groups and with the civil service, it is now diluted[91].

While the party's role in interest articulation and aggregation is no longer as significant to the policy process, this chapter suggests that the party is still an important link between society and the policy process. Both the Social Credit Party of Alberta, and its Progressive Conservative successor, came to power because of shifts in Alberta's economic conditions. Both have ideologies that reflect the interests of the class that formed or forms the core of party support. These ideologies, in turn, affected the policies and programs promoted by these two parties when in government. Social Credit ideology also affected the response of Social Credit to political competition, making the party over-sensitive to competition from the left, but more vulnerable to competition from the right.

The ways in which the political party operates as a link can be analyzed by treating the party first as a dependent variable, then as an independent variable, and finally as one of the links in the causal chain of the policy process. An initial section on party as *dependent* variable describes how the Social Credit party arose from the political economy of Alberta in the 1930's, with an ideology that met the need of small scale entrepreneurs for a panacea for their economic problems. In spite of increasing internal diversity, opposition to Social Credit was not strong (with the exception of Aberhart's election of 1940) until the mid-sixties. The economic relation between hinterland Alberta and central Canada led Albertans to support a provincial government that could represent their interests without internal opposition[92]. Then in the sixties the rural/urban balance shifted, to the disadvantage of the rural-based Social Credit party. Thus, party as a dependent variable is presented as the product of economic and class variables, with

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[91] F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, *Canadian Political Parties*, (Prentice Hall, 1975), pp. 149 - 166.
[92] T. Levesque and K. Norrie, "Overwhelming Majorities in the Alberta Legislature", *C. J. P. S.*, XII, No. 3, (1979), pp. 451 - 470.

party ideology reflecting the interests of the class in which the party is based.

In explaining public policy, party becomes an *independent* variable. Three mechanisms through which party influences public policy are discussed here, one direct, and two indirect. The first occurs directly through the party, with members and leaders making choices consistent with their beliefs about society and government. The second occurs when the government party responds to a perceived electoral threat. In the case of Social Credit, byelection results were interpreted as a threat from the left, to which the government was already over-sensitive. The government responded by adopting some welfare of "socialist" programs, leaving both the party and the electorate confused. The void to the right of Social Credit created by this shift was filled by the Progressive Conservatives in 1971. Part of the success of this second party of the right was based in the third mechanism through which party acts as an independent variable. The virulent anti-socialist rhetoric of Social Credit has influenced mass political culture in the province, so that many Albertans believed that socialism threatened to destroy their freedom.

The second section of this chapter relies primarily on the degree of correspondence between Social Credit principles and government policies. However, this correspondence, where identifiable, is no proof of causality, but merely an example of conjunction. To support the suggested central role of the party in the policy process, the causal chain for one policy event is unravelled. In the third section of the chapter meetings and discussions leading to the welfare reforms of 1966 are outlined, so that party influences in that causal chain may be identified. Party ideology will be shown to have resulted in the redesign of one reform proposal, and the rejection (or postponement) of another.

A. The Political Party as Dependent Variable

Political parties are usually expected to reflect the cleavages of the society in which they are based, including class cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan suggest that politically relevant cleavages may have both functional and regional dimensions, and may be based in religious divisions, or in divisions between landed elites and urban industrialists. They

describe the more recent cleavage between owners and workers as muted by other historical cleavages, but suggest that pluralist traditions encourage its political relevance [100]. Studies of the class origins of parties have generally focûssed on voting patterns of the industrial working class. Examples include Alford's comparison of the Anglo-American democracies, in which he found that in all societies but Canada working class status was associated with voting preference[101]. Epstein suggests that class voting by manual workers increases with urbanization and with the size of the manual class, and is reduced by the presence of cross-cutting non-class cleavages in the society (such as language, religion, ethnic group)[102]. In Canada, with religion, ethnicity and region all politically salient[103], and a small working class due to the economic structure, a working class party has not been as successful. As Engelmann comments:

> Everywhere else in the democratic world, except in the United States, industrial labour - some would say the working class - has launched important parties. In Canada this effort has been restricted to the C. C. F. /N. D. P., which has never drawn overwhelming labour support; to the only worker-based Social Credit party in Canada, the one in Quebec; and to the perennial but infinitesimal Communist Party[104].

Although working class parties have not been strong in Canada, class-based parties have developed with agricultural roots. Social Credit in Alberta[105], the Progressive movement[106] and the C. C. F. in Saskatchewan [107] all share these class origins. These parties rose to power in conditions of social and economic strain that predisposed class members to a new ideology. Social strain, vested interests with prospective gain and bitterness about

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[100] S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments", S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, (Free Press, 1967), pp. 1 - 64.
[101] R. A. Alford, *Party and Society in Anglo-American Democracies*, (Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 101 - 102.
[102] L. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, (Praeger, 1967), pp. 87 - 93.
[103] D. V. Smiley, *Canada in Question*, (2nd. ed.),(McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976), pp. 189 - 197.
[104] F. C. Engelmann, "Canadian Political Parties and Elections", J. H. Redekop, (ed.), *Approaches to Canadian Politics*, (Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 208 - 227.
[105] C. B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta*, (University of Toronto Press, 1962).
[106] W. L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada*, (University of Toronto Press, 1950).
[107] R. T. Naylor and G. Teeple, "The Ideological Foundations of Social Democracy and Social Credit", G. Teeple, (ed.), *Capitalism and the National Question in Canada*, (University of Toronto Press, 1972).

social change are all cited by Johnson as the roots of ideology[108].

To a population faced with social and economic strain, with something to gain or something to lose, ideology can be the catalyst for collective action, offering simplified explanations and an apparent level of truth that demands action[109]. In Alberta during the Great Depression of the 1930's, these three sources of strain co-existed. The economic hardship of the Depression produced "social strain"; the small land holding farmers were the "vested interests", afraid of losing their farms when they could not meet mortgage payments; and third, an incredible decline in prosperity produced bitterness to the governments that had fostered western settlement. The Social Credit system, endowed with "truth" by Aberhart's preacher style, offered a solution[110].

Other political parties have also risen under similar conditions of social strain, with a class basis and an ideology that met the needs of that class. The Creditistes arose in Quebec in similar strained conditions[111]. La Palombara and Weiner claim that most western political parties extant today have similar origins as direct challenges to prevailing ideologies[112].

Bell, while accepting this account of the origins of ideologically based political parties (particularly in the 19th century), points out that today broadly based parties have largely lost their ideologies[113]. He points to a broad consensus on major issues, such as acceptance of the welfare state, the desirability of decentralized power and of a mixed economy. There is, according to Bell, a decline in simple rationalistic beliefs[114]. Kirchheimer verifies this for the major parties of Europe, giving as examples the German and Austrian social democratic parties[115]. Canada's Liberal and Progressive Conservative

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[108] Johnson also mentions limited perspective due to social position and the persistence of outmoded traditions of thought, but these are value-laden terms not amenable to empirical analysis. H. M. Johnson, "Ideology and the Social System", D. L. Sills, (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Social Science*, (Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), VII, p.79.
[109] D. Bell, *The End of Ideology*, (Glencoe, 1964), p. 372.
[110] C. B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta*, (University of Toronto Press, 1953), p. 148.
[111] M. Pinard, *The Rise and Fall of a Third Party*, (Prentice Hall, 1971), p. 118.
[112] J. La Palombara, and M. Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties", Palombara and Weiner, (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*, (Princeton, 1966), p. 12.
[113] Hence Johnson's suggestion of "outmoded traditions" and "limited perspectives" as sources of ideology.
[114] Bell, *Ibid.*, p. 373.
[115] O. Kirchheimer, " The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems", *Political Parties and Political Development*, ibid., p. 187.

parties have also been described as not strongly influenced by particular ideologies[116]. The error in all these works appears to be the interpretation of ideological homogeneity or consensus as an absence of ideology[117].

However, while some Canadian political scientists have difficulty identifying the ideological character of Canadian liberalism, toryism or even socialism[118], the ideology of Social Credit is distinct from the more statist values of the major Canadian political parties. A number of ideological themes are present in Social Credit dogma and rhetoric. While Social Credit's beliefs included a faith in the free enterprise system typical of a right-of-centre party, the party's concern for monetary reform and its religious roots were unique. While several of these themes formed part of the panacea offered by Social Credit to the troubled Alberta farmers, other themes were introduced because of the background of Social Credit leaders.

The Ideology of Social Credit in Alberta

The success of the Social Credit League under William Aberhart in 1935 was a reaction to the Great Depression, to corruption in the U. F. A., and to a sense in Alberta of exploitation by eastern interests. These strains, as indicated above were typical of those that tend to give rise to such protest parties as Social Credit. However, as social and economic conditions changed in Alberta, Social Credit teachings no longer corresponded with the policies of the Social Credit government.

Four major elements in the ideology of Aberhart and his followers have significance for social policy. The primary plank in the Social Credit platform was monetary reform[119]. Second was a belief in the sanctity of the individual and of the free enterprise economy. Thirdly, and crucial for understanding Social Credit welfare programs, the party adhered strongly to the protestant work ethic; and fourth (but not

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[116] D. V. Smiley, *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.
[117] J. La Palombara, "Decline of Ideology: a Dissent and an Interpretation", A. P. S. R., LX, No. 1, (1966), pp. 5 - 18, suggests that those pointing to the end of ideology have a narrow perjorative concept of the word ideology, and in some cases present as scientifically established arguments that are ideologically based.
[118] Both Porter and Horowitz, for example, have decried the absence of "creative" class-based and ideologically structured politics in Canada. G. Horowitz, "Towards a Democratic Class Struggle", *Journal of Canadian Studies*, I, No. 4, (1966), pp. 3 - 12. J. Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, (University of Toronto Press, 1965).
[119] This interpretation of Social Credit ideology is based in an analysis of the published speeches of party members, in the legislature and in election campaign pamphlets.

least) was a sincere belief shared by all Social Crediters in Christian charity, with all the concern that implies for the welfare of fellow human beings.

1.— Monetary Reform

The core of the Social Credit program was monetary reform as advocated by Major Douglas. These aspects of Social Credit ideology appealed to the class of small entrepreneurs in Alberta, for they appeared an instant solution to problems of debt. Alberta during 1930's consisted of a dominant class of petit-bourgeois farmers (i.e. small scale property owners) producing for the world market and indebted to financial interests in Eastern Canada[120]. Douglas represented eastern Canadian economic interests as the scapegoat for economic depression in western Canada. He suggested that extensive credit and a social dividend would generate the spending power necessary to overcome the Depression, without threatening private ownership.

Aberhart took Douglas' theories on monetary reform, bending some of them, and offered them to the Alberta electorate as a panacea for their economic problems. The blame for their current difficulties, Aberhart claimed, was with those who held the mortgages on their farms. Speaking on the private debts in Alberta, he labelled those who carried those debts as villains.

> I want you to note down that these powerful vultures swoop down on the helpless debtor and disposses (sic) him of everything he had when conditions prevent him from complying with the terms of his mortgage or debenture. Such a system is not only vicious, it is diabolical, essentially unfair and thoroughly un-Christian[121].

The Social Credit monetary system was presented as the antithesis of this "diabolical" system of credit. The Social Credit alternative, claimed Aberhart, was Christian, democratic, and would free people from punishing debts. The Alberta electorate responded in 1935 by electing Aberhart's Social Crediters with an overwhelming majority. But, the new Alberta government was to have difficulty in establishing social credit.

Initially the federal government did not interfere with Social Credit

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[120] Macpherson, *Ibid.*, pp. 148. However, as was shown in chapter 3, diversity was greater than implied by Macpherson.
[121] H. E. Nichols, "Alberta's Fight for Freedom", (Alberta Social Credit League, undated), p.36.

legislation, commenting that the Alberta government had the mandate[122]. Also, the new Social Credit government moved slowly at first, and there was little protest. But moderate and extreme factions within Social Credit ranks began to dispute the pace of reform, and by 1937 the moderates were in decline. New legislation was introduced to regulate the credit practices of the banks, and produced tremendous opposition in the financial community. The banks and trading interests appealed to the federal government, which disallowed the legislation within ten days of its passage. The federal power to disallow provincial legislation had been thought obsolete, and the Alberta government was stunned. Open conflict continued between the two governments for five years, as Social Credit legislation was either disallowed by the federal government, or reserved amd referred to the courts to be struck down as outside provincial jurisdiction[123].

The monetary reforms basic to Social Credit were not implemented, but were reflected in other government policy. The scapegoat character of Social Credit's economic analysis, for example, continued to be reflected in other areas of Alberta's public policy. Eastern Canadian exploitation of the West attracted votes in Alberta, whether the issues involved were monetary reform (or lack of it), freight

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[122] J. R. Mallory, *Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada*, (University of Toronto Press, 1954), pp. 71 - 73.

[123] Mallory describes this struggle as a symptom of a deeper problem. The need for government involvement in the economy had become more apparent since the first world war, and yet had not been conceived by those creating the British North America Act. During the first world war, the federal government first tried to manage the Canadian economy, and war-time marketing legislation had been ruled "intra vires" for the federal government. The war time emergency was recognised by the courts as bringing matters normally within provincial jurisdiction (within the enumerated heads of section 92 of the B.N.A. Act) under federal power to govern for the Peace Order and Good Government of Canada. In the 1930's the federal government again introduced controversial legislation, in a "New Deal" intended to deal with the Depression. When King succeeded Bennett as prime minister, he referred this legislation to the courts, which ruled it "ultra-vires" for the federal government. The federal government was thereby paralyzed in dealing with the Depression, and the provincial government lacked the resources and the powers to deal with national economic problems. Mallory attributes this impasse to the general ambivalence to increased state activity, and to exploitation of this ambivalence by those who "stood to gain more by the old than by the new" (*Ibid.*, p.56). Alberta, as a province attempting to "modify the rules by shifting the balance of power in the community" was resisted by an "inanimate body of principles" (i.e. the accumulated precedents of the courts) exploited by groups who stood to gain from the status quo (*Ibid.*, pp.122).

rates, or resource taxation[124].

The perception of montary reform as the solution to problems of poverty also had implications for the development of social policy in Alberta. To begin with, monetary reform was expected to solve economic problems, so that poverty and unemployment would disappear. Social welfare programs were perceived as residual and temporary, not as an essential foundation of a healthy industrial society. This emphasis on monetary reform also produced an emphasis on programs of financial assistance, while other social services remained stunted.

2. The Individual and Free Enterprise

The political economy which gave rise to Social Credit in Alberta was associated in Saskatchewan with the rise to power of a social democratic party. Social Credit spoke of the dangers of socialism, and its threats to individual freedoms and the free enterprise system. Social Credit equated individualism and free enterprise with democracy, freedom, and the teachings of Christ. Social credit was considered to be the antithesis of socialism, collectivism, atheism and the welfare state.

Douglas believed the free development of the individual to be the highest social good. He favoured free enterprise, both philosophically and on the grounds of efficiency. He rejected socialist centralization of economic and political power[125]. Aberhart found Douglas' theories useful, and applied them in his struggle with the C. C. F. (Cooperative Commonwealth Federation) in Alberta[126].

This anti-state anti-socialist element continued to dominate Social Credit's public philosophy throughout the 1940's and 1950's. E. C. Manning, following Aberhart as leader in 1943, presented Social Credit in his first campaign as a "solid, sensible, free enterprise party threatened from the left by the C. C. F."[127]. He equated the C. C. F. with bureaucracy and regimentation, and Social Credit with

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[124] These grievances had deep roots in Western Canada. As Paul Sharp documents in *The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada* protests about transportation to the West had begun in the 1890's, and the scapegoating of eastern credit and banking interests predates the first world war. Protest against tariff walls that the National Policy had erected led to the Western Farmers "siege of Ottawa" in 1910 (University of Minnesota Press, 1949).
[125] C. H. Douglas, *Social Credit*, (Byre and Spottiswoode, 1933), pp. 108 – 115; *Major Douglas Speaks*, (Douglas Social Credit Association, 1933), pp. 21 – 28; *Credit Power and Democracy*, (Cecil Palmer, 1920), p. 6.
[126] S. M. Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism*, (University of Toronto Press, 1950), pp. 154.
[127] J. Barr, *The Dynasty*, (McClelland and Stewart, 1974), pp. 132.

social and economic achievement. Nearly twenty years later, in 1961, he was still warning against creeping collectivism, against step by step progress into socialism:

> The extent to which individual freedom and responsibility is impaired by each of these steps is scarcely noticeable, and if attention is ever called to it, it's always minimized. What we need to recognize is this, when you add up the aggregate loss of individual freedom and independence that even our nation of Canada has sustained since the turn of the century by these insidious steps, towards this collectivist philosophy of life, then you become aware that the trouble is because it has been whittled away a little bit at a time[128].

Admittedly, these words were addressed to businessmen, and Manning may have told them what he thought they wished to hear, but in 1961 he evidently still believed that the welfare state was not the ideal state, and not the goal of his party. In 1961 he would still have been influenced by the cold war. His own thinking was to change over the next few years, but many of his followers retained the virulently anti-collectivist and anti-social welfare stance characteristic of earlier Social Credit. This led an Edmonton journalist to write:

> To say this government is anti-socialistic is an understatement. Some cabinet ministers and back benchers see a Red Plot behind every social welfare move[129].

Legislative speeches in the 1960's included many complaints of creeping socialism, of welfare dependency and abuse, and the growth of government spending on social programs[130]. Charles Johnston, for example, reassured the legislature that Alberta's medical insurance program was not "socialistic"[131]. Minister of telephones, Ray Reierson explained government ownership of telephones as an accident of historical necessity, not an instance of socialism[132]. A. J. Hooke, who held several ministries in Manning's government, was horrified when he took over the Department of Welfare in 1967 that its "socialistic" programs had all the appearance of a welfare state:

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[128] E. C. Manning, "The Problem of Survival", Address, 1961.
[129] E. Keene, "Report from Edmonton", *Canadian Business*, XXXVIII, No. 9, (1965), pp. 9 - 12.
[130] Alberta Legislature Speeches, 1965: Roy Ells, (Grouard), Mar 2nd, pp. 85 & Mar 12th., pp.223.
[131] Alberta Legislature Speeches, C. E. Johnston, (Calgary Bowness), Feb 25th., 1965, pp. 150.
[132] Alberta Legislature Speeches, Feb 26th, 1965.

> I could not imagine how a department of government could be operating in a way so dramatically opposed to the philosophy we as social creditors so loudly proclaimed [133].

Hooke's complaints focussed on expenditure levels and service expansion, both of which encouraged dependency on the state, and discouraged self-reliance.

Robert Thompson, then federal Social Credit leader, epitomized this anti-collectivist, anti-socialist and anti-welfare-state position. He described the welfare state as "the materialistic, atheistic plan of life which makes all men dependent upon existing government"[134]. He warned that "all too soon we will all be bond slaves of welfare state. It is inevitable; we will have communism and socialism rather than liberty" [135].

The examples typified Social Credit rhetoric in the fifties and early sixties. Socialism and the welfare state were the antithesis of Social Credit, and the growth of government was deplored. As A. J. Hooke realized when he took over as Minister of Welfare, though, the gap between rhetoric and reality was increasing.

3. Fundamentalist Christianity & the Protestant Work Ethic

Alberta's Social Credit movement had the attributes of a religious movement. Aberhart developed his following in radio sermons. Ernest Manning had been Aberhart's assistant at the Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute. Both fundamentalist religious teachings and Social Credit philosophy have an antithetical character[136]. Those who are "saved", according to the fundamentalist doctrine, will gain everlasting life, and the rest are damned to suffer eternally in Hell. There is no middle road[137]. This antithetical character added venom to Social Credit treatment of "socialist" doctrine and programs.

Aberhart's protestantism distinguished his Social Credit doctrine from that of Douglas. Aberhart's belief in the work ethic affected the social welfare philosophy of the Social Credit government, retarding the development of the welfare state. Douglas, on the other hand, believed that under a truly Social Credit system the problem of unemployment would disappear, and the support system of

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[133] A. J. Hooke , "*30 + 5 ----I Know I was There*, (Co-op Press, 1967).
[134] R. N. Thompson, *Canadians.....It's Time You Knew*, (Aavangen Press, 1961), pp. 2.
[135] Thompson, *Ibid.*, p.3.
[136] J. A. Irving, *The Social Credit Movement in Alberta*, (University of Toronto Press, 1950), pp. 338.
[137] D. R. Elliott, "Antithetical Elements in William Aberhart's Theology and Political Ideology", *Canadian Historical Review*, LIX, (1978), pp. 38 - 58.

the welfare state would be unnecessary.

> You will understand that the physical facts of production are such that, operated in this way, only a small proportion of the world's population, working short hours, could find employment directly in the industrial process – a condition of affairs which is cumulative and reduces to an anachronism the complaint of the early Victorian socialist against the idle rich, and to an absurdity the superindustralist cry for greater production at the cost of harder work[138].

With social dividends available to everyone, whether or not there was employment, the negative and demoralizing aspects of relief would be replaced with payments without charity connotations. Douglas had some trouble in selling this concept:

> I have heard innumerable cases of resentment against the grant of what is so improperly called "the dole", usually accompanied by remarks on the demoralizing effect of not working. If you inquire, as mildly as possible, of such people, if by chance they receive any dividends which enable them to exist without working, you will, of course, be very unpopular, and you will be told that that is different, and if you suggest that a generalization of the dividend system if it could be obtained (and it can) would be desirable, you will be called "socialistic"; a parliamentary epithet for "dangerous"..the enforced leisure enjoyed by those who participate in it (the dole) is rendered practically valueless by the regulations which surround it[139].

In the Social Credit platform of 1935 the League bowed in the direction of Douglas' ideas:

> The problem of unemployment
> (1)Social Credit at once removes the demoralizing effect of unemployment by the issuance of monthly dividends based on the cultural heritage of citizenship [140].

The philosophy of Douglas continued to be heard. Miss Cornelia Wood (Stony Plain), for example, said 1965 that with the coming of Social Credit:

> The curse of unemployment can become a blessing of secure leisure. The unqualified right to an income would replace all welfare measures, and would change unemployment insurance to a shareholder's dividend and make leisure profitable to mankind[141].

National Social Credit leader Robert Thompson also believed that unemployment would not be a problem under Social Credit. When employment is the sole source of income, he commented, it is a "national tragedy". Under Social Credit, he claimed, everyone would have a national dividend, hours of work would

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[138] C. H. Douglas, *The Douglas Manual*, P. Mairet, (ed.), (Dent, 1934), p.106.
[139] C. H. Douglas, *Ibid.*, p.99–100.
[140] W. Aberhart, "Social Credit Platform 1935", Irving, *Op. Cit.*, Appendix I, p. 349.
[141] C. R. Wood, "Alberta Legislature Speeches", Feb 26th, 1965, p. 184.

decrease and the problem of unemployment would disappear[142]. The followers of Douglas and Thompson, though, were not numerous by the 1960's.

Aberhart disagreed with Douglas, for he believed that pay without work was demoralizing and destructive to man's initiative. Once elected, Aberhart's government proceeded to link the social dividend to work. In 1937, for example, farmers were invited to work out their debts on various road projects, and for three days' work two days' wages were applied to their debts, with one day's wages in credit at the Treasury Branches[143] rather than through a social dividend. Manning, like Aberhart, believed in individual responsibility. Dependency on the state should be discouraged, for it destroyed initiative.

> The government responsibilty should be limited to the extent necessary to bring the benefits of modern progress within the financial reach of all citizens who are willing to assume their rightful individual responsibility and exercise their own initiative and enterprise to attain the maximum measure of these benefits for themselves[144].

Alberta M.L.A.'s echoed their Premier. Fred Colborne, Minister of Municipal Affairs, for example, justified the province's community development program introduced in 1964 on the basis of jobs created[145]. Others welcomed one element of the welfare reforms of 1966, the Preventive Social Services program, because it would make people self supporting[146]. Several M.L.A.'s emphasized the necessity of ensuring that welfare applicants seek work[147]. This theme of work for relief also recurred in Social Credit League Convention Reports, though Minister of Welfare, L. C. Halmrast, consistently voiced his opposition to such programs. Therefore, expansions to welfare programs had to be defended to a party in which the protestant work ethic was strongly entrenched.

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[142] R. N. Thompson, *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[143] H. E. Nichols, "Alberta's Fight for Freedom", (Alberta Social Credit League, 1963), part 5, p. 89.
[144] E. C. Manning, "The Fork in the Road", an address to the Canadian Club, Dec 2nd, 1963, *Telefacts*, (Alberta Social Credit League, 1963).
[145] F. C. Colborne, "Alberta Legislature Speeches", Feb 25th, 1965, & "Pilot Program will assist Indian Metis", *Edmonton Journal*, Fed 25th, 1964.
[146] Roy Ells, (Social Credit, Grouard), "Alberta Legislature Speeches", Mar 2nd, 1965, p. 85; Mar 12, 1965, p. 223; Edward Benoit, (Social Credit, Okotoks–High River), Feb. 24th, 1965, p. 107; Dr. Gordon Geldart, (Social Credit, Edmonton West), Feb 24th, 1965, p. 113.
[147] James Henderson, (Social Credit, Leduc), "Alberta Legislature Speeches", Mar 8th, 1965, p. 148; Mike Mccagno, (Liberal, Lac La Biche), March 17, 1965.

4. Humanitarian Concern

A fourth element in the social welfare philosophy of Social Credit counterbalanced principles described above. Most Social Crediters shared a humanitarianism based in Christianity. The Social Credit movement had taken root in Alberta in the Great Depression of the 1930's when many men and women lacked basic necessities. Men like Aberhart, Manning and many of their followers believed their Christian duty included charity to those less fortunate. Aberhart's Social Credit Manual of 1935 included "our basic premise":

> It is the duty of the state through its government to organize its economic structure in such a way that no bonafide citizen, man, woman, or child, shall be allowed to suffer for lack of the bare necessities of food, clothing and shelter, in the midst of plenty and abundance[148].

As Christians the Social Credit leaders continued to be moved by individual instances of need. This softened their otherwise austere and punitive approach to public welfare.

The four themes of Social Credit ideology, in summary, reflected both the background of its leaders and the economic orgins of the movement. Monetary reform and an anti-statist preference for free enterprise, offered a panacea for the endebted small farmers who supported the party. The religious values of party leaders contributed a belief in the protestant work ethic, a humanitarian concern for neighbours, and an antithetical character which added venom to anti-socialist rhetoric.

The Changing Class Structure of Alberta and Political Competition

The sector of Alberta society on which Social Credit had been based declined after 1935 (see chapter II). As agriculture became less important, the class-based character of the party would either change in response to the newly dominant urban middle class, (either through expansion of Social Credit's membership base or through policy shifts to attract electoral support) or another party would benefit from this support and expand to compete with Social Credit, eventually inheriting the reigns of government. In Alberta the latter sequence of events took place, with the Progressive Conservatives becoming the "Government Party" in the provincial election of 1971.

Political parties can develop either within or outside the parliamentary system - from coalition of elected representatives with various partisan labels, or in protest from

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[148] L. V. Johnson and O. MacNutt, *Aberhart of Alberta*, (Co-op Press, 1970), p. 204.

groups outside the parliamentary system[149]. The Social Credit Party of Alberta has extraparliamentary origins. The Progressive Conservative party in Alberta is more difficult to classify. It predates provincial status, but by 1921 was in disarray[150]. The party's representation in the legislature remained small until 1940 when its identity was submerged in a number of constituency level Liberal/Conservative coalitions[151]. The party had no M. L. A.'s after the 1948 election or after the 1963 election, with only 1, 2 or 3 M. L. A.'s in the periods between[152]. The Conservatives had never formed a government in Alberta, could only recruit 33 candidates in 1963, and achieved only 13% of the vote and no seats. The party was moribund when Lougheed became leader in 1965, and had had three leaders since 1958:

> Harradance (*the resigning leader*) had left the party with "absolutely nothing". "Absolutely nothing" Lougheed emphasizes, "nothing in terms of finances, nothing in terms of organization – and the party had nothing in terms of history[153].

Part of the attraction of the leadership was "building the party from scratch, without owing anybody anything". Therefore, except for the absence of crisis and strain, the new Conservative Party of Alberta born after Lougheed's accession to the leadership, could also be described as extraparliamentary in origin.

La Palombara and Weiner suggest that the key to the development of political parties is "modernization" – involving improved communication and education and secularization of government programs[154]. Alberta between 1935 and 1971 was "modernizing" in a number of respects. The proportion of first generation Canadians living in Alberta changed from 27% in 1930 to 17% in 1971[155]. Albertans of British origin remained around 50%, but about 80% reported English as their mother tongue. These shifts improved access to the English language media. Transportation and communication also both expanded.

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[149] J. La Palombara and M. Weiner, Op. Cit.
[150] C. Caldarola, *Society and Politics in Alberta*, (Methuen, 1979), p. 374.
[151] C. Caldarola, *Op. Cit.*; in 1940 and 1944.
[152] *Ibid.*, p. 373.
[153] A. Hustak, *Peter Lougheed*, (McClelland and Stewart, 1979), p. 65.
[154] La Palombara and M. Weiner, *Op. Cit.*.
[155] W. B. Hurd, *Ethnic Origin and Nativity of the Canadian People*, (Queen's Printer, 1941), p. 197; Statistics Canada, *Perspective Canada*, (Industry Trade and Commerce, 1974), p. 271.

Education also improved, as more young people remained in high school[156], and education spending increased[157]. Secularization, or the movement away from the provision of services by the churches and towards services offered by the state, was also evident, expanding the new "state middle class". This class supported further expansion of the state sector, rather than the negative state favoured by Social Credit supporters. However, both education and secularization are output variables, the result of government policy. They are measures of the expansion of the welfare state, the dependent variable in this study. They cannot therefore be taken as measures of the social and economic changes that determine the behaviour of the dependent variable.

Therefore the major shifts that resulted in changes in the strength of the Social Credit party's support base were:

1. the shrinking number of agricultural entrepreneurs in Alberta, both absolutely and in relation to the total workforce;
2. the small size of the industrial working class in Alberta relative to the total workforce, which reduced the likelihood of competition from a working class party; and
3. the growth of the state middle class and a new indigenous bourgoisie which both saw the positive state as a mechanism for achieving their own ends. These major shifts, therefoire, were of a kind likely to produce competition from an urban state middle class, and from an indigenous bourgeoisie.

B. Party as an Independent Variable

A political party's ideology can influence public policy directly, through caucus and cabinet choices and preferences that reflect that ideology. The retardation and subsequent expansion of the welfare state in Alberta reflect Social Credit ideology. Perception of opposition threat can also affect policy indirectly as the government tries to retain electoral support. Third, and even less directly, a government party has the opportunity to influence and guide public opinion to weaken opposition.

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[156] *Perspective Canada*, ibid., p. 70.
[157] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Social Credit's Version of the Welfare State

The earlier years of Social Credit's version of the welfare state were outlined in Chapter I. Until 1960 municipalities operated welfare programs, without trained social welfare personnel in any but the two largest cities. After 1960 the province developed more social programs. These included new programs of the Department of Welfare, a community development program for Albertans of Indian ancestry[158], and an ambitious human resources development program[159]. These all still reflected the Social Credit philosophy decribed above, including a concern with money rather than services, with individualism and the free enterprise system, with preservation of the work ethic and with Christian charity.

The community development program of 1964, for example, was intended by politicians to help Indians and Metis find employment[160]. The Preventive Social Services Program of 1966 was also seen by politicians as preventing dependency on public welfare[161]. Even the human resources development program introduced by Manning in 1967 was seen in terms of individual development, independence and autonomy[162]. Other social programs were the result of the charitable responses of conscientious men to human crisis situations. Manning, for example, responded to the pleas of rural health workers who described the problems of mothers giving birth without medical care. In 1943, in his first term as premier, he had introduced maternity care[163].

Other examples of acute human sufferring had also produced attempts at reform. Additional funds for child welfare in 1949 followed the publicity surrounding the Whitton report, and graphic newspaper accounts of problems in the social welfare field. The Bompas tragedy of 1958 also spurred the expansion of social welfare services – initially an information service and later an expansion of the Province's child welfare

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[158] Speech from the Throne, Alberta Legislature Journals, 1964.
[159] E. C. Manning, "A White Paper on Human Resources Development",(Social Credit League, March, 1967).
[160] "Self Help Plan for Indians", *Calgary Herald*, March 21st, 1964.
[161] Alberta Legislature Speeches, 1966; Dr. Gordon Geldart, (Social Credit, Edmonton West), Feb. 24th, p. 113; Edward Benoit, (Social Credit, Okotoks–High River), Feb 24th, p. 107; Roy Ells, (Social Credit, Grouard), March 12th, p. 123; Hon. L. C. Halmrast, in interview, 1977.
[162] E. C. Manning, "The White Paper", *Telefacts*, (Alberta Social Credit League, 1967), p. 6.
[163] Described in interview by Orvis Kennedy, past president of the Social Credit League of Alberta.

branch[164]. The first social worker to be hired by the province joined as head of the child welfare branch at this time.

The deputy minister, Duncan Rogers, also justified the preventive social service program on humanitarian grounds, citing the increased number of children coming into care, with all the attendant human tragedies. But, although Rogers himself considered this to be the strongest selling point for the program[165], the minister, Len Halmrast, preferred to describe the rationale for the programs as related to the prevention of welfare dependency. The individualist work-oriented justification was generally more effective in selling social welfare programs to Social Crediters, unless they could really sympathize with the person in difficulty[166].

The Social Policy Goals of Social Credit

The social policy goals of Social Credit in the 1935-65 period can be classified according to a threefold scheme developed by T. H. Marshall. In some states policy goals focus on the "elimination of intolerable poverty", but may move towards "maximization of welfare" or perhaps even to "pursuit of equality"[167]. There is likely to be an interweaving of these goals, but at any one time, according to Marshall, one is likely to dominate a state's social policy.

The primary goal for the fiercely individualist Aberhart, faced with the Depression, was the elimination of intolerable poverty. However, even at this date, the theme of "maximization of welfare" was already being heard within the Social Credit movement. The teachings of Douglas, the writings of Thompson and the speeches of Cornelia Wood cited above call for a quality of life that could be described as "maximization of welfare." In the late 1960's Manning's own public position shifted from a goal of elimination of intolerable poverty (as indicated by the speeches in the legislature, in caucus and at annual Social Credit conventions), towards maximization of welfare.

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[164] A child was killed by his father. Since this tragedy occurred on military land, the province was responsible for child protection.
[165] Rogers, in interview & in speech to Funds and Council Annual Conference, Quebec, 1967.
[166] Alberta Legislature Speeches, L. C. Halmrast, Feb 26th 1965, p. 20; and in interview, August, 1977.
[167] T. H. Marshall, *Social Policy*, (Hutchinson, 1975), p.201.

Thus, the first two sets of social policy goals outlined by Marshall (elimination of intolerable poverty, and maximization of welfare) coexisted in Alberta, with Social Credit leaders shifting towards the second set of social policy goals during the 1960's. The third set of social policy goals, described by Marshall as related to the "pursuit of equality", found no place in the public policy of Alberta's Social Credit government. This theme would, to most Social Crediters be socialist or communist (considered synonymous by Social Crediters), and totally unacceptable. The possibility is explored below that the policy shift of the 1960's was a response to perceived electoral threat.

Interparty Competition and Public Policy

The theory that opposition threat could result in changes in the government party was first suggested by Duverger[168] and subsequently developed by Epstein[169]. The ideas were then developed by policy analysts, who sought to introduce political competition as one of the independent variables explaining patterns in government spending[170]. These studies were not notably successful in identifying political competition as an independent variable, but suggested that it might be among the intervening variables linking socio-economic variables to micro-decision processes.

The analysis that follows begins with discussion of the concept of "contagion" as introduced by Duverger, developed by Epstein, and as adopted by the policy analysts. The measures developed in a Canadian study of policy contagion[171] are reviewed and political competition in Alberta is described. As government party reaction to competition would be based on *perceived* threat, and perceptions are influenced by beliefs, the analysis closes with a discussion of the impact of Social Credit ideology on the party's response to competition. Certain policy initiatives taken by Social Credit in the 1960's are suggested to have resulted from an over-sensitivity to threat from the left - a sensitivity based in Social Credit's hostility to "socialism".

Contagion Theory

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[168] M. Duverger, *Political Parties*, (Methuen, 1951), p. xxvii, p. 64.
[169] L. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, (Praeger, 1967), pp. 126 - 129, pp. 257 - 260.
[170] For example, R. E. Dawson, "Social Development, Party Competition and Policy", W. N. Dawson and W. D. Chambers, (eds.), *The American Party Sytems*, (Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 203 - 257.
[171] W. M. Chandler, "Canadian Socialism and Policy Impact", *C.J.P.S.*, X, No. 4, (1977), pp. 755 - 780.

The idea of "contagion" between a government party and a strong opposition party was first introduced by Duverger, but was associated with party structure and process, rather than policy. Duverger suggested that the (then) newer mass-based parties of the left were so successful in Europe that some of the older cadre parties adopted the trappings of a mass base in order to gain the votes of enfranchised masses. The reality of party structure for the older party remained unchanged, however;

> If we define a member as one who signs an undertaking to the party and thereafter pays his subscription, then cadre parties have no members. Some do make a show of recruiting after a contagious pattern of mass parties, but this is not to be taken seriously[172].

The creation of electoral committees by older parties, in imitation of those of parties of the left is, according to Duverger an example of contagion from the left. Thus, in the election to the French National Assembly of 1871:

> The result was the Republic of Dukes. The creation of electoral committees tends therefore to be a left-wing effort because fundamentally it is advantagious to the Left: the task is, by means of these committees, to make known new elites which will be able to compete in the minds of the electorate with the prestige of the old elites. But, the Right is obliged to follow the example in order to retain its influence. This phenomenon of contagion from the left will be seen again and again as we analyze the structure of parties[173].

Epstein extended this discussion, showing that Duverger's concept of contagion from the left applied to the growth periods of mass-based parties in European Democracies, but not to these same parties today[174]. Today the mass-based parties of the left even have some characteristics of the cadre party. Epstein extended this discussion by suggesting that parties of the left now experience contagion from the right, adopting the media-oriented campaign styles successfully used by parties with middle class support and cadre organization[175].

Policy Contagion and Competition

Both Epstein and Duverger used contagion to refer to the adoption by a party of the organizational style of a threatening opposition, rather than the adoption of *policies* advocated by that opposition. The concept of policy contagion, however, has been of interest since the development of policy analysis and the attempt to isolate the relative

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[172] Duverger, *Op. Cit.*, p. 64.
[173] *Ibid.*, p. xxvii.
[174] L. Epstein, *Op. Cit.*, p. 127.
[175] *Ibid.*, p. 257.

impact of environmental and political variables.

The U. S. studies which include "political competition" as an independent variable avoid the suggestion of "contagion" from the left or right. These studies assume that the two American parties are broadly similar in ideology and policy, and that when in power both parties will expand government programs to ward off rising competition from the other. Such studies include those by Hofferbert[176] and Dawson[177] which identify party competition as at best a weak intermediary variable [178]. Klass has suggested that the effect of party as an intermediary variable varies with other constraints on local policy-making, and is related to the the electorate's apportionment of the blame for tax increases[179].

Competition appeared more influential in explaining *welfare* expenditures[180]. Tompkins discovered a more direct relationship between interparty competition and aid to dependent children[181], which he attributed to higher lower-class participation. He cites V. O. Key's analysis of non-competitive *Southern Politics*[182] as evidence that low welfare expenditure is associated with absence of competition and with low working class participation, and therefore that the converse is also true - that high working class participation should be associated with competition, and that both are associated with increased welfare expenditure. Although Tompkin's logic is fallacious[183] his empirical findings do support his conclusion. However, in Wilensky's study of welfare policy, based on international rather than inter-state comparisons, class variables (both the size of the working class and the strength of the working class as measured in the left vote,

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[176] R. I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in American States", *A.P.S.R.*, LX, no. 1, (1966), pp. 73 - 82.
[177] R. E. Dawson found limited support for competition as an imtermediary variable explaining public policy, but socioeconomic conditions remained the major explanatory variable."Social Development, Party Competition and Policy", W. N. Chambers and W. D. Burnham, (eds), *The American Party Systems*, (Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 203 - 237.
[178]This literature is reviewed by T. R. Dye and J. S. Robey in "Politics versus Economics; the Development of the Literature on Policy Determination", T. Dye and V. Gray, (eds.), *The Determinants of Public Policy*, (Lexington, 1980), pp. 3 - 17.
[179] G. M. Klass, "The Determination of Policy and Politics in the American States, 1948 - 1974", *ibid.*, pp. 141 - 149.
[180] C. Cnuddle and D. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States", *A.P.S.R.*, LXIII, no. 3, (1969), p. 865.; I Sharkansky and R. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics and Public Policy", *A.P.S.R.*, LXIII, No. 3, (1969), pp. 877 - 878.
[181] G. Tompkins, "A Causal Model of State Welfare Expenditures", *Journal of Politics*, XXXVII, No. 2, (1975), pp. 392 - 416.
[182] (Vintage Books, 1949).
[183] He assumes the logical structure: if A, then B; therefore, if not A, then not B.

voter turnout and union membership ratios) washed out in regression equations that also included the "crucial predictors of welfare effort", age of the population and "corporatist technocratic linkages"[184].

None of the studies cited above give much support a direct relationship between competition (whether from the left or otherwise) and welfare expenditures. However, certain case examples can be presented that demonstrate the dynamics of government response to threat from the left. The classic example is Bismarck's introduction of state socialism (the first right-wing-welfare state) to Germany in an attempt to wean away support from the growing socialist movements[185].

Within the Canadian context Liberal government responses to threat from the left also provides examples of contagion. Old age pensions introduced in 1927 were intended by Mackenzie King to obtain the support of the minute group of Labour Members of Parliament and thereby stabilize a minority government[186]. However, the introduction of Canadian family allowances in 1945, and the other Reconstruction proposals fit more closely the theory of contagion. The C. C. F. was gaining strength across Canada, and appeared likely to be successful in Ontario. The proposals put forward by King's Liberals included many programs that had been advocated by the C. C. F.. These coexisted with a Liberal government perception of electoral threat, so can be included as an example of policy contagion[187]. Other examples could include initiatives during Trudeau's minority government of 1972 - 1974.

> While some of the initiatives of the minority period - notably the creation of a virtually toothless Food Prices Review Board, and the proposal for a perilously vague and clealy improvised anti-profiteering law - were cosmetic measures to appease the N. D. P., the government nevertheless accomplished a great deal that was useful and popular in those eighteen months. Old age pensions were increased and indexed to the cost of living. Family allowance payments, Canada Pension Plan benefits, and the Veterans' allowance were all increased. There was a tax cut with particular benefits for low- and middle-income earners, and federal subsidies kept down the price of bread and milk. Parliament passed legislation restricting electronic surveillance, an election expenses act, and the Foreign Investment Review Act, and extended

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[184] A score is developed for this linkage based on the centralization of union or employer organizations and their relations with government. H. Wilensky, *The New "Corporatism", Centralization and the Welfare State*, (Sage, 1970), p. 30.
[185] W. Carr, *The History of Germany: 1815 - 1945*, (Arnold, 1969), pp. 152 - 158.
[186] K. Bryden, *Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada*, (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974), p. 69.
[187] D. Guest, *The Emergence of Social Security in Canada*, (University of British Columbia, 1980), pp. 128 - 133.

the ban on capital punishment for another five years[188].

As with the old age pensions of 1927, some of these initiatives were introduced by the Liberals to purchase the support of the N. D. P. members of Parliament, thus providing stability to Trudeau's minority government. However, the potential electoral gains from the policies were certainly also assessed by the Prime Minister and his policy advisors, and were to pay off in the election of 1974 when the number of N. D. P. seats in the House of Commons was reduced from 31 to 16. Therefore, while the Liberal's initiatives in this period could be described as a response to increased N. D. P. power in a minority House, they also provide examples of adoption by a centre, or right-of-centre party, of policies from the left, followed by weaning votes away from the left. This strategy would be intended to wean votes away from a competing party, the basic intention of any governing party adopting opposition proposals. These instances of contagion exist, but there has not been a systematic analysis of federal government response to threats from the left in Canada.

In the Canadian context the existence of an explicitly social democratic party capable of forming the government several provinces has allowed comparative study of the phenomenon of contagion from the left at the provincial level[189]. William Chandler selected the four western provinces and Ontario, for the between-election periods from 1945 to 1972. Chandler's independent variable, "contagion from the left", is conceived as present in two coincident conditions – "socialist threat" and "government insecurity". Socialist threat is operationalised as a four-category variable based on two conditions:

1. The level of popular support for C. C. F. – N. D. P. in which high support is defined as any percentage of votes above the provincial average and low support as any percentage below this average and
2. the direction of support. Has the C. C. F. – N. D. P. increased or decreased in vote strength since the last election?

From these two facts it is a relatively simple matter to construct four categories:

1. high and increasing support,
2. low but increasing support,
3. high but decreasing support and
4. low and decreasing support[190].

The security of the government party is operationalized by Chandler as majority

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[188] G. Radwanski, *Trudeau*, (Macmillan, 1978), pp. 280 – 281.
[189] W. M. Chandler, "Canadian Socialism and Policy Impact: Contagion from the Left", *C.J.P.S.*, X, No. 4, 1977, pp. 755 – 780.
[190] Chandler, ibid., p. 767.

position in the legislature[191], and as absence of any significant decline in the last election. Any government not meeting one of these conditions is categorized as insecure.

Competition in Alberta

Application of Chandler's indicators to Alberta for the period just prior to the 1966 welfare policy innovations, shows a socialist threat to Social Credit as follows. In the 1963 election the C. C. F./N. D. P. vote share was twice that in the previous 1959 election, but still below 10%. In the four elections from 1940 to 1952 the C. C. F. has polled between 11.1% and 24.9% of the provincial vote (see Table 3.1). Thus Chandler's measure would rate socialist threat in Alberta from 1963 – 67 as low, but increasing – the second largest category on Chandler's four category ordinal scale. During this period the Social Credit government held 60 of 63 seats in the Legislature, and was therefore "secure" according to Chandler's measure. The potential for contagion from the left would therefore appear to have been only moderate.

However, Chandler's measures are not as precise as they might be[192]. He deals with general elections as instruments producing threat, suggesting that the result of a previous election sets the conditions under which threat is perceived between one election and the next. However, politicians are threatened by *up-coming* elections, not by those already past, so a variety of indicators are watched for suggestion of voter satisfaction. Today polling technology provides an almost continuous reading of socialist or other electoral threat. However, such methods were not used by Social Credit during the period under study, and the party relied on more traditional methods. M. L. A.'s talked to and listened to their constituents, and read commentaries in the newpapers across the province. Pressure groups were heard (see chapter IV), and periodically the mood of the people was tested in a byelection.

There were three byelections in the 1963 – 67 period, two before the welfare reforms of 1966, and one after. The last two of these three elections both added new

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[191] Any government with less than 55% of the seats is classified as insecure. Op. Cit.
[192] Chandler's choice of "socialist vote" for an election as a proportion of the province's average socialist strength allows him to include Alberta as comparable with the other three western provinces, whereas an absolute measure would leave Alberta far below them in socialist strength. It is a mistake to use a measure that treats doubling of the socialist vote in Alberta as having the same implications as a doubling of the socialist vote in, for example, British Columbia.

members to the opposition. In 1964 a byelection in Three Hills had been comfortably won by Social Credit with a plurality, but in 1966 Liberal Bill Switzer won the Edson constituency in a close three-way fight with Social Credit and the N. D. P.. The New Democrats ran second. In 1966, in Pincher Creek/Crows Nest, N. D. P. candidate Garth Turcott won another close race, 130 votes ahead of the Social Credit candidate[193].

In the previous 10 years (1953 - 63) there had been nine byelections, with only one Social Credit candidate defeated (by a P. C. in Red Deer in 1954)[194], so the experience of defeat in 2 of 3 byelections, one of them a defeat by "socialists", could have produced a sense of threat for the Social Credit party.

Newspaper reports from the period give some indication of the degree to which the byelection results of 1965 and 1966 suggested a threat from the left. In 1965 the Edmonton Journal attributed the defeat of Social Credit to the refusal of the government to answer questions in the legislature[195]. The success of the Liberals and the N. D. P. was interpreted as good for the province, adding a third opposition M. L. A., and demonstrating that "Social Credit is not invulnerable"[196], rather than as evidence of any real threat. Manning was quoted as saying that he was disappointed, but no more.

The welfare reforms of 1966 *followed* this "disappointing" byelection, and therefore there is little support for a contention that these reforms were prepared in response to a perceived threat from the left[197]. However, the relatonship between the next byelection in 1966, the Human Resources program announced early in 1967 and the general election later that year suggests a clearer example of contagion in response to a perceived threat from the left.

The Pincher Creek byelection of 1966 was taken more seriously by all parties. The journalists also watched more closely, and one commented that "the winds of political change" were "ploughing through the Crowsnest

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[193] C. Caldarola, *Ibid.*, p. 381.
[194] This appears to have been a rare instance when the preferential ballotting system then in practice in Alberta produced a different result from what would have been produced by a first-past-the-post system. The Social Credit candidate gained 39.8% of the first choice voites, compared with only 37.3% for the successful candidate. By the 1959 election this system had been changed to the more common first-past-the-post system.
[195] "Recount Possible in Edson", *Edmonton Journal*, March 30, (1965), p. 1.
[196] "It's Good for Alberta", *Edmonton Journal*, March 30, (1965), p. 4.
[197] As is shown in chapter 8, the reforms were initiated by senior administrators in response to increased caseloads, rather than by politicians facing an election.

Pass"[198]. The Progressive Conservatives and the N. D. P. both sent in their leaders, and any organizers they could muster, while the Liberals were using such a soft-sell approach that "it could hardly be detected"[199]. The campaign appears to have been bitter[200].

When the N. D. P. candidate won, both the press and the premier reacted as if something significant had happened. The Edmonton Journal welcomed the province's first N. D. P. representation in the legislature[201], and editorialized a warning to Social Credit to strengthen local party organization:

> The results ought to be a cause of concern in the offices of the Social Credit Party. Social Credit was obviously unable to find an adequate replacement for its former M. L. A., the late Mr Kovach, and that fact hurt.
>
> Many Labour votes that formerly went to Mr Kovach appear to have been gleaned this time by the New Democratic party. The squeaks from rusty local Socred machinery could be heard from Edmonton[202].

The Journal, however, did not appear to feel that this was a threat from the left to Social Credit:

> But, does the byelection represent a swing to the New Democrats across the province? It is highly doubtful. Byelections are not reliable weather-vanes, and the plain fact is that the N. D. P.'s two most impressive campaigns under Mr. Neil Reimer's leadership - Edson and now Crowsnest - were both held in areas where organized labour has *always* been strong. There are few other strong labour centres in Alberta in which the New Democrats are liable to find an easy foothold[203].

And, more interesting, the Journal also read into the results a prick into the "bubble of the ambitions" of Lougheed's Conservatives.

The premier also responded. While in 1965 he had merely expressed his disappointment, in 1966 he added some comments about the unreliability of byelections as indicators of general election results. He is quoted as saying that "people are not really voting against the government in this sort of case", and accused the N. D. P. of flooding the constituency with outside organizers. He also reflected upon a theme that was to recur in many of his speeches over the subsequent years - the danger of "splitting the free enterprise vote", and thereby letting in the socialists. In this instance he expressed regret that the Conservatives had run a candidate and thus let in the N. D. P..

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[198] "Socreds due for a fall in byelection", *Edmonton Journal*, Oct. 1st, (1966), p. 1.
[199] Neil Reimer, Grant Notley and Tommy Douglas were all in the constituency helping Garth Turcott, and Lougheed was visible helping the Conservative candidate.
[200] "N. D. P. Charges Socreds, Tories", *Edmonton Journal*, October 3rd, 1966, p. 26.
[201] "At Last a Voice for N. D. P.", *Edmonton Journal*, Oct. 7th, 1966, p. 1.
[202] "First N. D. P. Seat", *Edmonton Journal*, Oct. 8th, 1966, p. 4.
[203] Ibid..

These comments by the premier in 1966 show that he did feel some threat from the left after the byelection, and his reaction was to propose consolidation of the right in a program that would include the social programs of the left with the economic programs of the right. The welfare reforms of 1966 were already under way before the 1966 byelection, and were not a response to its results. However, the Human Resources program announced between the byelection and the general election of 1967 shows signs of being an example of contagion[204]. Manning echoed this theme in *Political Realignment*, published in 1967[205], advocating the unification of the free enterprise parties in a program of "social conservatism" to prevent the success of the parties of the left. Unfortunately for Manning, the threat to his government was not from the a party of the left, but from another party of the right, based in the urban middle class.

Hindsight shows of course that the Progressive Conservatives were the real competitors to Social Credit. The party's ideology appeared similar in some ways, but differed in its more statist philosophy. The Social Credit party had favoured the negative state, and was ambivalent and passive in its response to pressures for the development of a positive provincial state. The Progressive Conservatives, with their base in the expanding state middle class and the new indigenous bourgeoisie, were to be more statist in their orientation, wanting to use the resources of the state to expand their own opportunities for capital accumulation. But even after the 1963 election the provincial distribution of votes gave no indication of the potential of the Progressive Conservative party in the province. The Liberals had 19.8% of the vote, the Progressive Conservatives 12.7% and the N. D. P. 9.5% (see Table 3.1), and the Social Credit party held 60 of 63 seats with 54.8% of the vote.

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[204] E. C. Manning, "A White Paper on Human Resources", *Telefacts*, (Alberta Social Credit League, March, 1967).
[205] (McClelland and Stewart, 1967).

Table 3.1 Electoral Support in Alberta Provincial Elections*

Election Date	Total Seats	Socred Seats	% of Vote	Lib. Seats	% of Vote	P.C. Seats	% of Vote	C.C.F./ Seats	N.D.P. % of Vote
1935	63	56	54.2	5	23.1	2	6.5	-	
1940	57	36	42.9	1	0.9	-	-	-	11.1
1944	60	51	51.9	-	-	-	-	2	24.9
1948	57	51	55.6	2	17.9	-	-	2	24.9
1952	61	52	56.2	4	22.4	2	3.7	2	14.1
1955	61	37	46.4	15	31.1	3	9.2	2	8.2
1959	65	61	55.7	1	13.9	1	23.9	0	4.3
1963	63	60	54.8	21	9.8	0	12.7	0	9.5
1967	65	55	44.6	3	10.8	6	26.0	0	16.0
1971	71	25	41.1	0	1.0	49	46.4	1	11.4

*Data taken from C. Caldarola, (ed.), *Society and Politics in Alberta*, (Methuen, 1979), p. 373.

The shift of 1967, however, moved Social Credit to its lowest share of the vote since the counter-reaction to Aberhart in 1940. The Progressive Conservative party had become the official opposition, with 26% of the vote, more than any opposition group with the sole exception of the Liberals in 1955. The Social Credit party had recovered after that Liberal resurgence, but were not to recover sufficiently after 1967 to hold off the Progressive Conservatives in 1971.

The threat to Social Credit was heightened by two factors. First, demographic shifts in the province favoured the urban-based Conservatives. Second, Social Credit anti-socialist rhetoric had hammered the Alberta electorate since 1935, resulting a preference for parties of the right.

Through the 1959 and 1963 elections support for Social Credit outside Edmonton and Calgary remained stable at around 58%. In Edmonton and Calgary only around 50% were voting Social Credit. Both in metropolitan centres and in the rest of Alberta the Progressive Conservatives had lost ground in 1963, with the Liberals and the

C. C. F./N. D. P. gaining. In 1967 both the N. D. P. and the Conservatives cut into the Liberal support, leaving the Conservatives (at 19%) within 1.8% of the N. D. P. in rural and small town Alberta. Correction of malapportionment for the 1971 election gave Edmonton and Calgary another 9 seats. This, with the collapse of the Liberals, was to allow the Conservatives to form a government with 49 of 75 seats, and with 25 of 29 seats in the two metropolitan centres.

Table 3.2: Geographical Distribution of Electoral Support, 1959 to 1971, Edmonton and Calgary

Year	S. C.	P. C.	Lib.	N.D.P./ C.C.F.	Other	
1959	14	.1	–	–	–	Seats
	51.7	27.8	14.6	5.7	.3	% of Vote
1963	18	–	1	–	–	Seats
	49.2	16.2	22.2	11.2	1.1	% of Vote
1967	14	5	1	–	–	Seats
	38.3	34.0	12.0	14.9	*.8	% of Vote
1971	4	25	–	–	–	Seats
	37.5	49.1	.9	11.7	*.8	% of Vote

Table 3.3:Geographical Distribution of Electoral Support in the Rest of Alberta, 1959 to 1971

Year	S. C.	P. C.	Lib.	N.D.P./ C.C.F.	Other	
1959	47	-	1	-	2	Seats
	58.0	21.6	13.5	3.5	3.3	% of Seats
1963	43	-	1	-	1	Seats
	58.9	10.1	18	8.2	4.9	% of Seats
1967	41	1	2	-	1	Seats
	47.8	18.6	19.6	16.8	*5.3	% of Seats
1971	21	24	-	1	-	Seats
	44.2	42.9	1.1	11.0	*.8	% of Seats

* Includes spoiled ballots.

The Social Credit threat was not to be from "the left", but from the new urban middle class described by Richards and Pratt[206]. Social Credit appealed to the petite bourgeoisie - the entrepreneurial class of farmers and small businessmen of small town Alberta. Cabinet and party membership often came from that class. Even towards the end of Social Credit's tenure party members were still disproportionately from small towns and rural Alberta, with no more than high school education, of average income and quite probably farmers or small businessmen[207].

A second factor reinforced this threat from the right. In the years since 1935 Social Credit rhetoric had affected the values of the electorate, as Social Credit leaders used anti-socialist propaganda to reinforce their own hold on political power[208]. Alberta's political culture was described in chapter II as consisting of belief in the free enterprise system; belief in the idea (but not necessarily the practice) of anti-statism; and hostility to external sources of power. Therefore, by the time empirical studies of political culture became possible, Albertans had become less anti-statist than Social Credit, but retained

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[206] J. Richards and L. Pratt, *Prairie Capitalism*, (McClelland and Stewart, 1979).
[207] O. Anderson, "The Alberta Social Credit Party: An Empirical Analysis of Membership, Characteristics, Participation and Opinions", Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Alberta, 1972.
[208] The Marxist perspective on ideology treats it as false consciousness used by the powerful to hold on to power. This perspective applies to the use of antisocialist propaganda by Social Credit to avert a threat from the left(J. Gould and W. Kolb, (eds.), *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, (Free Press, 1964), p. 315.

many of the individualist work-oriented values that had direct bearing on the structure (if not the existence) of welfare policies and programs. Lougheed realised this, and intended policies and programs little different from those of Social Credit:

> It was a matter of selling the same free enterprise philosophy in a new package once Manning was gone[209].

A year after the defeat of Social Credit by the Progressive Conservatives a survey showed that Albertans:

> Felt that too much leisure and free time will spoil a society and that we need to work to keep ourselves alert and strong (90%). Similarly, man needs to work to protect his self-image and dignity (84%)[210].

Social Credit had successfully convinced Albertans that the welfare state was not desirable. But, in the 1960's, in response to a threat from the left, Social Credit introduced many of the programs associated in the public mind with the welfare state. The public, it seems, responded with a shift to another right-of-centre free enterprise party - to the Progressive Conservative party.

C. Party Involvement in the Causal Chain of the Welfare Reforms of 1966

By the 1960's Social Credit dogma did not correspond with Social Credit welfare policy. The government party strengthened and expanded provincial welfare programs, building a provincial welfare state. An analysis of electoral competition has suggested that by 1967 the Social Credit government was acting in response to a perceived threat from the left. However, in 1966 when welfare reforms were implemented in child welfare, public assistance and municipal social services, the most threatening byelection had not yet taken place. The party, however, still had an influence on the welfare reforms of 1966, and this can be traced in discussions of the cabinet, in caucus and in the legislature.

Legislature

The welfare reform proposals of 1966 were first mentioned in the Speech from

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[209] Hustak, *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[210] Alberta, *Public Attitudes toward Public Assistance in Alberta*, (Health and Social Development, 1973), p. 3.

the throne of 1965[211]. A new Child Welfare Act, the provincial takeover of all municipal welfare responsibilities, and program of municipal preventive social services were all proposed.

Several members of the legislature commented in debate on the proposal for the preventive welfare services. Dr. Gordon Geldart (Social Credit, Edmonton West)[212], Edward Benoit (Social Credit, Okotoks-High River)[213], and Roy Ells (Social Credit, Grouard)[214] all supported the preventive program. All emphasized the need to avoid the welfare state. Benoit, for example, commented that:

> Alberta is leading in these matters, and we are doing everything we can to avoid what is commonly known as the welfare state. This (the program to prevent welfare dependency) is one of the steps that will prevent the welfare state[215].

Ells also emphasized the need to make sure people were self-supporting, and not dependent on the state[216]. Other M.L.A.'s, although not commending the preventive welfare program, shared this anti-welfare state position. Lee Leavitt (Social Credit, Queen's Park) emphasized the loss of self respect resulting from dependence on the state[217]. Mike Maccagno (Liberal, Lac La Biche) questioned the excessive generosity of the province's welfare programs[218]. James Henderson (Social Credit, Leduc) cited the reluctance of those applying for municipal public assistance to also apply for work in the municipality[219]. Only Cornelia Wood (Social Credit, Stony Plain) thought that with Social Credit "The curse of unemployment can become a blessing of secure leisure"[220]. The unqualified right to an income would replace all welfare measures, and unemployment insurance would become a shareholder's dividend. Her position, however, was exceptional.

Most Alberta's M.L.A's wanted a reduction in income support programs, at least for the able bodied. The preventive program seemed an opportunity to reduce welfare dependency, to "prevent welfare", and was therefore supported. Following the public

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[211] Speech from the Throne, Alberta Legislature, Feb 18, 1965. There is no Alberta Hansard for this period. Transcripts of major speeches are on file in the Library of the Provincial Legislature, and other quotations are taken from press clippings contained in the *Scrap Book Hansard* also in the Legislature Library.
[212] "Alberta Legislature Speeches, 1965", Feb. 24, 1965, p. 200.
[213] Ibid., Feb 16, 1965., p. 107.
[214] Ibid., March 2nd, 1965, p. 85, & March 12th, p. 223.
[215] Ibid., Feb 24, 1965, p. 107.
[216] Ibid., March 12, 1965, p. 85.
[217] Ibid., March 10, 1965, p.156.
[218] Ibid., March 17, 1965, p. 25.
[219] Ibid., March 8, 1965, p. 148.
[220] Ibid., Feb 26,, 1965, p. 184.

announcement in the speech from the throne Deputy Minister Duncan Rogers met municipal welfare officials (see chapter V). The proposal also became the more specific focus of the Social Credit caucus, and its committee of health and welfare.

Caucus

Macpherson described the Social Credit caucus as lacking in power[221], but the ministers interviewed for this analysis emphasized the importance of caucus in Manning's government. With no effective opposition in the legislature, controversial issues were settled in the Social Credit caucus. Without caucus support cabinet initiatives would not be pursued. J. D. Ross, who had been minister of health from 1957 to 1969, for example, put forward a public health bill. Although approved by cabinet, it was defeated in caucus and therefore not implemented[222].

Manning respected his caucus more than was often asserted in the popular press. If cabinet had a proposal to present to caucus, the proposal would be presented by the minister concerned, but other members of cabinet would not participate. After debate caucus would vote, but all cabinet members, including the minister concerned, would abstain. They were very careful not to dominate caucus. If the issues under discussion had been raised by a member of the caucus, and not from cabinet, then cabinet members would participate in the debate, and vote. Votes from caucus were important to Manning, and if there was a fairly even split in the caucus on a issue, he would delay the decision until a consensus was reached[223].

The preventive social service program first went to the caucus welfare committee in June 1965. The proposal was framed in terms of the savings that would accrue to the provinces under the proposed Canada Assistance Plan[224], suggesting funds be used to assume the welfare responsibilities of the municipal governments, and to

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[221] C. B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta*,, (University of Toronto Press, 1953) pp. 193 - 200.

[222] J. D. Ross, in interview, 1977. He commented that this was because the individual members were concerned about maintaining the smaller health units within their own constituencies, and were opposed to consolidation.

[223] Fred Colborne, the Minister of Municipal Affairs, in interview, 1977.

[224] A further discussion of the impact of inter-governmental relations on provincial social policy is provided in chapter V & VI.

meet half the cost of a new municipal program of preventive services[225]. The Committee expressed a number of concerns about the proposal. Ray Jorgensen, an erstwhile minister of welfare, expressed concern about the trend to centralization, and this was reinforced by Henderson. He and Strohscheim also suggested that the program be related to the public health unit. Some members were also concerned about the loss of individual responsibility that results from the expansion of welfare programs. The deputy minister responded by reassuring the committee that the provincial program was intended to restore individual responsibility, and to strengthen local autonomy[226].

Halmrast reported to Manning on the caucus committee meeting, emphasizing that the time was ripe for the new preventive program[227]. Welfare rates were increasing, poverty had caught public attention, and the program would return some responsibility to the municipalities. Halmrast also cited informal discussions with municipal welfare officials, who had supported the program. Later in October the Alberta cabinet gave approval in principle to the welfare reforms.

Following the normal practice, the proposal was then submitted to the whole caucus for discussion and decision. Caucus members had often discussed the need to get people off welfare, and they accordingly supported the preventive program. Little opposition was expressed, beyond concerns about the deleterious effect of the welfare state. One enthusiastic member even suggested the province should run the preventive program itself, leaving the municipalities to provide public assistance! Although recorded by Halmrast in a letter to Duncan Rogers[228] this recommendation was not followed.

The Party Convention

In November 1965 the Social Credit League held their annual convention, and as usual problems of welfare abuse were raised. At each annual convention some Social Credit member would raise this issue. In 1965 questions were raised about ensuring that those on welfare pay their rents and a request was made for closer investigation of

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[225] Letter from Halmrast to Mrs. C. Wood, Chairman of Caucus Committee Welfare Committee, June 21, 1965. Carbon retained in departmental files.
[226] Minutes of caucus welfare committee, June 28th, 1965, on file in Department of Welfare.
[227] Halmrast to Manning, July 2nd, 1965.
[228] Halmrast to Rogers, October 22nd 1965.

welfare recipients[229]. Halmrast addressed this convention, to describe the "Steps of Progress" in his ministry. Notably he reviewed the services to the elderly in Alberta under Social Credit, but did not mention the proposed welfare reforms[230]. While the position taken at the annual convention could not bind cabinet or caucus, it seems likely that the party's conservative position would remind its leaders of their commitment not to develop a welfare state in Alberta. Thus, when the preventive proposal again came before cabinet, reservations about welfare expansion and centralization resulted in changes to the proposals.

Cabinet

Cabinet reviewed the proposals again in December 1965, and for the first time faced head-on the takeover of municipal functions. Misgivings appeared, and the Deputy Minister was asked for revisions to reduce the centralizing impact of the reforms. Under Duncan Rogers' new proposal the province would take over all child welfare, increase cost-sharing for municipal public assistance from 80% to 90%, and increase cost-sharing for municipal preventive services from 50% as originally proposed, to 80%. However, the Deputy Minister preferred his original proposal, for under the new one the existing "cumbersome" duplication of administration would persist[231]. Cabinet accepted this new proposal in January 1966[232].

The Legislature

The new Child Welfare Act received all the public attention and the Preventive Social Service Act slipped through the Legislature with little debate. In the speech from the throne Manning had mentioned legislation:

> To enable municipalities to actively participate in preventive welfare services with provincial assistance. The report of the special committee appointed to examine the policies and procedures of adoption in Alberta will be tabled and you will be asked to approve extensive revisions to the Child Welfare Act, based on the committee's recommendations[233].

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[229] "Report of the Thirty First Annual Convention of the Alberta Social Credit League," November 23rd and 24th 1965, p. 16.
[230] Ibid., p. 30.
[231] To Halmrast from Rogers, December 30th 1965.
[232] To Rogers from Halmrast, January 5th 1966.
[233] Speech from the Throne, Alberta Legislature, Thursday February 17th 1966, page 2.

During the debate on the speech from the throne Halmrast reviewed the state of the department's services. He outlined the societal changes that had produced increased dependence on social welfare services. and described a three pronged approach to these changes:

> A realistic effort with respect to assistance to those who are dependent on it; a realistic program of rehabilitation and a comprehensive program for preventive service[234].

Child welfare, he reminded the legislature, was inextricably interwoven with public assistance, and should be part of an overall welfare program. The minister was unable to complete his address, because of lack of time, and did not go into detail on either the preventive program or the new Child Welfare Act.

Other M.L.A.'s also supported the preventive program. Edward Benoit (Social Credit, Nanton) and Bob Clark (Social Credit, Carstairs) were both enthusiastic. Benoit commented that "if we have to spend twice as much in preventing people from receiving welfare, as we do to pay them, I think that the money would be well spent .... I am 100% behind this program"[235]. Clark emphasized the local initiative needed for a successful program[236]. Alex Gordey (Social Credit, Vegreville) also emphasized the need to "prevent many would-be applicants for welfare"[237].

Halmrast introduced the preventive social service bill on February 25th[238], commenting that it would cut future welfare costs by preventing social conditions which encourage welfare. He acknowledged that an absolute decrease in costs was unlikely, but that since it was an act "to keep people off welfare" it might "stem future increase"[239]. On Friday March 4th the bill was given second reading, and referred to committee of the whole, and after study was given third reading and royal assent on April 7th 1966.

The dominant impression from these debates is that apart from the initial prepared speech by Halmrast, Alberta M.L.A.'s regarded the preventive social service program as preventive welfare - as intended to prevent people from going on welfare or to help them get off welfare - intended to prevent the welfare state. This is far

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[234] Alberta Legislature Speeches, Feburary 8th 1966, L. C. Halmrast, p. 7.
[235] Alberta Legislature Speeches, Feb 23, 1966. p. 5.
[236] Alberta Legislature Speeches, March 3, 1966, p. 3 - 4.
[237] Alberta Legislature Speeches, March 5, 1966.
[238] Bill 20, An Act to Encourage the Establishment of Preventive Social Service Programs, 1966.
[239] Welfare Bill Aimed at Prevention, *Edmonton Journal*, Feb 26, (1966), p. 32.

narrower than the concept of prevention promoted by provincial officials, who looked for programs to strengthen family life, and improve general well-being.

This section tracing the decision process through the Social Credit caucus, party and Cabinet, has shown that the party did influence the welfare reforms of 1966. Particularly, the centralization proposed by senior administrators and initially accepted by cabinet, was latter rejected by Cabinet in favour of an alternative that allowed the municipalities to retain some welfare responsibilities. This example confirms the suggestions that emerged in earlier sections of this chapter concerning the close link between governing party ideology and public policy.

D. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that while the political party no longer has a monopoly on the crucial roles of interest articulation and aggregation, in the case of Social Credit in Alberta the party, both at the parliamentary and extraparliamentary level, retained a significant influence over the form of public policy. Social Credit ideology, with its emphasis on anti-statism, individualism, the work ethic and christian charity, led the Social Credit government to favour social policies that would retain municipal programs, and that they believed would "prevent" the welfare state by strengthening local government and individiual initiative.

In addition, Social Credit ideology influenced the government's response to electoral threat. Antipathy for socialism and for the "socialistic" welfare state led the Social Credit government to over-react to a perceived threat from the left, with a shift towards the social policies advocated by the left. The Human Resources program of 1967, and Manning's proposals for political realignment, for example, included social programs more typical of the left but were introduced alongside free enterprise economic policies. The electorate, convinced of the evils of socialism by years of anti-socialist Social Credit rhetoric, responded to this shift by electing in 1971 another party of the right. The Social Credit party had taken root in Alberta in the Great Depression, with an ideology reflecting the needs and interests of its founding members. This ideology remained influential in the policy-making activities of Alberta's Social Credit

government, even after it lost relevance for most Albertans. Therefore, although the Social Credit cabinet and party convention remained a link between the economic structural variables in the society (between class variables) and policy, that link was not in a contemporary process of interest aggregation and articulation, but in party ideology based in the class *origins* of the party.

IV. INTEREST GROUPS, THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC POLICY

The declining role of political parties in interest articulation and aggregation has been attributed to the increasing significance of interest groups and the media in the policy process[240]. The process of gathering the concerns of the electorate, organizing them and channelling them to policy makers is now, according to some students of politics, dominated by interest groups, by the media and by the public services. This linkage role of interest groups and the related role of the media are explored here[241]. The chapter's first section deals with the role of interest groups in Canadian politics. Several examples of Canadian pressure groups studies are cited, indicating the aspects of the pressure group phenomenon that may be of interest in the case of Alberta.

The role of interest groups in the development of Alberta's welfare state is the focus of the second section of the chapter. The pressure groups studies include the native associations, the social welfare profession, the private counselling agencies, and the day care and child welfare lobbies. With the exception of the native groups (which did not impact upon general welfare policy), all these interest groups are based in the urban middle class whose expansion was described in chapter II. The need for welfare services was most likely to emerge in urban areas, so pressure groups with an urban base were most likely to express these needs to government. The government's own commissions on child welfare (the Howson Report of the 1940's and the Patterson Commission of the 1960's), though created by government, had a role analogous to that of pressure groups. While ostensibly established as an *input* to government, they were used by government to influence public opinion. The major newspapers of Edmonton and Calgary also advocated welfare reforms, and are therefore discussed in this chapter.

A concluding section of the chapter suggests that pressure group activity was not a significant causal link between social and economic changes and welfare reform in the province. The social work profession was more concerned with professional status than with social reform. The counselling agencies and the day care lobby were involved *after* the reforms of 1966 were finalized, and attempted to get funds for their own

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[240] J. Meisel, "The Decline of Party in Canada", H. G. Thorburn, (ed.), *Party Politics in Canada*, (4th ed.), (Prentice-Hall 1979), pp. 119 - 135. A. King, "Political Parties: Some Skeptical Reflections", R. C. Macridis and B. E. Brown, (eds.), *Comparative Politics*, (4th ed.), (Dorsey Press, 1972), pp. 233 - 251.

[241] The role of the public service is discussed in later chapters on intergovernmental relations, and is the specific focus of chapter VII.

programs. Only the major newspapers, with a long history of acrimony with Social Credit, had broader concerns. The Commissions were established by government in part in response to the accusations of the press (particularly the Howson Report), but were part of a strategy to gain public support for proposed changes (particularly the Patterson Commission).

A. Interest Groups and Canadian Politics

A number of case studies now show the conditions for pressure groups success (or failure) in Canada. Some examples reviewed below indicate the possible role of interest groups in Alberta's policy process. Aspects of particular interest are:

1. Classification of Pressure Groups
2. The Problem of Credibility
3. Early Access to Senior Administrators
4. Symbiosis between Government and Pressure Groups

Classification of Pressure Groups

Pross defines pressure groups as "organizations whose members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest"[242]. He classifies these groups according to the specificity of their objectives (single issue/multiple issue); internal organization (small memberships, no paid staff/extensive human and financial resources); their form of communication with government (publicity/ public relations and confrontation/ongoing liaison). Groups, according to Pross, tend to be either low on all the variables, or high, leading to four categories which subsume all the other variables. These are:

1. Institutionalized
2. Mature
3. Fledgling

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[242] A. P. Pross, "Pressure Groups: Adaptive Instruments of Political Communication", A. P. Pross, (ed.), *Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics*, (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975), p 2.

4. Issue Oriented[243]

Stanbury and Thompson also classify groups according to the number to benefit from its actions and the extent of that benefit. Some groups who would benefit large numbers, but only by a small amount, can be described as "public-interest" groups. Other groups acting in a more restricted self-interest are described as "private-interest" groups[244].

Examples of institutionalized "private" interest groups include the mining corporations that successfully protested the Carter tax reform proposals[245]; the organized medical profession which influenced the design and management of health programs[246] and the oil companies that were said to be squeezed between federal and provincial policies[247]. Examples of institutionalized *public* interest groups include the Consumer's Association of Canada[248] and the National and Provincial Parks Association[249]. Both groups have the membership problems that Stanbury and Thompson assert are common to public interest groups. The Canadian Federation of Agriculture[250] and the Canadian Labour Congress[251] fall on a continuum between public and private interest, sharing some of the weakenesses of public interest groups.

In Alberta most of the interest groups concerned with the welfare reforms of the sixties were issue-oriented rather than institutional, with all this implies for access to government, and group structure and behaviour. Also, although social welfare could be described as broadly in the *public* interest, several groups approached reform from the more restricted perspective of the private interests of their members. They were more concerned about the capture of funds, than with the broader social welfare.

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[243] Pross, Ibid., p. 15.
[244] F. Thompson and W. T. Stanbury, ibid., p. 229.
[245] M. W. Bucovetsky, "The Mining Industry and the Great Tax Reform Debate", A. P. Pross, *Ibid.*, pp. 87 - 114.
[246] M. G. Taylor, "The Role of the Medical Profession in the Forumaltion and Execution of Public Policy", *C. J. E. P. S.*, XXV1, No. 1, (1960), pp. 108 - 125.
[247] G. R. Berry, "The Oil Lobby and the Energy Crisis", J. R. Rea and J. T. McLeod, (eds.), *Business and Government in Canada*, (2nd ed.), (Methuen, 1976), pp. 292 - 321.
[248] H. J. Dawson, "The Consumer's Association of Canada", *C. P. A.*, VI, No. 1, (1963), pp. 92 - 118.
[249] Bella, Op. Cit.
[250] H. J. Dawson, "An Interest Group: The Canadian Federation of Agriculture", *C.P.A.*, III, No. 2, (1960), pp. 134 - 149.
[251] D. Kwavnick, *Organized Labour and Pressure Politics: the Canadian Labour Congress, 1956 - 68*, (Queen's University Press, 1972).

Credibility

Institutional groups have, by definition, established their credibility with policy makers. The group's name is known to policy makers, and policy initiatives are often discussed with the group before being formalized. Issue-oriented groups, however, do not have this early involvement, and must instead rely on publicity-oriented tactics for attracting the attention of policy makers.

There are fewer examples of issue-oriented pressure groups in the political science literature. Such groups are either short lived, or pass through the issue-oriented stage to become "fledgling", "mature", or "institutional groups". However, the community organization and the urban protest literature[252] include some examples. Public housing tenants, for example, or those concerned about cross-walk lights may organize on an issue basis, and not go beyond this stage of group development[253]. These groups have to attract the attention of policy makers, and to convince them the group's concern is shared by those they claim to represent - i. e. that the group is credible.

Some groups trying to influence social welfare policy in Alberta had credibility problems. Whitton's visit to Alberta left social workers suspect, and this mistrust was heightened by Social Credit values (see chapter III). As a result, the social work association was not given much credence. The native people, after decades of acquiescence, used confrontation to attract the government's attention, but with little immediate success. The major newspapers worked with the day care and child welfare lobbies, but their long history of mistrust with the Social Credit government probably reduced their effectiveness. The only pressure groups that *really* had credibility were those created by government itself.

Access to Senior Administrators

Institutional groups benefit from early access to the policy process. They can influence policy proposals, rather than react to government announcements. The Canadian

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[252] Community organization consists of eclectic professionally oriented literature with a base in political science, sociology and anthropology, and originating as an area of social work practice. Some of the urban protest literature, as published in *City Magazine* also include examples.

[253] L. Bella, "Three Stages of Group Development", unpublished manuscript, Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1976.

Federation of Agriculture[254] and the Canadian Medical Association[255] both have this opportunity, and in the latter case the relationship is reinforced by shared professional norms. One study shows administrators sought closer relationships with groups sharing their values, while keeping other groups at a distance[256].

This close relationship between administrators and the pressure groups that work for similar objectives has been noted by Mahon[257]. She points out that the power relationships between the various components of a bureaucracy tend to mirror the power relationships between the societal constituencies of those components. To increase their own influence within government system, elements in the bureaucracy will stimulate the development of interest groups supporting their own goals.

In Alberta during this period provincial welfare administrators did seek support from an outside constituency, but not through established pressure groups studied here. Instead, the administrators drew together the senior personnel of the municipal social service agencies in Edmonton and Calgary, and the senior staff of the two major United Ways and Social Planning Councils. This group is the focus of chapter V on provincial/municipal relations.

Symbiosis

The close relationship between policy makers and pressure groups described above leads to symbiosis. The pressure group relies on policy maker's information about future plans, and on the opportunity to influence those plans before they are formalized. The policy makers grant this advance access to information, hoping that the pressure group will support the proposals once they become public. Neither side wants to break this mutual dependence. The pressure group fears loss of privileged access, and the policy makers fear public confrontation with the pressure groups most closely concerned with their area of policy.

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[254] Dawson, (1960), ibid..
[255] Taylor, ibid..
[256] A. P. Pross, "Input versus Withinput: Pressure Group Demands and Administrative Survival", A. P. Pross, (ed.), *Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics*, (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975), pp. 149 - 171. The Deputy Minister had good relations with the forestry profession, but resisted pressure for him to work more closely with the forestry industry that his department was attempting to control.
[257] R. Mahon, "Canadian Public Policy: The Unequal Structure of Representation", L. Panitch, (ed.), *The Canadian State*, (University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 165 - 198.

In Canada this symbiosis is often reinforced by a financial tie. Because of the weakness of public interest groups in the Canadian context, governments fund such groups directly[258]. In Alberta only the native groups were receiving direct help from government, through the community development program and (in the case of the Metis organizations) through the Metis Betterment program. The commissions and inquiries were, of course, also government funded. But, the provincial social workers association, the day care and child welfare lobbies, and the private social agencies then had no financial ties to the province.

B. Pressure Groups and Alberta Social Policy

The focus here includes the very young association of professional social workers and the private sector social agencies (both having ambitions for institutionalization and with private interest goals); the day care and child welfare lobbies and the native organizations (all publicity seeking and issue-oriented during this period); the media, which often confronted government, particularly on child welfare issues, and the commissions and inquiries created by government.

The Social Workers

In the early 1960's Alberta's social workers had two professional associations, one in Calgary serving southern Alberta, and one in Edmonton serving the north. The main challenge to these associations in the early sixties was the creation of a single provincial organization, A. A. S. W.. Membership was open to social workers with an M. S. W. or equivalent, and in 1962 the total Alberta membership was 91[259].

Although much of the social work in the province was done by employees of the province's Department of Welfare, the government's social workers lacked the qualifications for association membership. The provincial welfare administrators (only one was qualified), regarded the social worker's association with hostility. The Association deplored the province's lack of professional standards, and the provincial administrators deplored the "impractical" navel-gazing of the Association. The politicians, since the

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[258] The Consumer's Association of Canada, the National and Provincial Parks Association and the Alberta Status of Women Action Committee are examples of groups with this financial tie.
[259] A. A. S. W. Executive Council, minutes, August 30th, 1962.

Whitton controversies of twenty years earlier, viewed the social work profession with suspicion. As a result, social workers and their Association lacked credibility with both provincial politicians and provincial administrators.

The politicians' mistrust of social workers had led to the promotion within the department of "non-professionals". Deputy Minister Duncan Rogers, for example, was an accountant. Only in 1958 was a qualified social worker hired (Bill Macfarland), who was to become Director of Child Welfare. Other senior administrators without qualifications were sent to the School of Social Work at University of British Columbia[260]. The relationship with the professional association, however, remained poor. Bill McFarland deliberately disassociated himself from the Association:

> They were at that time very irresponsible, and just assinine is the word I'd use. I resigned. They never came up with a positive idea the ten years I was there (*in Alberta*). Every time there were public hearings, such as the adoption Royal Commission, they'd come and make an asinine presentation[261].

Other contemporary comments about the provincial association are slightly less scathing. A. A. S. W. was absorbed with "navel gazing" and "professional insecurity". The Association was a private rather than public interest group, more concerned with the narrow issue of professional advancement than with broader issues of social policy[262]. Their briefs to government concerned professional status and training[263]. The Association's involvement in the development of P. S. S. was typical of their reactive response to broader policy issues. In March of 1966 the A. A. S. W. Board met in Red Deer, and discussed the governments new welfare reforms. They voted that their president should meet with the minister to:

> ....state that we are concerned with the total development of Public Welfare programs throughout the province, and that A. A. S. W. wish to be involved and consulted with respect to planning and implementation of this program[264].

In May 1966 the president reported on his meeting with the provincial social planner, John Smith, saying that few people other than provincial departments had

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[260] Bill McFarland attributes the association with U. B. C. to the influence of the school's director, Bill Dixon, who was admired in Alberta. Generally though, social workers were trained to think of Alberta social welfare programs as the worst in Canada, and this did not encourage social workers to apply for positions in Alberta, or those already working in Alberta to seek professional training.

[261] McFarland, in interview, 1977.

[262] See for example the letter to the editor from Isobel Munroe, A. A. S. W. president, *Edmonton Journal*, Sep 26th, (1962).

[263] The Association pressed for creation of a school of social work in the province, and were eventually successful in 1966.

[264] A. A. S. W., Executive Council, minutes, March 9th, 1967.

apparently been involved, and that the proposals were unlikely to be changed. The A. A. S. W. executive voted to act to ensure their involvement in the Preventive Social Service Program at the municipal level. This action was (temporarily) successful, in Calgary, where an A. A. S. W. representative was appointed to the first abortive Preventive Social Services Advisory Board[265], but was not successful in Edmonton. The Association's overriding concern, however, remained professional status, and in 1966 they met "to reach as clear definition of their role" in the new provincial programs[266]. Self analysis was still more important than policy analysis.

Not all professional social workers were involved in the association at this point. Professional staff in senior positions with municipal and other social agencies communicated directly with the provincial officials, without using the Association as an intermediary. The involvement of these senior municipal administrators is discussed in chapter V. Their membership in the small group consulting with the provincial administrators was based on their administrative positions, not their professional status.

In summary, therefore, the social work profession, as an interest group, had little impact upon the development of provincial social policy in the 1960's. This partly resulted from the history of provincial antipathy for social workers, and partly from the self-absorption of the Association. A few social workers were involved in preliminary discussions of policy changes, but usually because they were senior administrators, not because they were social workers.

Private Sector Social Agencies

The private social service sector was fairly strong in Edmonton and Calgary, but almost non-existent beyond these two metropolitan centres[267]. The Edmonton agencies, in particular, wanted an institutionalized relationship with the province, but the government was not responsive. Politicians' negative views of social workers were reinforced by the representations of some of these private sector social agencies.

When, for example, Edmonton's Family Service Association used the jargon of *their* trade, the minister retreated into a discussion of sheep farming. One can well

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[265] A. A. S. W., Executive Council, minutes, November 21st, 1966.
[266] "Talks Aim to Define Social Workers' Role", *Edmonton Journal*, April 14th, (1966).
[267] The United Way in Edmonton raised $1.3 million in 1966, and that in Calgary $1.2million.

imagine the disgust of an "elite" group of social workers for a minister who applied the principles of sheep breeding to the running of his department. Also, the social workers can have had little effect on the views of the minister who could not understand *their* jargon[268].

Although the provincial administrators had involved senior executives of the United Ways and the Social Planning Councils in preliminary discussions of the reforms[269], they had not included the private agencies that might receive funds under the new P. S. S. program. The counselling agencies, in particular, used an issue-oriented reactive stance with the province. The agencies' concerns were after-the-fact, as they attempted to capture P. S. S. funds. These efforts were aimed at both the province who initiated the program, and the municipalities who controlled the allocation of funds. This struggle for the control of P. S. S. then focussed on the local Preventive Social Service Advisory Boards required under the legislation.

In January 1966 Edmonton Family Service Association wrote to Mayor Dantzer, emphasizing the preventive nature of their agency's services, and endorsing the proposal for an advisory committee[270]. Within three weeks Wass also wrote to Dantzer, proposing a small technical committee to advise his department. Wass made no reference to the F. S. A. letter, and did not include any F. S. A. respresentatives in the list of proposed appointments to the committee. A technical advisory committee, reporting to the Department rather than to Council, was appointed in June 1966, including representatives of other civic departments, nominees from the United Way and Social Planning Council, and two citizens at large. Wass had used advance knowledge gained in his consultations with provincial officials to capture the committee.

In Calgary the dispute over membership on the Social Service Advisory Committee was more open than in Edmonton. The city's private agencies already resented government intrusion into the voluntary sector. An abrasive relationship with the City was exacerbated by advent of the preventive social service program. In Edmonton the membership and status of the social service advisory committee was settled by

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[268] Bill McFarland, in interview, 1977.
[269] This involvement was in the form of meetings at the administrative level that also included the senior administrators of the municipal welfare agencies. This part of the process is outlined in chapter V.
[270] A copy of the letter was sent to Edmonton Social Service Director, Keith Wass, dated January 18th 1966.

administrators in private, but in Calgary City Council debated it openly. The private agencies successfully lobbied for places on the committee[271].

An existing welfare committee of Calgary City Council recommended in March 1966 that the new social service advisory committee include seven members: "Four aldermen, and three from the community at large representing the Board of the United Fund and the fields of Health and Education"[272]. The board later expanded its own membership to include representatives appointed by a number of other community organizations (A. A. S. W., Calgary Interfaith Action Committee, United Fund, Social Planning Council, Juvenile Court, University of Calgary, the Medical Society and the two school boards)[273].

This committee, however, was shortlived. By October 1967 it was split, both internally and with the P. S. S. director Ron Hooper. This limited Calgary's use of P. S. S. funds, a problem highlighted in letters to the editor and eventually brought to the attention of City Council. Council's Legislative Committee heard submissions and recommended restructuring the Committee. In December 1967 Council voted on a new structure, to include three aldermen, one United Way representative, three citizens at large and the P. S. S. director. Future nominations were to be by Council, not by outside organizations[274]. Even this arrangement, however, was not satisfactory, and the committee was reconstituted again, this time as a Committee of Council consisting entirely of aldermen[275].

In addition to struggles over the membership of the boards supervising the new preventive program, the private agencies also became involved in a struggle for spoils. Edmonton's Family Service Association was searching for new funds, and had written to the provincial deputy minister in August 1965. Rogers had replied that he could not provide funding, but that some might be available under the new preventive social service program. Rogers also asked the Association if he could use the F. S. A. letter to support

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[271] Alderman Barbara Scott remembers discussing with private agency board members the lobbying techniques that would be effective. The Calgary Social Planning Council sponsored a public meeting to debate the issue of representation on the City's P. S. S. committee,"Joint Welfare Body Urged", *Calgary Herald*, May 31st, (1966).
[272] City of Calgary, Minutes of Welfare Committee, 1966, pp. 677 - 681.
[273] Calgary, City Council, minutes, 1966, p. 1205.
[274] Calgary, City Council, minutes,,1967, pp. 2178 - 2179.
[275] L. Bella, *Preventive Social Services in Calgary*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1980).

his own submission to Cabinet on preventive services[276], a typical instance of the use by administrators of pressure group support to advance their own policy initiatives. After the passage of P. S. S. legislation F. S. A. successfully applied for funding for their homemaker program. F. S. A., however, then applied for P. S. S. funds for counselling, family life education, a detached youth worker, an in-trainee-program and an urban renewal project[277]. Only the homemaker service was funded, and the agency director, Jackson Willis, protested the City's decision. He described his agency's long term emphasis on prevention:

> ...to this point the family counselling program and the family life education program of the Family Service Association of Edmonton do not qualify for support as a preventive service for the individual and his family. Despite the rapidly growing impersonal urban area, despite the increasing incidence of problems in families - the plea for the development of a multidiscipline family-centred clinic goes unheeded and almost humourously is regarded in some quarters as an attempt to empire build[278].

F. S. A. tried to influence the City's decision. In December 1966 their president W. A. Johnson wrote again to mayor Dantzer, offering the services of one of his board members on the advisory committee[279]. The letter appears to have been discussed by the Commission Board, and then referred to Wass for his comments. Wass described the existing committee and advised the Mayor not to accede to the F. S. A. request:

> I believe it would be a most dangerous precedent to meet the Family Service Association request for respresentation. They had made one application for preventive social service funds to the City, and I know further submissions are forthcoming. I do not believe their representative could be an objective member. Of necessity some agency applications will be rejected due to service priorities, budget limitations, etc., and a committee composed of representatives of agencies whose submissions are under review would have difficulty functioning adequately[280].

The structure of the committee remained unchanged, and the inconsistencies in Wass's arguments remained unchallenged. In Edmonton in 1967 57% of preventive social service funding was allocated to services administered directly by Wass's own City Social Service Department[281]. The City provided social planning, day care services, a teaching homemaker service and various special services, all funded under P. S. S..

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[276] W. A. Johnson to Rogers, August 24th, 1965; Rogers to Johnson, September 1st, 1965. Departmental files.
[277] Family Service Association of Edmonton, *Annual Report*, 1966, p. 5.
[278] Ibid., p. 9.
[279] W. A. Johnson to Mayor Dantzer, December 2nd, 1966.
[280] D. K. Wass to Mayor Dantzer, "Re: Social Service Advisory Committee", December 12th, 1966.
[281] Edmonton, Social Service Department, *Annual Report*, 1967.

Therefore, by "stacking" the committee with representatives of City departments, Wass was ensuring that the committee would allow him to allocate a large proportion of P. S. S. funds to the City's own agencies. This structure paid off over the long term, and by 1980 64% of P. S. S. funds in Edmonton were being spent by the municipal agencies, in comparison with 36% in Calgary[282].

Wass's position on F. S. A. funding reflected his concerns about retaining the size and status of his own department. With the loss of the child welfare function in the reforms of 1966, and with the expectation that financial assistance would eventually also be taken over by the province, his department faced dwindling responsibilities. New roles had to be found for the City's staff. His position was also based in animosity between Wass and Willis. The latter was a broadcaster and showman, and his colourful public image led other social workers to mistrust his counselling skills. The United Way and the Social Planning Council, already members of the advisory committee supported Wass. But, the rivalry between Wass and Willis masked the underlying issue of control of preventive social service funding.

The government's decision not to fund sectarian agencies under P. S. S. was also of concern to private agencies across the province. In several smaller centres sectarian agencies amalgamated, to form a single secular agency[283]. Opposition to this forced amalgamation was led by Catholic Father Pat O'Byrne. Since his banishment to the "wilderness" for helping Charlotte Whitton in the 1940's, O'Byrne had worked across southern Alberta to develop and strengthen Catholic social services. Their loss of identity was a blow to him. Only in Edmonton and Calgary, have Catholic counselling agencies maintained their identity. In Calgary this has been through a federation of counselling agencies, which has been eligible for preventive social service funding. In Edmonton Catholic Family Services survives without P. S. S. funding.

Competing applications for funding for family life education were also presented. In Edmonton the F. S. A. application was turned down in favour of a new volunteer oriented agency. In Edmonton, also, the City has supported its own homemakers through

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[282] L. Bella, *The Development of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1980).
[283] In Medicine Hat and Lethbridge, for example. L. Bella, *The Origins of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1978), chapter 3.

P. S. S., in addition to the F. S. A. program. These instances have further increased the resentment between the private and municipal social service sectors in the City.

The private social agencies in the two major cities adopted a reactive stance to the welfare reforms of 1966. As private interest groups they tried to capture a share of the new funds. Their success depended on the skill with which municipal administrators use advanced knowledge of the P. S. S. program to structure a decision process to their advantage.

Day Care

Day care or the children of working parents was the largest element in the new preventive social service program. The day care lobby was most active of all the welfare interests and was the only social service lobby to influence substantially the provincial cabinet. The day care lobby could also be characterised as a "public" rather than private interest lobby, involving groups whose members would not gain personally from the reforms of 1966. The struggles for expanded and subsidized day care services in Edmonton, Calgary and Lethbridge are outlined below. In other communities the same issues were debated, but once it was established that the province *would* fund subsidized day care, the province was not usually involved in the local debate.

One subsidized day care centre in Edmonton, the Creche, had been operated since 1930 by a group of charitable women. Apparently bored with the centre, in 1964 they proposed to close it[284]. Parents using the Creche opposed the closure, and were supported by the United Way, the Edmonton Social Planning Council (then known as the Edmonton Welfare Council), and by members of Edmonton City Council. Alderman Ed Leger, for example, urged the City to carry on the Creche[285]. The Social Planning Council set up a day care study, and recommended that the Creche be kept open[286]. The United Way operated the centre itself on a temporary basis[287], but its building was to be demolished[288].

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[284] "Protest Mounts over Closure of Day Nursery", *Edmonton Journal*, April 1st, 1964, p. 3.
[285] Op. Cit.
[286] "Welfare Council Supports Creche", *Edmonton Journal*, May 6th, (1964).
[287] "Creche Must be Downtown", *Edmonton Journal*, March 3rd, (1965), p. 4.
[288] "Time Running out on Creche Site", *Edmonton Journal*, March 4, (1965), p. 3.

The Social Planning Council released another survey[289] in December 1965, shortly after the specifics of the new welfare reforms had been announced, suggesting that day care spaces in Edmonton be doubled[290]. The Edmonton Journal (whose efforts in child welfare are described below) supported the Planning Council in editorials[291], and in special articles on day care[292]. The Journal also reported the efforts of various associations in support of day care. Church groups[293], the Alberta Continuing Committee of the Canadian Conference on Children[294], The University Women's Club[295], the Students' Union for Peace and Action[296] and various letters to the editor also supported day care[297].

In February 1966 a coalition was suggested to work for day care, and a public meeting called for action by both provincial and city governments. The City's Social Service Director, D. K. Wass, commented at the meeting on the funding to be available under the new preventive social service program[298]. Meetings continued through February and March, and although a new pro-day care interest group was not formalized, this loose association of existing groups operated informally as an "issue-oriented" pressure group.

In March 1966 Edmonton's Family Service Association's report on Day Care was released, recommending downtown rather than suburban day care. F. S. A., as a city wide social service agency based downtown, identified itself as an approproate sponsor[299]. As in the areas of counselling, family life education and homemaker services, F. S. A. also competed with City Social Services for control of day care programs in Edmonton. In this issue, also, F. S. A. operated as a private rather than public interest group. Both the Social Planning Council and the F. S. A. proposals were presented to a sympathetic City

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[289] "Survey", *Edmonton Journal*, April 22nd, (1965), p. 21. The study was released in December 1965 under the title *An Assessment of Need for Day Care Services for Children of Unemployed Mothers in Edmonton.*
[290] "City Welfare Council Urges Doubling of Day Care Facilities", *Edmonton Journal*, December 6th, (1965), p. 3.
[291] "Day Nurseries", *Edmonton Journal*, December 7th, (1965), p. 4.
[292] Karen Harding, "A Nursery Story", parts i and ii, *Edmonton Journal*, January 18th (1966), p. 9 and January 19th, (1966), p. 11.
[293] "Stand on Day Care is Praised", *Edmonton Journal*, January 19th, (1966)., p. 17.
[294] Karen Harding, "Public Meeting Called on Day Care Centres", *Edmonton Journal*, January 22ns, (1966), p. 17.
[295] "Meeting to discuss Day Nurseries", *Edmonton Journal*, February 2nd, (1966), p. 19.
[296] "Day Nurseries: Meetings", *Edmonton Journal*, Feburary 8th, (1966), p. 15.
[297] See *Edmonton Journal*, January 28th, February 5th, February 7th, February 15th, February 23rd and February 25th, (1966).
[298] K. Harding, "Day Nurseries", *Edmonton Journal*, February 16th, (1966), p. 23.
[299] "Sweeping Day Care Changes Recommended", *Edmonton Journal*, March 23rd, (1966).

Council. Although Alderman Julia Kiniski attacked working mothers and withheld her support, recommendations for increased day care were referred to the administration for a report[300].

Although the City alderman were generally supportive of day care expansion, the provincial cabinet had not yet accepted subsidized day care as within the guidelines for preventive social service funding. The Minister of Welfare, Len Halmrast, protested that the provincial government would not use public money to "provide babysitters for working mothers". Day Care centres, he added, might be eligible for P. S. S. funding only if the mothers could not provide the necessities of life without working[301].

Edmonton's Mayor Dantzer, concerned about the possibility of losing funds for this important program, led a City delegation to meet with the provincial cabinet. Dantzer, Keith Wass, a board member from the Social Planning Council and a day care mother, met with the full cabinet. The meeting was not publicized, and few appear to remember it[302]. Wass comments that the day care mother "did a helluva good sales job"[303] explaining that without day care services she would be on welfare. The Cabinet, moved by the sincerity of a person in need, agreed that daycare should be approved as a preventive service for those who would otherwise be on welfare.

The day care lobby, therefore, was successful in convincing the province of the need for the program. But, the lobby's effectiveness was less due to their issue-oriented strategy, than to the ready access of municipal politicians to their provincial counterparts. Leadership had not come from the various groups that made up the day care lobby, for these remained issue-oriented and lacked institutional relationships with the province. The City of Edmonton (see chapter V) retained access to the province at both political and administrative levels. The United Ways and the Social Planning Councils also retained access at the *administrative* level, but in the context of meetings that also includes the municipal social service directors from the two major cities.

Groups interested in day care continued to be active in Edmonton as they awaited

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[300] "Public Money Cannot Provide Babysitters", *Edmonton Journal*, April 9th, (1966).
[301] "Public Money Cannot Provide Babysitters", *Edmonton Journal*, April 9th, (1966), p. 15.
[302] John Smith, then director of P. S. S., associates this meeting with the turbulent Hooke period, when as minister he refused to approve *any* P. S. S. projects, but Wass does not remeber this as being the case.
[303] Wass in interview, 1977.

response to their Council submissions[304]. At the end of June 1966 Mayor Dantzer announced that the City *would* be including day care in its program of preventive services, and would hire a day care director, and day care centre fees would be scaled according to means[305]. Licensing standards would be introduced, and the old Edmonton Creche (by now renamed Edmonton Community Day Nursery) would be part of the new program. A new municipally operated centre would be built in the suburbs, rather than under private sponsorship downtown as recommended by F. S. A.. D. K. Wass had again expanded his own programs, and limited the role of F. S. A.. Dantzer's proposals were approved in principle by City Council, with the dissent of Julia Kiniski who wanted subsidies payed to mothers to keep them at home[306]. However, by mid-1966 responsibility for day care had been accepted by both Edmonton and the provincial government.

The day care issue took a different form in southern Alberta, where two competing day care lobbies were evident. One informal alliance of public interest groups struggled for subsidized public day care, while the commercial day care lobby protested unfair competition from a subsidized public sector. The development of day care in Calgary and Lethbridge both show the results of this competition.

In Calgary a service club had operated a non-profit day care centre[307], but like the operators of the Creche in Edmonton, they were unable to maintain services[308]. Under P. S. S. the City of Calgary funded a day care study by the City's Social Planning Council. After the initial hiatus caused by conflict over the membership on the Preventive Social Service Committee, Calgary also moved into subsidized day care.

The commercial day care operators protested this "unfair competition" from high quality ("cadillac") subsidized centres. The private day care lobby challenged Council, which responded to the market-based arguments of the commercial operators. Eventually Calgary cut (nominally) the standards in their own centres in a vain attempt to

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[304] *Edmonton Journal*, June 2nd, (1966), p. 6; June 7th (1966), p. 3; The University Women's Club also continued to press the Minister for more day care, "Day Care Results Urged", June 10th, (1966), p. 7. See also "Report Awaited on Tot Centres", May 26th (1966), p. 3.
[305] "Day Care Services Program Proposed", *Edmonton Journal*, June 29th, (1966), p. 3.
[306] "Heresy", *Edmonton Journal*, June 6th, (1966), p. 4.
[307] "Day Nursery Has Become Second Home to Children", *Calgary Herald*, Oct. 16th, (1953).
[308] "Six Month Survey Planned of Need for Day Nursery", *Calgary Herald*, Dec. 1st, 1955.

reduce private sector opposition. The commercial operators also challenged the province every time higher province-wide day care standards were proposed. To solve this ongoing political problem the province introduced in 1978 a portable day care subsidy program. City politicians responded enthusiatically, but Calgary's own welfare administrators, and the supporters of public day care, resisted the new program. For both the province and for the Calgary's aldermen, however, the program solved a long-standing conflict between "public" and "private" day care lobbies[309].

A similar but more bitter conflict took place in Lethbridge. The first attempt to develop public day care foundered on community opposition. The provincial minister had been summoned from Edmonton to meet a stormy protest meeting. The private operators objected to subsidized public sector competition, and some people objected in principle to day care for small children. The minister withdrew his department's approval for a subsidized day care project in Lethbridge, until the local dispute had been resolved.

A head-start program was successfully introduced, however, and expanded to several locations. In the 1970's the organization running head-start expanded into day care, and with more careful preparation of their case obtained P. S. S. funding. Opposition recurred and continued to trouble municipal and provincial politicians until the introduction of the portable subsidy program in 1978. Now the advantages of the subsidy are available to both profit and non-profit operators.

While the non-profit day care supporters have had public interest motives, the commercial sector has been more concerned about its own interests. Their market-based arguments about unfair competition from subsidized "cadillac" day care centres have found sympathy with municipal politicians in southern Alberta. The more public-interest arguments and the statist philosophy implied in public day care has not been accepted either by the provincial government or in southern Alberta. In northern Alberta, in contrast, the commercial day care sector has met with less sympathy on municipal councils[310].

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[309] L. Bella, *The Development of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1980), p. 53.
[310] L. Bella, *The Development of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, Ibid.

Native Groups

In Alberta the provincial government retains responsibility for the Metis population, and in the 1960's also accepted some responsibility for Indians in the province. Provincial legislation to help the Metis included the Metis Betterment Legislation of the 1940's, and a number of provisions for Metis "colonies" or "settlements" similar to the Reservations established for Treaty Indians.

By the 1960's Alberta's native people were still relatively acquiescent, occasionally expressing concerns through their formal organizations. In 1963, for example, leaders met and advocated changes to relief (to require that it be repayed), to eliminate compulsory schooling, to provide free school lunches, to rewrite the Indian Act intelligibly, and to obtain more permissive fishing regulations for natives[311].

The native people of Alberta, however, became more forceful as pressure groups under the community development program of 1964. This program attempted to assist and encourage people of indian ancestry to meet their special social and economic problems[312]. This provincial initiative originated with a northern resources inquiry sponsored by the provincial government in 1963, which exposed a number of M. L. A.'s to the problems of the Metis[313]. The provincial Minister of Municipal Affairs, Fred Colborne, met community development workers from Ottawa and from Manitoba, where a program had been in operation since 1961. These workers convinced the minister that community development was the panacea that would restore the individual initiative and independence of native people. Accordingly, in 1964 a program was begun under Colborne.

The results of this program were not as anticipated by the provincial cabinet. Community development helped native groups develop tactics that soon produced confrontation with the province. The Hay Lakes protest exemplifies this pattern of confrontation. The Indians were a federal responsibility, but marched on the *provincial*

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311 "Welfare, School, Indian Act Changes", *Edmonton Journal*, March 7th, (1963), p. 19.
312 "Relief no Solution for Metis", *Edmonton Journal*, Jan 3, (1964), p. 3; "Self Help Plan for Indians, *Calgary Herald*, March 21, (1964); "Pilot Program will Assist Indian, Metis", *Edmonton Journal*, Feb 25th, (1964).
313 F. Colborne and L. Bella, "Community Development: A View from the Top", *Perception*, I, No. 4, (1978), pp. 36 – 40.

legislature, asking provincial officials to pressure the federal government[314]. These tactics produced verbal commitment to reform[315]. But, the native groups had used tactics typical of an issue-oriented group more concerned with publicity than public relations, and they continued to be caught in the vise of federal provincial relations[316].

For the provincial cabinet events like the Hay Lakes protest were confusing. As Colborne remembers Cabinet reaction:

> ....There are fifteen or seventeen guys, most of whom don't know what's going on at all and have never been exposed to the ideas in depth. Suddenly they discover that some stupid cabinet minister has set up a fifth column out in a community to undermine government, stir up the people, get them dissatisfied when everything was peaceful and quiet. That's the way they saw it. They thought of these community developers as communist infiltrators, agitators, upsetting everybody, with no good purpose, all evil, bad. Now that wasn't all of Cabinet. Some of Cabinet understood what was going on and realized.....
> L. B. Did Premier Manning understand?
> F. C. Manning .....I don't think Manning understood fully. I think he was carried along by his loyalty to his minister, whom he trusted. I think Manning believed that I was not doing anything to hurt the government and was willing to listen. He had some doubts and I'm sure there were times when he was unhappy. I put him through terrible things, really, confrontations with Indian people that they'd never experienced before in government[317].

Jim Whitford, coordinator of the community development program, encouraged native organizations to press for change[318], but his own high profile endangered the program. In 1967 it was absorbed by the Human Resources Development program. Colborne believes this absorption was a deliberate attempt to stifle the aggressive approach taken in community development[319]. However, this submersion of the program did not occur until after a base of native organization had been established in the province. The native organizations had created issue-oriented pressure groups, and although these did not influence policy in the 1960's, in the 1970's they became the more mature and broadly based organizations that tackled aboriginal rights and other major issues.

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[314] "We're People, Indian Marchers tell City", *Edmonton Journal*, Feb 22nd, (1965), p. 1; "Ottawa Man to See Indians", *Edmonton Journal*, Feb 23rd, (1965), p. 1; "These Canadian People", Ibid., p. 4.
[315] "Official Promises to Aid Indians", *Edmonton Journal*, Feb 24th, (1965), p. 1; "Indians Leave with Aid Promise", *Edmonton Journal* February 25th, (1965), p. 1.
[316] "Ottawa Should Continue to Assume Responsibility", *Edmonton Journal*, Feb 26th, (1965), p. 3. "Alberta Refuses Indian Welfare Responsibility", *Edmonton Journal*, January 10th, (1966), p. 1.
[317] F. Colborne and L. Bella, ibid., p. 39.
[318] "Indians Await Agreement", *Edmonton Journal*, January 27, (1966), p. 23.
[319] Colborne and Bella, Op. Cit.

The Press and the Child Welfare Lobby

None of the pressure groups described above (the social workers, the private social agencies, the day care lobby and the native organizations) were more than issue-oriented. Organized, broad-based consistent review and criticism of government policy and programs was left to the press - in particular, to the province's newspapers. The daily papers in Edmonton and Calgary, expressing the concerns of a growing urban population, were particularly critical of the social policies of a Social Credit government whose base was in rural and small town Alberta.

In 1935 these newspapers had been critical of Social Credit economic principles[320]. Because of the antithetical structure of Social Credit thinking (see chapter III), Aberhart and his followers reacted strongly to this criticism, condemning the press, and eventually passing legislation in an attempt to reduce opposition[321]. This would have required the press to print government statements countering their own articles, and to identify those who had written items or given information for such articles[322].

The Alberta newspapers campaigned against this legislation, and suggested that Aberhart was a Hitler-like leader[323]. This campaign focussed international attention on Aberhart's government, and the Pullitzer prize was awarded to the province's newspapers for their campaign against the legislation[324]. The legislation was struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1938 with a comment that:

> Freedom of discussion is essential to enlighten public opinion in a democratic state; it cannot be curtailed without affecting the right of the people to be informed through sources independent of the government concerning matters of public interest[325].

This initial skirmish was symptomatic of the relationship that continued untill the 1960's between the Social Credit government and the province's newspapers. Criticisms of the government's social programs, and a series of campaigns for welfare reforms, formed one part of the continual criticism of the government by the written press. Child welfare programs, particularly, were criticised in the press as a series of crises and

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[320] R. C. Hill, "Social Credit and the Press; The Early Years", unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1977, p. 55.
[321] Alberta, An Act to Ensure the Publication of Accurate News and Information, Alberta Legislature, 1937.
[322] Hill, ibid., p. 3.
[323] Hill, ibid., p. 47.
[324] Ibid., p. 10.
[325] Canada, *Supreme Court Reports*, (1938), pp. 145 - 146.

tragedies produced worthwhile copy.

The Whitton report of 1947 provide grist for the mill. The Calgary Herald, particularly, responded to this report[326], charging among other things that a black market in babies existed with the United States. The provincial government created their own inquiry (The Howson Report), and after it found provincial services inadequate some improvements were made. In 1949 changes in the Child Welfare Act and the Bureau of Public Welfare Act provided for the province to assumed a larger share of municipal costs for child welfare and relief. The province, in announcing these changes, made no verbal or written reference to either its own inquiry or to Whitton's study[327].

Child welfare issues came to prominence again ten years later, in 1958, when the killing of a child by his father resulted in a much publicised trial. This incident occurred on military land, and was therefore a provincial rather than municipal responsibility. The Edmonton Journal followed the case in detail[328], and in an editorial recommended that such incidents could be prevented by the development of a Children's Aid Society in the province, similar to those providing child welfare services in Ontario[329].

The Edmonton Journal led the campaign for the creation of such an institution, and received scores of letters and phone calls in support[330]. The Director of the City's Council of Community Services (i.e., the Welfare Council or the Social Planning Council) called for a study of the need for such a body[331]; the Legion [332], the East Edmonton Businessmen [333], the Canadian Handicrafts League[334] and the Study Group for Family Welfare Services[335] all supported the creation of a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (S. P. C. C.).

This publicity coincided with the Alberta Social Credit League's Annual Convention, and party members supported the proposals advocated by the Edmonton Journal and by

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[326] Liberal leader Harper Prowse commented that "it wasn't until the I. O. D. E. and the Calgary Herald set a fire under the government that they moved"; *Calgary Herald*, March 16th, (1949), p. 2.
[327] *Calgary Herald*, February 17th, (1949).
[328] *Edmonton Journal*, Oct 2, 1958, p. 1; Oct. 3rd, 1958, p. 1; Nov 17th, 1958, p. 1, 2; Nov 18th, 1958, p. 1, 2; Nov 19, 1958, p. 1, 2.
[329] *Edmonton Journal*, Nov. 20th, 1958, p. 4.
[330] *Edmonton Journal*, Nov. 22nd, 1958, p. 1, 2.
[331] Op. Cit.
[332] "Canadian Legion Supports S. P. C. C.", *Edmonton Journal*, Nov 24th, (1958), p. 3;
[333] Letter to the Editor, *Edmonton Journal*, Nov. 25th, (1958), p. 4.
[334] "75,000 interested in Society", *Edmonton Journal*, Nove. 27th, (1958), p. 1.
[335] Letter to the Editor, *Edmonton Journal*, Nov. 27th, (1958), p. 4.

so many community organizations. A. J. Hooke, then provincial secretary, was enthusiastic, and volunteered to call a meeting on the issue. The Convention passed a resolution deploring the child welfare tragedy and supporting the creation of an S. P. C. C. [336].

However, the society was not created. A number of community groups came forward with reservations, not about the intention of an S. P. C. C., but about the mechanism. Jackson Willis, executive director of Edmonton Family Service Bureau (later Edmonton Family Service Association) wrote in this vein:

> Thus, instead of a 'solution' encompassing a 'new private agency', a more effective course might be to start with an examination of existing facilities to give them greater support, and to make better use of them. This same principle applies to existing private agencies *(presumably including Willis' own agency - author's addition)* where staff shortages and limited support also apply[337].

The Journal's campaign for a private children's aid society halted at this point, with their own editorial reiterating Willis' position[338]. Community enthusiasm also began to falter. The Chamber of Commerce decided not to act on the proposal to create an S. P. C. C., commenting that the City and the province were already responsible for child welfare[339].

After 1960 the role of the newspapers in promoting child welfare reform then shifted. The province began the reform process, and attempted to gain public support through a study committee[340]. The newspapers shifted from overt criticism to basic support of provincial reform initiatives. The Edmonton Journal, for example, quoted the speeches made by various provincial welfare officials and presented several series on welfare issues[341].

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[336] "75,000 Interested in Society", *Edmonton Journal*, Nov 27th, (1958), p. 1.
[337] "Aid Existing Services", *Edmonton Journal*, Nov. 29, (1958), p. 4.
[338] *Edmonton Journal*, December 4th, (1958), p. 4.
[339] *Edmonton Journal*, Dec. 11th, (1958), p. 3.
[340] Members included Ken Crockett, Thelma Scambler, Betty Farrell, Ande Dorosh and Dave Critchley. The result of their study was the creation of the province's first information and referral centre, operated in Edmonton with provincial and municipal support.
[341] For example, a series by Irene Hart in December 1964 and in January 1965; one by John Barr in June and November of 1965; and by Karen Harding in January and February of 1966.

The Province Stimulates Public Support for Child Welfare Reform

A major characteristic of Canadian pressure groups is the tendency for them to be manipulated by government, to stimulate support for initiatives already determined by government. The child welfare reforms of 1966 exemplify this approach by government.

In the five years after the tragedy of 1958 the province's child welfare programs were strengthened under the leadership of the new Deputy Minister Duncan Rogers. A qualified social worker was hired, and became Director of Child Welfare. Regional offices were opened, and more staff hired, to give the Department a presence all over Alberta. No major scandals or tragedies tickled the fancy of the press, and the next issue was defined by the province, rather than the media.

By 1962 the illegitimate birth rate in the province was climbing and fewer couples wanted to adopt children. More children, many of them Catholic and/or Metis, were remaining provincial wards. The welfare minister, Len Halmrast, had long been convinced that one particular policy change would solve this problem. In 1952 as Minister of Welfare, he had been aware of the problem:

> We were accumulating so many children, you see, in these orphan homes, that could not be put up for adoption because of the Catholic view (*which would not allow children of Catholic parents adopted into protestant homes - author's addition*). So I said to my Deputy one day (I had been minister for about a month) – "Something has to be done about this – we'll have to change that" and he just laughed at me. "Well" he said, "You just try it". I said "I'm going to try it". But I was only there for a year, and I never had a chance at it[342].

Mr Halmrast was offered the welfare portfolio again in 1962, and he made his acceptance conditional on the premier's agreement to promote a policy change allowing children born of Catholic parents to be adopted into protestant families. Halmrast quoted in interview his memory of this interview with premier Manning:

> But he said "that year you had welfare, you mentioned a couple of things that you thought should be done, but were not done under Mr Jorgensen. He was a little concerned about confrontations with the Catholics or Jews, or some others in this child welfare situation, so he pretty well let the thing ride out."
> "Oh, Yes" I said, "there were some things there that I wanted to do, and I still think they should be done. I would be inclined to take a chance at it. I think it would be a real challenge".
> And it was – a real challenge. But, I did some of the things I talked about, I put them through.[343]

Halmrast *was* to have difficulty getting the reforms through, particularly the one concerned with the religion of adoptive children and parents. He faced opposition both in

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[342] L. C. Halmrast, in interview with L. Bella, 1977.
[343] L. C. Halmrast, in interview with L. Bella, 1977.

cabinet and in the community. Fred Colborne, the sole Catholic in cabinet, commented:

> F. C. I was very much opposed to this. I believed that a child born to a Roman Catholic mother should be raised Roman Catholic regardless, and should not be adopted by anyone except a Roman Catholic. I don't believe that now, but that's what I believed then. I was a loyal Catholic.
> L. B. How did you deal with that in Cabinet?
> F. C. I just raised Hell every time we talked about it. I lost out[344].

The first time Halmrast brought the proposal to Cabinet Colborne's opposition was sufficiently effective that it was decided to "let it rest for a while"[345]. So, the minister proposed a committee to study child welfare in the province. Cabinet accepted this proposal[346], and Judge Patterson, a Catholic lawyer and Mrs Marjorie Bowker were appointed. The committee was brought into the minister's office, and Halmrast told them that he wanted their report to support the change in the adoption law to allow children of Catholic parents to be adopted into protestant homes. The committee was intended to do a sales job[347], and according to the province's Director of Child Welfare they did just that:

> That committee did a fantastic job of educating public opinion because they really had public hearings in various places; they did the preparatory work for what happened later.(*Marjorie Bowker*) agreed with the main report, but she wanted to add her own, so she wrote a whole book herself. They did a lot of public relations work, and at that point so did the rest of the Department[348].

As indicated by McFarland, the senior provincial administrators also made many public addresses. The Director of Child Welfare, for example, publicised the problems as adoptive homes became less available[349], the problems of child abuse[350] and adoption promotion[351].

But, even after this public relations work, and after the positive report of the provincial government's own committee (The Patterson Report), opposition was still

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[344] Fred Colborne, in interview with L. Bella, 1977.
[345] L. C. Halmrast, in interview with L. Bella, 1977.
[346] "Adoption Act Changes Postponed for Survey", *Calgary Herald*, Feb. 25th, (1964).
[347] The committee heard mothers, adoptive parents, an Edmonton Study Group and the Edmonton Welfare Department(*Edmonton Journal*, March 2nd, 1965, p. 19; March 3rd, 1965, p. 4.); the St Thomas More Guild, and the Province's Department of Welfare (*Edmonton Journal*, March 4th 1965, p. 3.). The Committee members also accepted speaking as well as listening engagements(*Edmonton Journal*, Jan 13, 1966, p. 17).
[348] W. McFarland, in interview with L. Bella, 1977.
[349] "Illegitimate Birthrate Surges as Child Adoption Totals Decline", *Edmonton Journal*, Dec. 8, 1962, p. 3.
[350] "Battered Child Remains Vexing Problem", *Edmonton Journal*, April 18th, 1964, p. 3.; "Child Neglect", *Edmonton Journal*, March 14th, 1966, p. 4.
[351] "Single People can Adopt a Child Here", *Edmonton Journal*, Jan 4th, 1966, p. 9.; "Adoption Meet Draws Record Crowd", *Edmonton Journal*, Feb 22, 1966, p. 13.

expressed by representatives of the Catholic Community[352]. One Catholic group protested to the premier[353], but Manning supported his Minister "One hundred percent"[354]. This change was included in the 1966 Child Welfare Act. Also in this new legislation the province tookover municipal child welfare programs. The latter provision received far less public attention, for it was not the focus of pressure group activity. The municipal welfare administrators, who might have opposed such a takeover had been "consulted", and bought off with the new municipal program of preventive services (see chapter V).

C. Interest Groups and the Reforms of 1966

Most of the interest groups whose activities have been the subject of this chapter were based in the urban state middle class growing in Alberta in the 1960's. With the exception of the native groups, all were urban, and dominated by the traditional public sector professions. The social workers and the counselling agencies, and many of the organizations participating in the day care and child welfare lobbies, were all urban and were predominantly middle class. None, however, effectively influenced welfare reforms.

The social workers, the counselling agencies and the commercial day care operators lobbied as private interest groups. None were consulted about the form that social policy should take, and all had therefore to be reactive. The social workers were self-absorbed and mistrusted, and therefore lacked credibility. The private counselling agencies tried to capture P. S. S. funds, but with a level of success that varied inversely with the political skills of municipal social welfare administrators. The commercial day care sector stalled the development of subsidized day care in some municipalities, and influenced the development of a new provincial day care program in the late 1970's, but did not affect *provincial* policies in the 1960's.

The newspapers, the public day care lobby and the child welfare lobby were more typically public interest in orientation. But, the urban dailies were still not trusted by a provincial government that had legislated to control them in the 1930's. Both the day care

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[352] An example is the letter to the editor of the *Edmonton Journal* by the Catholic Archbishop(March 8, 1966, p. 2). Although the paper also printed a letter from Halmrast, the paper's own editorial the following day supported the Bishop(March 9, 1966, p. 4).
[353] "R. C. Group Gives Views on Adoption", *Edmonton Journal*, March 10th, 1066, p. 3.
[354] Halmrast, in interview, 1977.

lobby and the child welfare lobby only became credible and effective when (in the case of day care) they used an existing channel to Cabinet via the municipal politicians, or (as in the case of child welfare) the information was produced by a government inquiry.

This chapter has shown that although interest groups were pushing for welfare reform in Alberta, and although these groups were based in the urban areas where the need for the welfare state was typically greatest, these pressure groups were *not* the major link between social change and the policy process that introduced the welfare state. The process of interest group liberalism, with policy makers responding to pressures from interest groups, did not apply to the Social Credit government of Alberta's approach to the development of social policy. Pressure groups linked the growth of the urban middle class to the policy process, but with the exception of the one meeting with cabinet over day care, these links did not influence social policy. Moreover, more influential than these interest groups developing spontaneously from the concerns of the urban middle class, were the Boards, Commissions and inquiries *created* by government. For example, the government created a committee to *promote* the child welfare reforms of 1966, thereby using a mechanism usually considered as providing input *to* government rather than output. The Alberta government did not just respond to public opinion and to pressure group activity, rather took an active role in molding public opinion.

V. PROVINCIAL MUNICIPAL RELATIONS AND ALBERTA SOCIAL POLICY

Urbanization was among the social changes described in chapter II. Between 1958 and 1969 the proportion of Albertans living in cities increased from 47% to 59%. Several possible linkages between this shift and the policy process have already been explored. Chapter III suggested that Social Credit responded to perceived threat from the left, but not to the more realistic threat from an urban party of the right. Chapter IV suggested that urban-based pressure groups attempted to influence the provincial policy process, but only succeeded when they were allied with a municipal government. This chapter looks at the impact of these municipal governments themselves on provincial policy. The influence of the political leaders and senior administrators of these burgeoning municipalities will be shown to have been greater than that of the issue-oriented pressure groups described in chapter IV, but still not a major influence in public policy.

Although they are another level of government, because of the weakness of their constitutional and other resources, the municipal governments were to have a place in the provincial government policy process analogous to that of mature and institutional pressure groups[355]. Municipal/provincial intergovernmental relations in this instance had more in common with the pressure group process described in chapter IV, than with the federal/provincial intergovernmental process described in chapter VI. However, the significance of the municipal role was increased by several conditions; by urbanization which concentrated more of the electorate in two major urban areas; by the position of municipalities as the administrators of existing social welfare programs; and, by the ideology of the ruling Social Credit party, which favoured local government autonomy. In Canada however, the influence of local governments is reduced by their constitutional position as dependents of the provincial governments, leaving them with few political resources in intergovernmental relations. All these conditions coincided under Social Credit in Alberta, so that the municipalities were more like effective pressure groups (for the larger cities) or a mature pressure group (the Union of Alberta Municipalities, U. A. M., representing the smaller municipalities).

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[355] As discussed in the previous chapter, Pross classifies pressure groups as institutionalized, mature, fledgling or issue oriented, depending on several criteria including the multiplicity of their objectives, their institutionalization and the extent of their resources.

In the 1960's most provinces were taking over municipal social welfare programs. Many municipal politicians, who found welfare programs a financial burden and a political liability, welcomed this trend. Municipal welfare administrators, however, were less enthusiastic, for they would lose their departments. Resistance from this group might have been more open, and found the provincial cabinet sympathetic. But, provincial administrators promoting the takeover co-opted the municipal administrators by involving them in token discussions of the new programs. The provincial administrators therefore treated the municipalities as if they were significant pressure groups. The Social Credit government supported strengthened local autonomy. This ideology led cabinet to be cautious about taking over municipal programs, slowing provincial centralization. Also, the new municipal Preventive Social Service program was introduced to ensure some continued municipal initiative.

This chapter shows that these conditions led the Alberta municipalities to be more effective than the issue-oriented pressure groups described in chapter IV. However, even under these conditions, the municipalities did not produce major modifications to the welfare reforms of 1966. Instead the large municipalities were alerted to new provincial policy initiatives, and used this advance information to take better advantage of the program.

A. Urban Growth in Alberta

Urban growth in the province increased the electoral significance of the urban municipalities, particularly Edmonton and Calgary[356]. But malapportionment delayed the electoral impact of urban growth. In 1963 over half the population already lived in Edmonton and Calgary, but less than 1/3 of the seats were in these two major urban areas. The 19 seats in these two cities compared with 45 in the rest of Alberta (see Table 3.2). By the 1967 provincial election this imbalance continued, with 20 seats in Edmonton and Calgary and 45 in the rest of Alberta.

Although most of Alberta's electorate were now in Edmonton and Calgary, the majority of seats were still in small town and rural Alberta. Until 1967, however, all of

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[356] The process of urbanization has been described in chapter II.

the metropolitan constituencies were held by Social Credit, and as was suggested in chapter III, urban competition to the governing party was not yet evident. Neither of the byelections lost by the government in this period were in Edmonton or Calgary. Therefore, the government could feel reasonably secure in these two cities.

While the pattern of *provincial* politics did not increase the influence of the urban areas in the provincial policy process, municipal politics might also have increased the government's sense of threat. The party background of those successful in the civic elections of the two major cities (the success of municipal councillors of N. D. P. or Liberal persuasion, for Liberals were often described as "socialist" by Social Credit) might appear a threat to Social Credit.

Non-partisan municipal politics were typical of Alberta during this period. "Alphabet" parties, not officially tied to major national of provincial parties, were active in Edmonton, Calgary and Lethbridge[357]. However, although *officially* non-partisan, the aldermen, particularly in Edmonton, did have party ties. Party politics was submerged but ever present[358]. In 1962 William Hawrelak, open about his Liberal ties, was elected Mayor of Edmonton, defeating a well known C. C. F. incumbent. The leaders of the labour-based Edmonton Voter's Association (E. V. A.) suggested that the Liberals dominated Edmonton's City Council[359], and Anderson suggests that the "bias of non-partisanship" favoured the provincially unpopular Liberals, because their party label did not appear on the non-partisan municipal ballots[360].

The presence of a strong contingent of Liberals on Edmonton's City Council, with a Liberal or C. C. F. mayor, might lead a Social Credit provincial government to be wary of translation of this support into a provincial swing away from Social Credit. This would reinforce any sense of threat from the left resulting from the byelection defeats outside Edmonton and Calgary described in chapter III.

This party difference could have affected the response of Social Credit provincial government to requests and demands from the municipal governments. The difference in

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[357] J. K. Masson, "The Ebb and Flow of Municipal Party Politics in Alberta", C. Caldarola, (ed.), *Society and Politics in Alberta*, (Methuen, 1979), pp. 356 - 368.
[358] G. M. Betts, "The Edmonton Aldermanic Election of 1962", unpublished M. A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1963, p. 239. All parties appeared active.
[359] Betts, ibid., p. 241.
[360] J. Anderson, "Origins of Nonpartisan Urban Politics in Canada", J. Anderson and J. K. Masson, *Emerging Party Politics in Urban Canada*, (McClelland and Stewart, 1972), pp. 5 - 21.

party could have increased tension, or as was suggested by Simeon in his study of federal provincial relationships[361], party could have been irrelavent in those negotiations. This chapter shows that municipal/provincial relations, at both the administrative and the political level, were unaffected by partisan considerations. Although the expansion of Edmonton and Calgary did not alter the political level interchange between provincial and municipal governments at the political level, *administrative* relations *were* affected. The major Alberta cities had developed large social service departments. The administrators of these departments were consulted privately by provincial administrators over planned welfare reforms. This process was analogous to the involvement of institutional pressure groups in the public policy process.

B. The Municipality and the Welfare State

The historical position of the municipality at the core of the poor relief system is key to understanding its significance in pressing for welfare reform. The B. N. A. Act of 1867 assigned health, welfare and municipal affairs to the provincial governments[362]. In English Canada[363], following practice derived from England's Elizabethan poor laws[364], local government assumed responsibility for poor relief.

This emphasis on local responsibility was challenged in Canada by the catastrophic depression of the 1930's. Faced with massive unemployment, the municipalities were financially incapable of providing adequate relief, and the provinces (and later also the federal government) intervened. However, although provincial intervention had proved necessary in the depression, consensus did not emerge in the post-war period on the welfare role of local government.

Papers submitted to the Reconstruction Conferences of 1943 and 1945

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[361] R. Simeon, *Federal Provincial Diplomacy*, (University of Toronto Press, 1972).
[362] The B. N. A. Act of 1867, s. 92, listing provincial responsiblities includes "92.7 The Establishment, Maintenance and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the province, other than Marine Hospitals." Section 92.8 reads "Municipal Institutions in the Province".
[363] The poor law relief system of Quebec had strong roots in the religious rather than the secular institutions of that province. See A. G. Reid, "The First Poor Relief System of Canada", *Canadian Historical Review*, XXVII, No. 4, (1946), pp. 424 - 431.
[364] H. L. Wilensky and C. N. Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare*, (Russell Sage, 1958), p. 148.

advocated a *national* program of social security. The Marsh Report, for example[365], was modelled on William Beveridge's proposals for social insurance in Great Britain[366], and proposed income security and a managed economy. Although federal/provincial agreement on social welfare or other national issues was not forthcoming, over the next few decades many of the advocated programs were introduced. Federal cost-shared programs, and provincial legislation to take advantage of federal funding were introduced.

Gradually across Canada the two senior levels of government assumed more responsibility for welfare, but without consensus on a lessened municipal role. In 1964 a social work educator noted that only 3% of health and welfare costs were then being met by local government, and the centralist trend seemed almost inevitable. He favoured retention of local government welfare involvement:

> Everything seems to call for large units of administration and for more highly skilled and specialized services, if only to ensure the necessary range of services and essential coordination and flexibility of service.... to guarantee their availability to those who need them.
>
> In spite of these evident pressures for the abolition of the local unit of administration, I am convinced that our next major task in public welfare administration is to invent administrative devices that will expand, enlarge and extend municipal participation in welfare administration[367].

Morgan sums up his three main points. First, in 1964 local administration was being strengthened, and could tackle the complex tasks associated with public welfare. Second, such local government responsibility was essential for "political responsibility". And, third, "the very nature of welfare services requires local operational units of administration, with a range of choices in decisions to serve the client"[368]. Therefore, although the role of the municipality in social welfare had declined in Canada in the post-war years, this debate continued in the sixties.

In Alberta the provincial takeover of municipal welfare functions proceeded more slowly. This reflected the Social Credit philosophy that decried the welfare state (see chapter III and below), and the less urban and industrialized nature of the province. Controversies of the 1940's also retarded the development of a *provincial* alternative to

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[365] L. C. Marsh, *Report on Social Security for Canada*, (King's Printer, 1943).
[366] W. Beveridge, *Social Insurance and Allied Services*, (Macmillan, 1942).
[367] J. S. Morgan, "The Contribution of the Municipality to the Administration of Public Welfare", *Canadian Public Administration*, VII, No. 2, (1964), pp. 137 - 149.
[368] Morgan, *Op. Cit.*, and A. Leigh, "Municipalities and Public Welfare", *Canadian Welfare*, XL, No. 1, (1964), pp. 16 - 22.

municipal welfare.

In the post-war period, while Marsh's proposals for national programs were being considered in Ottawa, another well known figure in the welfare field was making contradictory recommendations in Alberta. Charlotte Whitton was invited by the I. O. D. E. (Imperial Order of Daughters of the Empire) to study social welfare programs in Alberta. Her critique of child welfare services[369] attracted the public attention, but her recommendations for strengthening municipal welfare institutions were probably more important. She contradicted the recommendations of the Marsh Report and other contemporary documents, showing instead a preference for municipal and voluntary control of social programs rather than national and provincial control.

Whitton's 1947 study criticised the centralization reflected in Alberta's child welfare legislation, even though this did provide for municipal administration of the program[370]. She also criticised the province's assumption of responsibility for limited aspects of public assistance. She recommended a system of local self government, with District Welfare Units responsible to Public Welfare Boards. The Boards would include respresentatives from municipal councils within the district, residents directly elected to the Boards, one person appointed by the provincial government and two members nominated by the Council of Social Agencies. Financial resposibility would be apportioned between the provincial government and the municipalities. The consolidation of smaller municipal units would solve the municipalities' financial incapacity[371]. Whitton considered this better than either provincial subsidy (which would create "financial dependency of a free and democratic unit of government") or further transfer of responsibilities to the province ("which weakens the local authority itself and invites all the dangers of remote and extended control"). She recommended a flat mill rate in all municipalities, with the difference between this and the cost of services paid by the province[372].

The Board structure recommended by Whitton is remarkably similar to more recent attempts to develop municipal social programs. The Preventive Social Service

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[369] Referred to in the previous chapter.
[370] C. Whitton, *Welfare in Alberta: The Report of a Study*, (I. O. D. E. and Douglas, 1947).
[371] *Ibid., p. 171.*
[372] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

program introduced in 1966, the West 10 experiment introduced in Edmonton[373] and the Resources Boards attempted in British Columbia all resemble Whitton's proposals of 1947[374]. Whitton's ideas for strengthened local government involvement would have been consonant with Social Credit ideas about the need for strong local government (see below). However, these proposals were overshadowed by publicity associated with her criticisms of provincial child welfare practices. The government responded only to the criticisms[375], and her other proposals were largely forgotten.

The provincial welfare department stagnated until about 1960, and services in the larger municipalities expanded, with qualified staff and improved services. In the 1950's between 2.8% and 3.2% of the Provincial Department of Public Welfare's budget was spent on staff salaries[376]. This compares with 11.8% of the Calgary Public Welfare budget for 1957/58, and 15% for the City of Red Deer Welfare Department in 1960[377]. This probably indicates both lower case-loads and a higher level of professionalization in the municipal welfare agencies. In 1961 only one member of the province's senior staff was an A. A. S. W. member, and by 1963 only 8 provincial staff had joined the association. In 1961 12 out 50 staff in Edmonton had joined the professional association[378]. Thus, since training was necessary for A. A. S. W. membership, the municipal social service agencies appear to have had more professionally qualified staff than the province.

Although social services had been developing in Edmonton and Calgary, and to a lesser extent in the smaller Alberta cities[379], services in rural areas of the province were almost non-existent. The smaller communities were responsible for child protection and relief, but exercised these responsibilities reluctantly and without qualified staff. Municipal secretary-treasurers, untrained in social welfare, often had punitive attitudes to

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[373] City of Edmonton, *Developing Edmonton's Human Resources: Report of the Mayor's Committee on Human Resources*, (City of Edmonton, 1968). Leisure Consultants, "The Design of a Project for the Development of Human Resources in the City of Edmonton; Volume 1", (City of Edmonton, 1970). D. Aird, "West 10: From Conception to Miscarriage", (unpublished, 1975).

[374] British Columbia, Community Resources Boards Act, Bill 84, 1974.

[375] There was a trial, a public inquiry (The Howson Report) and many questions in the Legislature.

[376] Calculated from budget statements in Department of Public Welfare *Annual Reports* for 1953 to 1960.

[377] From *Financial Statements* for City of Calgary, 1957/58, and City of Red Deer, 1960.

[378] Based on membership lists for A. A. S. W. for 1961 - 63. Eligibility for membership was based on having an M. S. W. degree, or inclusion under a grandfather clause.

[379] Red Deer and Lethbridge, for example, were attempting to provide counselling under private auspices, but were under severe financial constraints(Correspondence between L. Bella and City of Red Deer, June 7, 1977, and with City of Lethbridge, June 7, 1977).

relief applicants, and assistance was often insufficient. Child welfare tragedies abounded, as children were apprehended because of their parents' poverty, or because their mother had dyed her hair[380]! The province had to look after apprehended children, and this was an additional inducement for apprehension by municipalities supporting children still in their own homes. However, until 1960 the province did not usually intervene to prevent the tragic family breakdowns forced by municipal child welfare practices.

Alberta's Department of Welfare was passive in the 1940's and 1950's and the role of the municipality in social welfare was unquestioned. The government did not expand the provincial department, and Alberta's health and welfare spending lagged behind that of other provinces[381]. Changes began with the appointment of Duncan Rogers as the new Deputy Minister in 1959. With a number of new staff, he began to create a provincial capacity to take over the welfare functions of the municipalities in Alberta.

Departmental policy was codified for the first time in a manual available to provincial and municipal field workers. A staff development program provided in-service training and academic up-grading of department staff. A network of regional offices brought the department into local communities. A new *provincially operated* social allowance program provided benefits based on need rather than category[382]. Between 1960 and the early 1970's Alberta moved step by step towards complete takeover of municipal welfare. This takeover, however, took place in the face of a government preference for strong local government. This Social Credit preference delayed the completion of the takeover, and resulted in a token program to retain a municipal role.

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[380] Anecdotes were numerous: Duncan Rogers, Dave Stolee, John Ward, John Smith and Bill MacFarland, in interview with Leslie Bella, 1977.

[381] In 1961 Alberta spent 22.7% of the provincial budget on welfare, compared with an average of 26.7% for all provinces.

[382] Previously welfare payments had been to those who fitted a category designated in legislation (disabled, blind, mothers with dependent children, for example), without regard to the varying needs of the recipients. The new program allowed for people's individual needs to be assessed, and funds grants to meet those needs, regardless of any "category". This reform was borrowed from one under consideration in Manitoba. Alberta had much catching up to do, and generally benefited from introducing ideas already tested in other parts of Canada. (Ward in interview, 1977). McFarland also emphasized that he was encouraged to tour other provinces before proposing changes in the Alberta's child welfare programs. Rogers commented in interview that the province benefited from the experience of others, as far as was possible.

C. Municipal Autonomy and Social Credit Ideology

Social Credit ideology was shown in chapter III to contain four themes with implications for social policy. The fourth theme, that of individualism, was linked to anti-statist values that condemned big government, and supported strong local government. This anti-statism of Social Credit is of particular importance in this chapter, and may in part be due to the stronger presence of immigration from the United States in Alberta. The result was a strong preference for local autonomy. To some extent this was expressed in provincial government programs to enhance this autonomy. The province, for example, was among the first to provide *unconditional* grants to municipalities.

Provincial Programs and Municipal Autonomy

Provincial programs that affect municipal autonomy include shared cost programs, that are said to "distort" local priorities[383]; programs that require the municipality to enforce provincially legislated regulations, such as health standards and day care regulations; and unconditional grants which enhance local autonomy.

Shared-cost programs in Alberta were extensive by the 1960's, providing nearly $100,000,000 to Alberta municipalities in 1964/65, around 30% of the provincial budget, and 32% of all local government expenditures[384]. Education, health, welfare, highways, recreation, libraries and police buildings were all included. The Alberta municipalities already considered these programs detrimental to their own autonomy, and the provincial government shared this concern. As a result a legislative committee studied the problem of municipal finance. The Committee's Report reflected the general Social Credit penchant for strengthening local autonomy:

> First, Alberta is a vast province of 255,000 square miles embracing a great variety of local conditions. Local government can cope with conditions peculiar to an area much better than any centralized government is able to do so, simply because its members possess detailed knowledge.
>
> Second, as a society we do not want two closed groups of people, the governing and the governed; rather we want one in which those willing and able to manage public affairs have an opportunity to prove their worth and to accept the responsibility of public office. Local government permits the adaptation of public policy to particular circumstances and leaves the door

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[383] See Canadian Union of Municipalities brief to the Tri-Level Conference, *Puppets on a Shoestring*, (Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, 1976).
[384] L. Bella, *The Origins of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1978), p. 100.

open to many citizens to participate[385].

The committee found that local governments could *not* support expanding education, welfare and public health services. They recommended that the local governments continue to administer these programs, but with increased financial help from the province. Shared-cost programs would continue, because this seemed the only way to maintain the fiscal responsibility of local governments.

But shared-cost programs have disadvantages, for as provincial premiers have long complained, they do distort local priorities[386]. Also, unless such programs included an equalizing provision, as in Alberta's school foundation program, they also penalize poorer local communities. These problems can be overcome by unconditional grants. Under the Municipal Assistance Act of 1953[387] one half of Alberta's gasoline tax was used to provide unconditional grants to municipalities, with the grants adjusted to provide some equity between poorer and more prosperous regions. By 1961 around $17 million was available through this program. In 1966, as the committee described above finished its deliberations, one third of the income from oil and gas royalties was earmarked for municipal unconditional grants.

This unconditional grants system available in Alberta compared favourably with provisions elsewhere in Canada. Alberta in 1962 was spending 5.5% of the provincial budget on such grants, with the average for Canadian provinces at 2.3%. The Saskatchewan government was spending .01% of the provincial budget on such commitments, and the equivalent figure for Manitoba was 2.06%[388]. The financial commitment to local autonomy reflected in this program indicates that for Alberta's Social Credit government local autonomy was not just rhetoric, but an essential element in their vision of the negative state. This ideological preference for local autonomy was to influence both the form and the pace of the welfare reforms of the 1960's.

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[385] Alberta, Legislature, *Report of the Public Expenditure and Revenue Study Committee*, March, (1966), p. 113.
[386] As early as 1963, for example, Premier Lesage of Quebec described shared cost programs as a "fiscal prison". *Financial Post*, Nov. 23, (1963). The federal government now also realizes that shared cost programs can restrict both parties, and therefore brought in legislation to finance such established programs. P. E. Trudeau, "Established Program Financing: A Proposal Regarding the Major Shared-Cost Programs in the Fields of Health and Post-Secondary Education", J. P. Meekison, *Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality*, (3rd edition), (Methuen, 1977), pp. 246 - 258.
[387] Alberta, The Municipal Assistance Act, (1953), Ch. 3 (2), s. 10 (1).
[388] L. Bella, *Ibid.*, (1978), p. 29. Raw data obtained from the *Canada Yearbook*, 1965.

D. Provincial Municipal Relations: 1960 - 66

Three means were used by municipalities to influence provincial welfare policy in Alberta in the 1960's – two public, and one private. First, the Alberta Union of Municipalities held annual conventions, and submitted numerous briefs to the provincial government. Second, the Joint Expenditure and Revenue Study Committee, a committee of the Alberta Legislature already referred to above, held hearings to study the fiscal situation of the municipalities and reported in March 1966. Third, and not public, were consultations held throughout 1965 between provincial welfare officials and their municipal counterparts.

The Public Debate

During the 1960's the Alberta Union of Municipalities held annual conventions involving delegates from elected local councils across Alberta. Such conferences usually included a ministerial address. Education Minister Aalborg, for example, explained the equalization provisions in the new School Foundation program[389]. The conferences also adopted various resolutions, later incorporated in the U. A. M.'s annual brief to the provincial cabinet.

In the early 1960's many of these resolutions asked for strengthened provincial welfare programs, and for provincial help with municipal welfare responsibilities. In 1960, for example, resolutions asked for scholarships for social work training, and for the province to expand its welfare services to towns and villages and to provide services on a shared-cost basis to other municipalities[390]. Mayor Findlay of Vulcan commented "as far as social services in my own particular area is concerned were are doing a very poor job of it". He hoped that the province, with a larger and more qualified staff, would do a better job. A similar resolution moved by the City of Red Deer was adopted at the 1962 conference, and another resolution requesting provincial help in establishing regional

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[389] Union of Alberta Municipalities, (U. A. M.), "Report of the Proceedings of the 57th Annual Convention", October 25, 26 and 27, 1961, Edmonton, Alberta.

[390] The municipalities moving these resolutions included both cities and smaller centres. The Cities of Lethbridge and Grand Prairie, the towns of Peace River, Beverly, Rimbey, Athabasca, Vulcan, and the Village of Bassano were involved. U. A. M., "Report of Proceedings of 56th Annual Convention", (Lethbridge, 1960), pp. 69 - 71.

welfare departments was referred to a U. A. M. subcommittee of the Cities[391]. The municipalities were not doing a good job, for they were often punitive to those on welfare. In 1963, for example, the Town of Fort McMurray asked for welfare changes to allow them to refused assistance to a "destitute employable single person who has refused to perform unemployment relief work in the municipality"[392].

In spite of this general disatisfaction with existing municipal relief programs, no direct requests for provincial takeover were made until 1964. Smaller centres made several requests for provincial services on a shared cost basis, but the two major cities of Edmonton and Calgary were less interested. By 1964, however, the province's new social allowance program, and the proliferating regional welfare offices, were evident to U. A. M. delegates. The municipalities remained responsible for child protection and temporary relief to unemployed residents. Although they were reimbursed by the province for 80% of the costs of relief, most municipalities wanted the province to takeover these remaining welfare responsibilities. In 1964, the the City of Medicine Hat moved a resolution requesting complete takeover of municipal welfare services by the provincial government.

> WHEREAS the Province of Alberta through its Department of Public Welfare has as of the first day of July A. D. 1961 assumed responsibility for the major areas of welfare under the social allowance program
> AND WHEREAS Municipalities are only responsible for social assistance, including child protection services
> AND WHEREAS the Department of Welfare has in operation 26 Regional Offices, and has proposed four more
> AND WHEREAS each Municipality is required to have its own premises for the operation of the social assistance program for which it is responsible
> AND WHEREAS in each City there are at least two welfare offices, one under the control of the Province of Alberta and the other under the control of the Municipality concerned
> AND WHEREAS there is duplication of administration which causes confusion among those persons who are entitled to obtain either social allowance or social assistance
> AND WHEREAS this duplication results in higher administrative costs to the Municipalities, even though the Municipalities are assisted by the Province in administration
> AND WHEREAS as a result there is a lack of continuity in the counselling services in child neglect cases, when a child is declared neglected and made a ward of the Government as between municipal counselling and Provincial welfare counselling
> AND WHEREAS the Provincial Department of Public Welfare is able to obtain and employ qualified social workers
> AND WHEREAS it would be desirable to have all welfare services operated one office under qualified social workers to save administration costs and to ..

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[391] U. A. M., "Report of the Proceedings of the 58th Annual Convention", (Red Deer, 1962), p. 43.
[392] U. A. M., "Report of the Proceedings of the 59th Annual Convention", (Calgary, 1963).

provide a better service
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Government of the Province of Alberta be requested to study the wisdom of assuming and operating all welfare services in the Province[393].

Although the resolution was passed, the convention was not unanimous. The City of Red Deer opposed the motion, and presented a survey showing the extent and quality of municipal welfare services. They advised that the problems cited in the Medicine Hat resolution could be solved without further encroachment on local autonomy, and recommended consolidation of smaller districts for welfare purposes. The social services provided by Edmonton and Calgary, they commented, were of a high standard. Red Deer recommended further study of alternatives, pointing out that the province was already studying the problem[394].

The second forum for discussion of municipal welfare was a committee of the Alberta Legislature. The finance and administration of welfare was within the terms of reference of the legislative Committee on Public Revenue and Expenditure. This committee had been established in 1963, to study the expenditure of both provincial and local governments. Members included three Social Credit members, representatives of the municipalities and school districts, of labour, agriculture, hospitals and the Chamber of Commerce. The Committee received briefs and interviewed witnesses, including the Union of Alberta Municipalities. By their next annual convention in 1965 the U. A. M. was still awaiting the results of the provincial committee's deliberations. No resolutions on welfare, therefore, were placed before the 1965 convention, in the hope that the Committee would recommend provincial takeover of all welfare services, and that the province would agree.

The Public Expenditure and Revenue and Study Committee also heard from others, in addition to the U. A. M. Some submissions, such as that of the deputy minister of Welfare, Duncan Rogers, supported the U. A. M. request for provincial takeover of municipal welfare. Rogers commented on the poor standards of municipal welfare:

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[393] U. A. M., "Report of Proceedings of 58th Annual Conference", (Lethbridge, 1964), p. 45.
[394] The City of Red Deer, Social Services Committee, Ethel Taylor, (chairman), "Effective Social Welfare Services at the Local Level", October 26th, 1964.

> Frequently their officials are unfamiliar with legislation, extremely judgmental, and without time or skill to devote to rehabilitative measures. Considerable misunderstanding occurs in rural areas as punitive measures appear self evidently correct, and apprehension of child by reason of poverty (and/or) neglect may occur to "unload" problems of welfare costs to the senior governments[395].

The Committee responded to Rogers' criticism in their Report, and defended local welfare administrators:

> The defenders of local administration would be quick to point out that professional welfare workers are not sufficiently hard-boiled. Certainly a transient who has spent the day in the beer parlour can demonstrate his need for a bed and breakfast. Whether he is entitled to such consideration is another matter[396].

The Committee acknowledged arguments of both the Provincial Welfare Department and the U. A. M.. They concluded, however, that some local responsibility for welfare should be retained. They had been impressed by presentations from municipal and voluntary agencies in Edmonton[397], and were also influenced by the traditional Social Credit party line on municipal autonomy. This ideological position is exemplified in a contemporary speech in the Alberta Legislature by James Henderson, Social Credit M. L. A. for Leduc:

> They have been elected to carry out and administer to the problems that come up in the day to day affairs of their local citizens, and this they are certainly doing to their best intention, to the best of their financial ability and I would hope that we can see fit to, if they wish to louse it up themselves, that we continue to let them do it[398].

The essence of local autonomy, then, was to allow the municipalities enough freedom to "louse it up" if they so wished, regardless of the criticisms of provincial officials such as Duncan Rogers.

The Committee weighed the arguments, and concluded that although there was some duplication of services, the larger municipal welfare agencies should be maintained. Their's was a pluralist conception of society, with limitation on the powers of "big" governments considered more important than efficiency or the provision of a uniform standard of social welfare programs:

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[395] Alberta, *Report of the Public Expenditure and Revenue Study Committee*, March, (1966), p. 12.
[396] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[397] D. K. Wass from City of Edmonton Welfare Department, and representatives of both Edmonton Family Service Bureau and Edmonton Catholic Charities are all quoted in the Committee's Report.
[398] James Henderson, *Alberta Legislature Speeches*, March 8th, (1965), p. 150.

> In this era of centralization and "big government" when a great deal of administrative as well as financial responsibility for such local matters as health and education have already been transferred to Edmonton (*i. e. to the province; author's addition*) we feel that it is difficult to place a monetary value of this intangible asset (*i. e. retention of local responsibility*). We are therefore in favour of retaining the urban municipal welfare offices even though some savings might be achieved by their amalgamation with the provincial welfare offices[399].

The Committee acknowledged the problems in rural areas, and suggested that the province take over municipal functions in these areas, or alternatively that social workers be attached to local health units. The first suggestion, for a different treatment of municipalities of different sizes, was not attractive to Social Credit. The principle of equity, of equal treatment for all, was emphasized in a number of areas of municipal affairs[400]. The second suggestion, for co-operation with the health units, was already in practice in one region, but the welfare department was not enthusiastic about increased interdependence with a department within which they had been dominated for several decades.

The Committee reported in March 1966, and in the Spring Session of the Legislature the province further reorganized social welfare in Alberta. The province assumed responsibility for all aspects of child welfare, taking over first in the rural areas. A new Child Welfare Act removed religious restrictions on adoptions. Municipal social assistance programs were not taken over by the province, but cost-sharing was increased from 80% to 90% for municipalities participating in the new preventive social services program (P. S. S.). Under this new program the province paid 80% of the cost of municipal "preventive" programs such as counselling and family life education.

At the 1966 U. A. M. convention Alberta's deputy minister of welfare, Duncan Rogers, presented this new preventive program[401]:

> In essence a preventive social service is one designed to develop community awareness and resources, to strengthen and preserve human initiative and to preclude family breakdown. It is any activity which is available to all the members of a community on a voluntary basis for the enrichment of their physical, mental and social well-being[402].

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[399] *Report*, ibid., p. 13.
[400] D. G. Bettison, J. K. Kenward and L. Taylor, *Urban Affairs in Alberta*, (University of Alberta Press, 1975), p. 491.
[401] Rogers used the conference to promote the program, with the topic "The new Preventive Welfare Program as it applies to Human Resources". The Human Resources Development program (H. R. D.) was formally introduced in 1967, and eventually P. S. S. was categorized as a human resource development program. However, P. S. S. predates H. R. D., and was to outlive it.
[402] U. A. M., "Report of the Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Convention", (1966), pp. 116 - 117.

Although this broad definitition was unspecified in the legislation, and some said vague, the *structure* of the program was more explicit. Local governments were to implement the new program, with 80% provincial cost-sharing, because the "municipal councillor is made aware of necessary social services and thereby the authority could be truly responsible to the community"[403]. Rogers also described the "carrot", the increasing cost-sharing for municipal public assistance for municipalities entering P. S. S..

Response from municipal politicians was not as enthusiastic as Rogers might have hoped. Alderman Julia Kiniski of Edmonton launched into a long diatribe against welfare families who "multiply like flies", about forcing welfare recipients to work, about immorality, drunkenness and child neglect. She concluded "we have to be rude to be good [404]." Rogers responded diplomatically that she had made a good case for preventive social services, including family planning.

An alderman from Red Deer approved the principle of the preventive program[405]. However, she questioned the municipal autonomy in the program, for the province retained the right to turn down programs as not within the provincial definition of prevention. There was also some confusion over the responsibilities of the preventive social service directors. Would they be responsible to the province or to the local municipality? Rogers reassured the Red Deer alderman that the province would encourage an imaginative approach to prevention, but did not really clarify the extent of local autonomy in the program[406].

The U. A. M. members reacted by reiterating their requests for complete provincial takeover. In 1966, and again in 1967 and 1968 the U. A. M. asked the province to take over remaining municipal welfare functions[407].

This response at annual conventions of the Union of Alberta Municipalities shows that local responsibility for social welfare remained an issue in Alberta, even after the

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[403] Ibid., p. 117.
[404] Ibid., p. 119.
[405] Red Deer, as had already been indicated, was a strong advocate of local control of welfare programs, and several years earlier had initiatied a servey of local welfare services.
[406] Ibid., p. 119. Municipal autonomy as it developed in the program is discussed in L. Bella, *The Development of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1980).
[407] Resolutions drafted by the City of Camrose, the Towns of Blairmore and Rocky Mountain House and the Cities of Lethbridge and Red Deer all asked the province to takeover more welfare responsibilities U. A. M., "Report of Proceedings of Annual Conventions", 1966, 1967, and 1968.

reforms of 1966. The new programs introduced by the province in 1966 rearranged municipal responsibilities, in another step towards provincial control of all social welfare programs. The inclusion of P. S. S. in that package was intended by provincial administrators to mollify proponents of local autonomy, while also satisfying those wanting more provincial responsibility.

In this package of reforms the province had developed a solution acceptable to all because each had something to gain. Those local governments who wished to relinquish social services to the province were relieved of responsibility for child welfare, and had additional cost-sharing for unemployment assistance. Those who believed in local autonomy and demanded that local welfare programs be retained were also pleased, since local governments retained unemployment assistance and had responsibility for a new program of preventive social services.

However, this solution had not been produced in the public debates outlined above, although it may have appeared that way to observers outside government. The details were discussed privately between senior provincial and municipal administrators, and were then modified by the provincial cabinet before the introduction of legislation.

Private Consultations

The development of the compromise package of reforms introduced in 1966 did not take place in the public forums of the U. A. M. Conventions or the Legislative Public Revenue and Expenditure Study Committee. The design was formulated by provincial administrators in consultation with their minister, and refined in discussions with the administrators of municipal welfare agencies. The relationship between administrators and their minister will be discussed in chapter VII, and the focus here is on the consultation between Deputy Minister Rogers, his senior staff and the administrators of local welfare services. This consultation, involving municipal administrators before the form of the program had been officially determined (though after its general form had been unofficially determined), appears typical of attempts by policy makers to involve and co-opt potential opposition. Similar examples, involving pressure groups rather than

municipalities, are described by Dawson, Kwavnick and Mahon[408].

Provincial/municipal co-operation had been one of Rogers' concerns since his appointment as Deputy Minister. Acutely aware of the deficiencies in rural social welfare services, he initiated both formal and informal communication. More formal were the "Municipal Circulars" outlining provincial policy to guide municipal administrators. Informal communication was strengthened with the appointment of John Smith in 1962 as Director of Social Planning. His slide presentation to promote local area planning was later used to promote preventive services[409].

Internal discussions of preventive services had begun in 1963, and by November 1964 Rogers asked his minister for permission to begin planning for takeover of existing municipal welfare programs, and for a program of preventive services. Rogers' letter reviewed his Department's progress, and reminded his minister of their several discussions of preventive services "to reverse the trend towards increased dependency." After an outline of some possible preventive services Mr. Rogers continued:

> With this in mind and also recognizing the attitude of the Government concerning the autonomy of municipalities, we would like to explore the possibility of putting together a kind of package deal that might be offered to the municipalities who are interested in doing something, not only to prevent welfare assistance, but to create a healthier community[410].

Rogers suggested that the province would provide consultation, and share the cost. He asked if the government would support the idea, so that his staff could work on it in 1965. Response from Cabinet was slow, but eventually positive, and the idea of prevention was mentioned in the 1965 Speech from the Throne in the Alberta Legislature.

With the green light from Cabinet, Rogers confirmed new instructions to John Smith:

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[408] H. J. Dawson, "The Consumer's Assocation of Canada", *C. P. A.* , VI, No. 1, (1963), pp. 92 - 118. D. Kwavnick, , *Organized Labour and Pressure Politics: the Canadian Labour Congress 1956 - 68*, (Queen's University Press, 1972). R. Mahon, "Canadian Public Policy: The Unequal Structure of Representation", L. Panitch, (ed.), *The Canadian State*, (University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 165 - 198.

[409] Alberta, Department of Welfare, *Annual Report*, 1962 - 3, p. 38. John Smith, in interview, October 1977.

[410] D. W. Rogers, Deputy Minister, to Hon. L. C. Halmrast, Minister, November 26th, 1964, "Re: Preventive Services in Welfare", (Alberta Social Services and Community Health, Department Files), p. 2.

> The important thing is that the Department is now committed by the Minister to some action aimed at preventing the dependence on welfare and the deterioration of family life[411].

Rogers then cited the minister's request for meetings to discuss the idea of prevention and suggested that a first meeting be held with "Mr. Wass, Mr. Coulter and Mr. Kemp of the two major cities, Mr. Bishop and Mr. Tyler of the two Councils, Mr. Ward and Mr. Landsdowne of the two United Funds, together with some representation from the Union of Alberta Municipalities"[412]. These were the administrators that the province recognized as having a legitimate stake in the outcome of welfare reforms. The nature of these reforms initiatives had been generally determined in Rogers' discussions with his minister. Now discussions with the pressure group administrators would either ensure their support for the reforms, or at least avert their opposition. Rogers wrote to all these administrators, quoting his minister's speech in the legislature, and inviting them to a meeting in Edmonton on April 12th 1965 to discuss preventive welfare[413]. Meetings were held with this group throughout 1965, to explore the concept and structure of the new package of social services[414]. Rogers chaired the meetings, and is quoted as beginning with the comment that:

> The problem I have is that under C. A. P. Alberta will gain, or recover, or not have to spend, approximately $10 million. What are we going to do with it? I'd like you to tell me.
>
> Specifically, I am interested in using this money to prevent people from having to get into the welfare situation.

The group began with a discussion of the meaning of "prevention". Interpretations varied. Some had a narrow view. Mr. Kemp of the Calgary Welfare Department, for example, was more concerned with the imminent takeover of his own department's functions[415]. Rogers and Smith visited Kemp in Calgary to discuss these matters further[416], and the possibilities caught Kemp's imagination. He gave Rogers a string of suggestions for the

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[411] D. W. Rogers, Deputy Minister, to J. R. Smith, Director of Social Planning and Development, March 3rd, 1965.
[412] Op. Cit..
[413] This letter appears to confirm verbal arrangements set up by John Smith, but Bishop specifically remembers having been called by Rogers himself.
[414] No minutes were kept of these meetings, and this account has been pieced together from interviews wih Rogers, Smith, Ward, Wass, Bishop and Tyler. Mr. Kemp, of Calgary welfare department and now deceased, described the meetings in letters to his Commissioner, and also wrote to Rogers. This correspondence generally confirmed the verbal accounts.
[415] In a letter to his Commissioner he desc this probability, and a change in his own agency's role and staff needs that would result. W. Kemp, Superintendent, to I. S. Forbes, Commissioner of Finance, April 21st, 1965, Re. Preventative Welfare Services.
[416] Alberta, Department of Welfare, Directors Meetings, "Minutes", May 5th 1965.(A. S. S. C. H. Departmental Files).

structure of the new preventive program[417].

In June 1965 Rogers indicated to another meeting of the group that a proposal was ready for Cabinet, and that following Cabinet approval formal discussions would begin with all municipalities[418]. The meeting was still uncertain about the structure of the proposed municipal program. An independent board was one possibility, while another would be direct purchase of service by the municipality. Rogers favoured control of the program by municipal councils, but the United Way representatives were dubious since funds might not be used for their own member agencies. According to Bishop the debate became quite fierce:

> As we talked about the mechanism for carrying out a program of this type, some of us perceived it as money being available to a group of citizens in a community who would allocate it, and this got terribly close to the United Way. Duncan kept saying "I'm not comfortable with that. It's got to be the municipality." When we said "City Council?" – well that was the answer.
>
> But then, as director of a voluntary organization I asked "Who then is going to set priorities to use this money?" So we agreed that the responsibility would go to a department of municipal government, but that a citizens' advisory committee would provide for citizen input. That's how the advisory committee concept was born[419].

Bishop was glad to be consulted by the Deputy Minister, and delighted that the group's advice was being used in the design of a new program – "Once he (Rogers) got the view of it, it was straight go ahead." Wass, as superintendent of Edmonton's social services, also welcomed the consultation:

> This legislation didn't come out of the blue to us like most of it does. There was a fair bit of discussion, and I think in the same way that Ottawa and the Provinces worked on C. A. P., preventive services came out of joint thinking and sharing[420].

Both Wass and Bishop were convinced of their contribution to the final form of P. S. S.. Dr. Tyler, then executive director of the Social Planning Council in Calgary[421], had a more restricted perception of the meetings:

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[417] Foundations, commissions, and boards were suggested, and Kemp requested that one of Calgary's system analysts prepare and organizational chart. W. Kemp to D. W. Rogers, Deputy Minister, May 14th, 1965, Re: Preventative Welfare.
[418] W. Kemp to I. S. Forbes, June 14th 1965.
[419] Bishop, in interview, 1977.
[420] D. K. Wass, in interview, 1977.
[421] Tyler was at this time involved in the attempt to establish a School of Social Work in Alberta, a province-wide campaign that is echoed in U. A. M. debates, letters to the editor of the Edmonton Journal, and in submissions to the provincial government. The School of Social Welfare was established at the University of Calgary in 1966, and Dr. Tyler became director of the new school.

> Their purpose was reinforcement. The United Way comes out of the charity ethic ...and the decision of the government was to do something to reinforce charitable sharing, and this would likely affect the United Ways and Planning Councils. These agencies should be involved, because the program had fiscal implications for them[422].

Both United Way representatives and municipal administrators perceived these consultations as a sincere attempt to involve agencies that would be affected by the proposal. To Rogers, however, their essential purpose was to gain support and avert opposition, rather than to influence the form of the proposals.

> These meetings were critical things. You had to have the absolute support of all these people or else the thing wouldn't have worked at all. Of course we had meetings on C. A. P., and social allowance with the municipalities, but with P. S. S. it was even more vital[423].

To Rogers, then, the meetings were to gain support, rather than advice. Many aspects of P. S. S. had already been decided, if not formalized, before these consultations. In March Rogers already knew that municipal councils would be responsible for the program; that the legislation would be permissive; that private agencies would be allowed to receive funds and that the program should in some way "tie in to" the United Way structure. Rogers already knew that he did not want to fund sectarian agencies, or to undercut the United Ways. Even before the first of these meetings with municipal administrators he had summed up their purpose as the gaining of support, not the design of the program:

> I have found from experience that in the final analysis it will likely be left to us to make some basic and final decisions but this should not prevent us from consulting all who have an interest in the field and all who might have some information of value. Even if no consensus of opinion or course of action can be obtained from either meetings or conference, at least a wealth of knowledge should be available to us if we must make some arbitrary decisions [424].

Rogers' intention in these private meetings, therefore, was to forestall opposition from those most likely to oppose his plans[425]. The reorganization would include the provincial takeover of both municipal child welfare and municipal public assistance. The municipal administrators from Edmonton and Calgary would lose most of their Department's functions, and could be expected to oppose the changes. The United Ways

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[422] T. Tyler, in interview, 1977.
[423] D. W. Rogers, in interview, 1977.
[424] D. W. Rogers to J. Smith, March 3rd, 1965, p. 3. (A. S. S. C. H. Departmental Files).
[425] This interpretation of Rogers' motives has been confirmed by him to me verbally, after he had read sections of this chapter as included in L. Bella, *The Origins of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1978).

would be concerned about new government funding available to their member agencies, fearing that their own authority would be undercut. All those involved in these meetings would lose from reorganization, but through these preliminary consultations Rogers sought their support. Rogers' method was typical of that used by public administrators who seek to neutralize pressure groups[426].

The proposals themselves also contained some compensatory benefits to purchase acquiescence. The P. S. S. program would provide a new role for municipal welfare departments. The United Ways would retain a role in the advisory boards that would determine priorities[427].

These meetings did not produce major changes in the reforms of 1966, but the illusion of participation *was* useful in obtaining the continued support (or non opposition) of these social welfare administrators (both public and private sector). Rogers had maximized the chance of a "non-zero-sum-game" that would gain the support (or at least neutralize the opposition) of this crucial group of adminisrators. Following these meetings, and following internal sanction from Cabinet, the package of proposals was made public. As is shown below, the public opposition from municipal social welfare administrators was prevented in Edmonton, but not in Calgary. Also, municipal autonomy continued to be a concern at the political level.

The Public Debate Continues

The public discussion of Rogers' proposals began after Cabinet approved preliminary proposals in 1965 (shortly after the U. A. M. meeting of 1965, see above). A municipal circular described the reorganization[428], in which the province would relieve municipalities of their existing public assistance and child welfare functions. The province would pay 50% of the cost of municipal preventive social services. The province would

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[426] H. J. Dawson, "National Pressure Groups and the Federal Government", Pross, *Ibid.*, pp. 29 - 58.

[427] Rogers had been vague about the specific mechanism for "tying in" the United Way, and through the meetings the idea of an "advisory committee" was developed. This concept was also vague, however, and took a variety of forms. The technical advisory committee was established in Edmonton; Calgary tried an advisory committee to council, and eventually a committee of city council. In many rural areas the committee was regional, consisting of municipal councillors and/or citizens from constituent municipalities.

[428] D. W. Rogers, "Re. Preventive Welfare", *Municipal Circular No. 12*, October 25th, 1965.

help municipal councils to review the proposals. Edmonton was supportive at both the administrative and the political level. In Calgary the social welfare administrators manouvered for retention of their public assistance and child welfare functions, but were overruled by City Council.

In November 1965 Calgary City Council referred the circular to its Commissioners for study[429]. The City's welfare administrators planned for reorganization, and met with the Social Planning Council and United Way to:

> ...try and reach some agreement on the community-wide organizational structure which would outline the division of labour between the municipal authorities, the Fund and the private agencies[430].

But, these administrators were still not satisfied that takeover was inevitable. In January 1966 they reviewed Circular No. 12 for their commissioners, recommending the City accept P. S. S., but ask for retention of municipal public assistance and other existing services[431]. This memorandum was not forwarded to Council by the Commissioners[432], but instead the Council's Welfare Committee reviewed the province's proposals and recommended that the City participate in the new provincial program[433]. The welfare committee recommended acceptance of all provincial proposals, and on July 18th 1966 Calgary City Council voted to participate in the new program, and allocated funds for the new preventive social service director's salary[434].

In Edmonton, also, Municipal Circular No. 12 had been reviewed by both Council and administration. Mayor Dantzer had commented that City costs would be cut, leaving the City's welfare role confined to "areas such as counselling by social workers and operation of the Edmonton Creche"[435]. Dantzer intended to study the proposal in detail, and asked D. K. Wass to review it before Council[436]. Wass emphasized to Council the savings to the City from the takeover, and the additional funds available under P. S. S.[437].

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[429] Calgary, City Clerk to Commissioner of Finance, November 10th 1965.
[430] H. Coulter to I. S. Forbes, November 23rd, 1965.
[431] W. Kemp and H. Coulter to I. S. Forbes, Commissioner, January 27th, 1966.
[432] Correspondence from Calgary City Clerk to Leslie Bella, November 18th, 1977.
[433] Calgary, Welfare Committee, Minutes, March 25th, 1966.
[434] Calgary, City Council, Minutes, July 18th, 1966, p. 4.
[435] "Province May Pay All Welfare", *Edmonton Journal*, November 5th, (1965), p. 33.
[436] "Welfare Proposal Studied", *Edmonton Journal*, November 9th, (1965), p. 33.
[437] Wass had been as dubious about the provincial takeover as his Calgary counterparts, but these misgivings were only expressed in private. Edmonton's mayor Dantzer favoured the takeover, as the movement of people into Edmonton was placing a burden on local government finances. "Cities Must Get More Aid", *Edmonton Journal*, January 20th, 1966.

> The City already makes grants in excess of $60,000 to private agencies. These grants could be shared with the province under the new program, and integrated with grants from the province[438].

A day later Edmonton's City Council authorized Wass and the commissioners to continue negotiations with the province:

> The Committee recommends to Council that the proposal be approved in principle, and the commissioner and welfare superintendent be authorized to enter into negotiations with the provincial government on the matter[439].

In Edmonton therefore support for the reorganization came from both politicians and administrators. In Calgary administrators continued to attempt opposition. The result was a slower takeoff for the Calgary program.

The proposals in Municipal Circular No. 12, however, were not consonant with the conclusions of the province's own Public Revenue and Expenditure Study Committee. Although the Committee did not report until March 1966, its publicised proceedings had already shown that it supported municipal autonomy[440]. In January 1966 the provincial cabinet decided not to takeover of all statutory municipal welfare programs. They asked Rogers to revise the package.

The new proposal, as approved by the provincial cabinet, was forwarded to the municipalities in Municipal Circular No. 13. The province would takeover municipal child welfare programs as planned, but the municipalities would retain public assistance. To ease the remaining burden on the municipalities, the province would share administrative costs for this program. Also, cost-sharing for P. S. S. would be increased from 50% to 80%. Rogers expressed to his minister his preference for the earlier proposal[441].

Implementation by the Municipalities

This new reform package became law in May 1966. In both Edmonton and Calgary plans continued for entry into the new program. In Edmonton D. K. Wass moved rapidly. In February 1966 he had asked permission to create a technical committee to advise his department[442]. The request reached City Council on May 9th, but was struck from the agenda and referred to the Commissioners. The proposed committee was then approved

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[438] D. K. Wass, Report to Committee of the Whole Council, November 22nd, 1965.
[439] Edmonton, City Council, Minutes, November 23rd, 1965.
[440] As was already indicated above, the Committee eventually recommended that the municipal welfare offices in Edmonton and Calgary be retained.
[441] D. W. Rogers to Hon. L. Halmrast, Re. Preventive Welfare Services, December 30th, 1965.
[442] D. K. Wass to Mayor Dantzer, February 9th, 1966.

by the Commission Board "on the understanding that it was advisory to our Department, and was not considered a Committee of Council"[443]. Wass established the committee in June 1966, including representatives from the United Way, the Social Planning Council, the Health Department, School Board and Parks and Recreation Department, two interested citizens and a member from the University.

Wass quickly submitted a tentative budget for the program[444]. In Edmonton Wass took advantage of the extra lead time given him by the meetings of 1965, and he prepared for inclusion in P. S. S. as soon as it became law[445]. Wass used this lead time to freeze the private social service agencies out of the advisory committee, and to create a committee supportive of the expansion of municipal projects under P. S. S..

Edmonton faced a problem with day care funding under P. S. S.. The provincial minister decided not to fund "baby sitting". The Edmonton Mayor, the head of the City's Social Service Department, someone from the Social Planning Council and a day care parent met with the provincial cabinet. As suggested in the previous chapter, the day care mother persuaded cabinet that without day care she would be on welfare, and that therefore day care prevented welfare and should be funded under P. S. S..

In Calgary the takeoff was slower than in Edmonton. However, opposition from the City's welfare administrators subsided as the legislation passed through the Legislature and takeover became inevitable. An outline for new services was prepared, including a day care study, an information service, funding for home help, counselling, area services and youth programs[446]. The City's Welfare Committee studied the matter, and received letters endorsing preventive social service forwarded to them by City Council[447]. The Anglican Bishop of Calgary[448] and Calgary Interfaith Action Committee[449] both wrote to support the program, urging City participation. The provincial legislation passed on July 1st, and less than three weeks later the City of Calgary gave third and

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[443] D. K. Wass to Mayor Dantzer, December 13th, 1966.
[444] In January 1966 (D. K. Wass to D. W. Rogers, January 26th, 1966. "Re. Preventive Budget".), with additional suggestions for cost-sharing in March (D. K. Wass to D. W. Rogers, March 21st 1966 and March 22nd, 1966, "Re: Day Care in Edmonton").
[445] This kind of advantage is often given to pressure groups by early involvement in the policy process. H. J. Dawson, "National Pressure Groups and the Federal Government", Pross, *Ibid.*.
[446] Calgary, "Preventive Welfare Services, July 1st - December 31st, 1966", Unsigned Memorandum, May 2nd, 1966.
[447] Calgary, Chairman of Welfare Committee to Mayor and Council, March 25th, 1966.
[448] Bishop of Calgary to Mayor Leslie, April 20th, 1966.
[449] Rev. Dr. Nelson Mercer to Calgary City Coucnil, May 4th, 1966.

final reading to a bylaw providing for the City to "do all things necessary and convenient to carry out preventive social services"[450].

Other centres also responded to the initial October memorandum on preventive services. The City of Red Deer, already active in social welfare, was also interested in P. S. S.. In December 1965 the Director of Red Deer's Social Service Departments, W. H. Irvine, wrote to Wass in Edmonton[451]. Rogers and two of his staff had addressed a seminar in Red Deer in November, and the City had established a study committee[452]. The committee asked for help to study local problems, but Rogers replied that funding could not be forthcoming until the legislation was passed. Red Deer, with Edmonton and Calgary, was one of the first municipalities to enter the program in 1966, and a Red Deer alderman supported the program at the 1966 U. A. M. Convention.

Other communities were less supportive. Paul Sisson, secretary treasurer for Picture Butte, responded to the first municipal circular with the comment that day care was destructive to family life, and was a poor example of a preventive social service. Rogers replied that Picture Butte did not have to have a day care centre if they did not want one, and that such local choices were the essence of the program[453]. A letter from Medicine Hat queried the relationship between P. S. S. and local health units, and Rogers replied with reassurance.

Some municipalities were more favourable; and six entered the program almost immediately upon passage of the provincial legislation. By March 1968 eight local governments were receiving funding for P. S. S. programs (The Cities of Edmonton, Calgary, Red Deer, Medicine Hat and Lethbridge; the County of Leduc; Lac La Biche and District and Fort McMurray). By March 1968 64% of Albertans were living within an area that had signed an agreement with the province to provide preventive social services[454]. However, enthusiasm was keener, and takeoff quicker, in the two municipalities that been most deeply involved in the initial discussions about the form of the program.

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[450] Calgary, Bylaw 6808, Calgary, City Council, Minutes, July 18th, 1966, p. 1405.
[451] W. H. Irvine to D. K. Wass, December 6th, 1965.
[452] "Preventive Welfare Study Group Set Up in City", *Red Deer Advocate*, December 1st, 1965.
[453] P. Sissons to D. W. Rogers, November 17th, 1965; D. W. Rogers to P. Sissons, November 25th, 1965; Halmrast to Osborne, February 28th, 1966.
[454] M. W. Findlay and S. Cowley, "An Overview of The Preventive Social Servcices Program", (Alberta Social Services and Community Health, 1974).

E. Provincial Municipal Relations

This chapter has shown that although municipal governments in Alberta tried to influence provincial policy, they were only moderately successful. Their attempts to influence the province were both public and private, and differed for larger and smaller municipalities.

The smaller municipalities expressed their concerns through the Union of Alberta municipalities. Within this forum the local politicians of Alberta's smaller centres pressed for more provincial help with municipal welfare, and eventually for provincial takeover. The larger municipalities, however, communicated directly with provincial policy makers, rather than using the U. A. M. as an intermediary. The cities of Edmonton and Calgary, particularly, had a relationship with the province analogous to that of an institutional pressure group. In addition, the senior executives of the two urban Social Planning Councils and United Ways were also included in meetings with provincial and municipal welfare officials. Administrators from all these agencies involved in preliminary discussions of the welfare reforms of 1966, and believed that they had influenced these reforms. The provincial administrators, however, intended that this illusion of involvement would reduce the potential for opposition to or obstruction of reform.

The involvement was illusory, however, for the basic structure of the 1966 reforms had already been determined. They were not to be changed either by the influence of municipal welfare administrators or by the demands of the U. A. M. for a more complete takeover. The only substantive changes were to be made by the provincial cabinet in an attempt to make the reforms more consonant with the governing Social Credit party's ideological preference for strong local government. The final shape of the 1966 reforms, therefore, stopped just short of complete takeover of municipal responsibilities for statutory welfare.

Urbanization was one of the social changes associated with the expansion of the welfare state in Alberta. The local governments of these rapidly growing urban areas were not a major influence in determining the form of provincial government response to urbanization; neither were the local governments of the rural areas which remained the strongholds of the Social Credit party. Two factors have been shown as responsible for the ineffectiveness of local governments as a linkage between the macro-process of

urbanization and the micro-level policy process. The first was the diversity of municipalities themselves, and the second concerned the weakness of the municipalities' constitutional position.

First, the larger municipalities differed from the smaller municipalities in their attitude to provincial takeover of municipal programs. The smaller centres welcomed provincial takeover of onerous welfare responsibilities. The larger centres were providing better social services, and the administrators of these programs were opposed to provincial takeover. Also, the political leaders of the larger centres were at least ambivalent towards a provincial takeover. With the provincial tendency to treat all municipalities alike, these contradictory influences were sufficient that neither the larger nor the smaller municipalities were able to get exactly what they wanted in the reforms of 1966.

Secondly, unlike provincial governments dealing with a federal governments, municipal governments can not bargain on an equal basis with senior governments. Without constitutional rights and responsibilities, municipal governments are relatively weak, because they depend upon the provincial government for their existence, their structure and the extent of their responsibilities. The result is a process which may admit the administrators of municipal government to advance discussion of provincial policy changes, but gives these administrators few political resources with which to influence the outcome. Municipal politicians may be granted access to cabinet, but have little bargaining power when they get there.

This chapter has shown that although the municipalities bargained in the same manner as institutional pressure groups, the municipalities were divided, and lacked the political resources to influence the province. At the administrative level their influence was illusory, intended to avert opposition or to purchase support. At the political level strategy by the Edmonton Mayor and other welfare groups from the City was sufficient to ensure inclusion of day care in the program - but this did not take place until the reforms of 1966 had already become fixed in legislation. The municipalities were not an effective link between urbanization and social policy.

VI. FEDERAL PROVINCIAL RELATIONS

The preceding chapters have assessed the importance of various links between macro-level societal processes and the micro-level policy process in Alberta. Political parties, pressure groups and provincial/municipal relations have all been discussed. In this chapter the importance of a process *external* to Alberta will be assessed, that is - the extent of the influence of federal government policy on provincial initiatives. Policy analysts have focussed on the influence of the spending of one government on that of another. Shared cost programs, grants-in-aid and other fiscal transfers from central to regional governments have been shown to influence policy development in the recipient governments. An American study, for example, found that federal grants:

> Were "outside money" to state and local government officials which permitted them to fund programs at levels beyond their resources. Hence they noted the decline in the closeness of the relationship to economic resources in state and local spending, particularly in the fields with heaviest federal involvement[455].

A similar situation can be anticipated in Canada. The constitutional responsibility for health and welfare in Canada is generally recognised as provincial, being among the enumerated heads of s. 92 of the B. N. A. Act. However, in the Great Depression of the 1930's the financial demands on the provinces were too great for provincial resources, and since then federal government involvement has increased. The federal government proposed at the Reconstruction Conferences of 1943 and 1945 that subsidies to the provinces could support health and welfare, in return for continuation of war-time centralization of taxing power. The provinces, wanting to restore the autonomy lost in the Depression and the second world war, rejected the federal proposals.

After 1945 the federal government introduced a series of shared-cost health and welfare programs. Old age assistance and pensions for the blind and the disabled were introduced in the early 1950's, and hospital insurance and unemployment assistance were established as shared-cost programs in 1956. Three major programs were introduced in the mid-sixties, the Canada Pension Plan, the Canada Assistance Plan and Medicare.

The conventional wisdom is that the provinces responded to each new federal

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[455] Quoted in T. R. Dye, *Policy Analysis*, (University of Alabama Press, 1976), p. 27.

program by expanding their own[456]. This chapter, however, suggests that social welfare initiatives of the sixties in Alberta were not a response to federal initiatives, but rather that Alberta was generally ahead of Ottawa, moving into new areas of social services before the federal government was able to share the provincial cost. Furthermore, federal initiatives were a response to *provincial* initiatives, rather than *vice versa*.

Two approaches are taken in exploring this suggestion. The first involves the comparison of spending on social services by the two levels of government in the sixties. If spending in Alberta "takes off" before that of Ottawa, then the province can be said to be leading. If, on the other hand, rapid increases in Alberta follow a change in the rate of increase of spending in Ottawa, then the federal government can be said to be leading.

The second approach involves the analysis of the context in which the initiatives were introduced in Ottawa and in Edmonton in the 1960's, to identify the extent to which either level of government influenced the other. The sources for this analysis include personal interviews, the public records of federal provincial negotiations, and federal and provincial documents made available by public officials of the two levels of government[457].

A. Provincial and Federal Health and Welfare Spending

Both federal and provincial governments increased health and welfare spending in the 1960's. Federal health and welfare spending increased from $1,489 million in 1960 to $4,987 million in 1970[458], a 335% increase. In Alberta the equivalent increase for both health and welfare was from $76 million to $282 million, a 371% increase[459]. Federal welfare spending increased from $1,262 million in 1960 to $3950 million in

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[456] R. Dyck "The Canada Assistance Plan: The Ultimate in Cooperative Federalism", *C.P.A.*, IXX, No. 4, (1976), pp. 587 - 602. R. Splane, "Social Policy Making in the Federal Government: some Aspects of Policy Making in Health and Welfare Canada", S. A. Yelega (ed.), *Social Policy Making in Canada*, (Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1978), pp. 209 - 226.

[457] The core of the second part of this analysis has been published in L. Bella, "The Provincial Role in the Canadian Welfare State", *Canadian Public Administration*, XXII, No. 3, (1979), pp. 439 - 452.

[458] From *Canada Year Books*.

[459] Alberta, *Public Accounts*.

Diagram 6.1

Federal Health and Welfare Expenditures, 1957 - 1977[479]



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[479] Canada Year Books. Federal Expenditures are corrected for inflation usinf the Canadian cost of living index

Diagram 6.2

Alberta Health and Welfare Expenditures[430]



[430] Alberta, Public Accounts, presented in 1949 dollars using the weighted average of the cost of living index for Edmonton and Calgary.

Diagram 6.3

The Rate of Increase of Federal Health and Welfare Expenditures 1957 - 1977[481]



[481] Canada Year Books. Federal Expenditures are corrected for inflation using the Canadian cost of living index.

Diagram 6.4

The Rate of Increase of Alberta Health and Welfare Expenditures[432]



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[432] Alberta, Public Accounts. presented in 1949 dollars using the weighted average of the cost of living index for Edmonton and Calgary.

1970, an increase of 313%. In Alberta the equivalent increase was from $19 million to $74 million, or 379%. Therefore, during the decade of the sixties the general increase in health and welfare spending for both levels of government was between 300% and 400%. This would generally support a proposition that spending increases in Alberta followed cost-sharing available from the federal government. However, the data could also support the suggestion that the federal government programs expanded in response to pressure from the provinces for cost-sharing of their own policy initiatives. A relationship of this kind (i.e., constant conjunction) does not imply direction.

Although the extent of the increase was similar for federal and Alberta governments during this period, the timing was not identical. As is shown in Diagram 6.1 expenditures of the federal government increased slowly from 1960 to 1964, more rapidly in 1964 - 65, dropped in 1965 - 66, and subsequently increased more rapidly. The curve for health and welfare follows a similar form[464]. Alberta expenditures are presented in Diagram 6.2, and appear to increase steadily from 1958 to 1972[465].

The difference between the rate of increase for Alberta and for the federal government is further highlighted in the semi-logarithmic graphs in Diagrams 6.3 and 6.4. The federal rate of increase is stable until 1964, has a sharp increase in 1964 - 65, and again after 1967. In contrast the Alberta rate of increase (see Diagram 6.4) begins to take off in 1958, and shows no marked change in the rate of increase due to additional funds available under the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966. The rate of increase of Alberta welfare spending does increase slightly after 1969. The general form of these graphs does not support the suggestion that welfare reforms and expansion in Alberta were a provincial response to federal initiatives. It appears more likely that provincial expansion preceded major federal expansion, and continued steadily throughout the sixties. Federal initiatives do not appear to have influenced the pace of reform in Alberta.

This policy analysis approach, relying on the relationship between quantifiable dependent and independent variables, can be criticised. Spending as a measure of policy omits the purpose of that policy; there is no causal chain linking independent and dependent variables, and therefore there is also no assurance of the direction of the

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[464] Federal expenditures are corrected for inflation using the Canadian cost of living index.

[465] Alberta expenditures are presented in 1949 dollars by using the weighted average of the cost of living index for Edmonton and Calgary.

relationship. The case study in the second part of this chapter traces the causal chain of intergovernmental diplomacy that linked federal and provincial policy in this period. As will be shown, the detailed case analysis supports the general suggestion derived from spending analysis that Alberta policy initiatives were not a response to (i. e., they were not "caused" by) those of the federal government.

B. Executive Federalism

Analyses of the process of executive federalism which led to the various welfare initiatives of the 1960's have included Simeon's study of the Canada Pension Plan[466], and Dyck's of the Canada Assistance Plan[467]. Splane, a participant in the process, has also written of this period[468]. These works focus on the *federal* government – on federal policy making and federal legislation, in spite of the *provincial* responsibility for health and welfare under the Canadian constitution. These analysts have expected the federal government to lead, with national programs and standards, and the provinces to respond. Federal policy making is treated as the major independent variable in the creation of provincial policy[469].

This perception of "federal leadership" can be found in the phrases of a number of contemporary proponents of social reform. John Morgan, a social work educator, wrote in 1966 of the "latent opportunities" for the provinces in the Canada Assistance Plan[470]. The Director of the Canada Assistance Plan spoke in 1970 of the Plan's being responsible for a wide range of innovations in provincial welfare services. Improvements in assistance, social services, prevention, rehabilitation, appeal procedures, child welfare and the concept of right to assistance were all attributed to the federal government's Canada Assistance Plan[471].

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[466] R. Simeon, *Federal Provincial Diplomacy*, (University of Toronto Press, 1972).
[467] R. Dyck, "Poverty and Policy Making in the 1960's", unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Queen's University, 1973. "The Canada Assistance Plan: The Ultimate in Co-operative Federalism", *C. P. A.*, IX, No. 4, (1976), pp. 587 – 602.
[468] R. Splane, Op. Cit.
[469] One result of this approach is the treatment of the Quebec influence over the final form of the Canada Pension Plan as in some way remarkable or regrettable.
[470] J. S. Morgan, *Welfare and Wisdom*, (University of Toronto Press, 1966), pp. 10 – 11.
[471] R. Dyck, "Poverty and Policy Making in the 1960's", ibid., pp. 269 – 280.

However, the analysis in the first section of this chapter suggests another possible interpretation of the processes of executive federalism that led to federal social policy initiatives in the 1960's. The federal legislation can be interpreted as a federal government response to *provincial* initiatives[472]. In the area of pensions, the federal government, having received little support for its own pension plan[473], adapted a program developed by the Quebec government. In the welfare area the federal government included programs already *implemented* by the provinces. Several provincial governments had developed new welfare programs, and were frustrated by the inconsistencies between their new programs and the older federal shared-cost programs. The federal minority government sought strength by mobilizing the support of provincial governments.

Both the Canada Pension Plan and the Canada Assistance Plan resulted from the federal government's need for provincial support. Federal innovations were limited by provincial jurisdiction, and by the relative weakness of the federal government's political resources *vis-a-vis* the provinces. The federal government's War on Poverty produced some limited changes to the Canada Assistance Plan, but became a liability in the federal government's negotiations with the provinces.

While C. P. P. and C. A. P. were being negotiated, from 1960 to 1966, Alberta introduced a new Social Allowance Act, new child welfare legislation, and a preventive social service act. All became shareable (or at least in part) under C. A. P. in 1966. The provincial legislation was not the result of federal "leadership". Rather, the reverse was the case, with the federal government broadening the Canada Assistance Plan to retain provincial support.

The Development of the Canada Assistance Plan

The federal government's work on the Canada Assistance Plan began under the Diefenbaker government in 1962. A number of shared-cost programs had been

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[472] This approach is implied in E. R. Black and A. C. Cairns "A Different Perspective on Canadian Federalism", J. P. Meekison, (ed.), *Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality*, (Methuen, 1977), pp. 31 - 49.

[473] Robarts of Ontario and Woodrow Lloyd of Saskatchewan were opposed, for different reasons, while Quebec sought to develop a provincial plan. K. Bryden, *Old Age Pensions and Policy Making in Canada*, (University of British Columbia Press, 1974), p. 167.

introduced by the federal government in the 1950's. The federal welfare administrators wished to review and revise one of them – the Unemployment Assistance Act, in operation since 1956. Drafting anomalies in the original legislations needed to be cleaned up, and the review was necessitated by several new provincial welfare programs. In Saskatchewan, for example, supplementary assistance was being provided to the low income employed[474]. In Alberta[475], Saskatchewan and Manitoba means tested categorical programs of public assistance were being replaced by single integrated needs tested programs[476]. Both of these new features in public assistance complicated cost-sharing arrangements under existing federal legislation. Federal officials were also concerned about the absence of regulations under the existing Unemployment Assistance Program, and the problem of overcoming provincial resistance to regulations in a program already in operation for over five years.

These conditions led the federal officials to review the possibility of a new Act. Others outside the federal service supported this initiative. In 1958 the Canada Welfare Council had recommended a program similar to that introduced in Alberta in 1961. The Council staff had included Norman Cragg and Bill Dyson, who by the 1960's were working for the federal government, and Frank McKinnon who was now Deputy Minister in Nova Scotia. In addition to the support of the voluntary Canadian Welfare Council, the federal welfare administrators also anticipated the support of the new National Council of Welfare. This had just been created by Diefenbaker, and included the Deputy Ministers of Welfare from across Canada and various other welfare interests known to federal officials[477].

The federal department also expected the provinces to respond favourably. They had approached the provinces informally, and found them determined to use any

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[474] Canada, Health and Welfare, "Meeting of the Federal Provincial Working Group on Welfare Programs", Minutes, February 14th, 15th 1964, p. 118.

[475] The first memorandum received by Joe Willard when he became federal deputy minister in 1960 had been from Duncan Rogers, deputy minister in Alberta, describing the province's new social allowance program and asking for cost sharing under the Unemployment Assistance Act.

[476] A "categorical" program provides assistance to people on the basis of their falling within a category such as "blind", or "mother with dependent children". A means test involves ensuring that a person is without means before assistance is granted. In a "needs test" a person's budget needs are assessed, regardless of category, and the difference between their income and their needs is granted as assistance.

[477] This was the era before the vogue for "citizen participation", and before welfare rights groups became active. There were no "ordinary" citizens and no welfare recipients on the National Council of Welfare until after it was reorganized by the Trudeau administration.

discussion of regulations as an opportunity to demand new legislation. Alberta was particularly anxious for new federal legislation to match their new Social Allowance program. The other provinces were taking every opportunity to press for federal cost-sharing of their own Mother's Allowance programs.

At the political level, however, welfare was still not a popular subject, and a provincial premier's meeting in July 1962 showed considerable interest in reducing welfare rates through a program of work for relief. The federal Deputy Minister then instructed the committee of officials to prepare three documents:

1. a memo to the minister on work for relief,
2. a memo to cabinet on amendments to the Unemployment Assistance Act and
3. a proposal for new legislation to be called the "General Welfare Assistance Act".

The Diefenbaker administration did not survive to act on these reports, but was replaced in April 1963 by a Liberal minority government under L. B. Pearson.

Pearson's Welfare Initiatives

During the election campaign Pearson had emphasized the need for a national pension plan, and during the 60 days of decision he moved quickly to present a plan to the provincial governments[478]. The hastily conceived and poorly organized proposal was not well received by the provinces. As federal-provincial meetings continued throughout 1963 agreement seemed more remote, until the Quebec delegates revealed their own pension plan. More generous than that of Ottawa, the Quebec plan made a pension fund available for use by provincial governments. Hasty scrambling by federal negotiators produced a new national plan based on the Quebec model.

As the Canada Pension Plan negotiations lurched to a conclusion, another series of federal provincial negotiations began, with less publicity and less conflict. At a federal provincial conference in November 1963 Pearson had acknowledged the provinces' position on a new welfare plan, and had committed his government to discussions:

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[478] The progress of the pension plan negotiations is described by R. Simeon, *Federal Provincial Diplomacy*, (University of Toronto Press, 1972), Chapter 3. J. LaMarsh, then federal minister of welfare, in *Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage*, (McClelland and Stewart, 1968) and P. C. Newman, *The Distemper of Our Times*, (McClelland and Stewart, 1968), chapter 22.

> On the assistance programs I will at this stage merely point out that in our view they must be considered in relation to the more general welfare program provided through Unemployment Assistance. Several provinces are, we appreciate, disposed to favour consolidation into one program. The federal government is willing to discuss that approach[479].

A committee was struck under Judy LaMarsh, federal Minister of Welfare, and the federal Deputy Minister Joe Willard continued discussions with his provincial counterparts[480]. A federal provincial working group of administrators met in Ottawa in February 1964. The provincial representatives described their various new programs to federal officials, hoping that Ottawa would share the costs. From this point onwards the current practices of various provincial governments, and their requests for cost-sharing, began to produce expansions to the proposed legislation. Originally the new programs in the three prairie provinces had spurred the consideration of new legislation. Now the other provinces began to request cost-sharing for their other welfare programs; mother's allowance; child welfare, health services for welfare recipients, subsidies to the working poor, the costs of administration and of rehabilitation.

The federal administrators then proposed a meeting of Welfare Ministers for May, and prepared a proposal for Cabinet that would be the basis of further negotiation. Cabinet cautiously agreed to present the proposal to the Welfare Ministers as "a basis for discussion" – as a response to the province's position, not as a firm federal commitment. The welfare ministers affirmed positions previously taken by their deputy ministers. They supported a new broad federal provincial public assistance program, based on needs rather than means, and cost-sharing Mother's Allowance, health services for public assistance recipients, and administration.

The federal bureaucrats then drafted a proposal to Cabinet that would reflect the provincial position. By October 1964 the proposal was ready for review by the Cabinet Committees on Social Security and Labour and on Federal Provincial Relations. This proposal again reviewed the input from the provincial premiers, and recommended a new Public Assistance Act to replace existing categorical programs, based on the needs test approach and, as requested by the provinces, including Mother's Allowance. Where the provinces had requested the sharing of all administrative costs, the federal officials

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[479] Canada, *Federal Provincial Conference*, Ottawa, November 26 – 29, 1963. (Queen's Printer, 1964), p. 14..

[480] Discussions began with a dinner with the federal deputy minister at his home on the eve of the November conference (Dyck, ibid., pp. 106 – 119).

proposed that administration only be cost shared for programs designed to assist recipients become self-supporting. Sharing of health costs was not recommended, since a national medicare program was anticipated. Thus, the federal departmental officials included in this first proposal some (but by no means all) of the provinces' requests.

In addition a number of federal initiatives were included in this early proposal.

1. The provinces would take over the administration of welfare services to Indians[481];
2. Provincial residency would not be a condition for receipt of assistance;
3. Provisions for maintaining standards of assistance were proposed, together with auditing arrangements.

The Departmental officials sought approval for this proposal, which was to be submitted to the Cabinet by Welfare Minister Judy LaMarsh, before a Welfare Ministers' conference intended for November 1964.

The Ministers' meetings was postponed, but instead in November 1964 a working group met to discuss work for relief, raised by the provincial governments at many federal provincial meetings[482]. The group reviewed the various attempts across Canada to deal with the technically employable but chronically unemployed. Programs from Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta were described, ranging from more traditional winter works programs in British Columbia to community development programs in northern Alberta and rural Quebec. The meeting made no formal decisions, but several ideas were later included in the Canada Assistance Plan. Rehabilitation of those on welfare, so that they could be self-supporting, and community development both later became shareable under the Canada Assistance Plan.

By January 1965 an internal draft was ready, and had been reviewed by the Cabinet Committee on Social Security and Labour. The January draft contained references to the Canada Pension Plan, for the Minister was concerned about the delay before the Pension Plan would pay out. The provisions for cost-sharing of administration were broader than had been anticipated in October, and the discussion of "work for

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[481] This provision was eventually included in the legislation, but met with opposition from native groups and was not implemented.

[482] R. Splane, Director of the federal government's Unemployment Assistance Program, chaired this meeting, and cited the discussions in the meetings over the Pension Plan in September 1963; in the Prime Ministers' Conference in November 1963; at the Working Group meetings of Feburary 1964; at the Welfare Ministers' meetings of May 1964; and at the meeting of the first ministers in October 1964 when Saskatchewan premier Ross Thatcher had made a specific proposal for a work-for-relief program.

relief" was reflected in new proposals for work training programs. The federal welfare administrators had intended to fund community work programs, following provincial ideas expressed at the November meeting, but these were to be opposed by the federal Department of Labour. A more restricted program was put forward instead. The cost of health care for welfare recipients was still excluded, pending the development of a general medicare program[483]. The federal government still intended to set provincial standards of assistance, and to hand over to the provinces responsibility for welfare services to Indians.

Canada's War on Poverty

Later in January 1965 the federal Minister held an important strategy meeting to discuss plans for the new public assistance legislation. Those present included the Minister, her Deputy Minister (Joe Willard), the Director of Unemployment Assistance (Dick Splane) and Tom Kent of the Special Planning Secretariat. This small group reviewed potential opposition to the legislation, and planned strategy for getting the proposals over the various hurdles. They anticipated opposition from Labour to the work programs, and had some hesitancy themselves because of the "retrograde" aspects of such programs. They also recognized that the programs would be provincial, with little credit going to federal politicians. Deputy Minister Willard insisted that national standards should be set, and the others agreed.

Kent was already working on a poverty program for Canada, along the lines of the War on Poverty declared by President Johnson in the United States. Kent outlined to the small group the range of programs that would be included, suggesting that the new public assistance program would be part of the package. The group then chose a more catchy name, Canada Assistance Plan, or C. A. P. (to match the name of the pension plan, or C. P. P.) to replace the name General Public Assistance Act. They planned to have C. A. P. mentioned in the upcoming Speech from the Throne. A meeting of the Welfare Ministers would then discuss it in April, and the legislation would introduced later that month. Early in February 1965 LaMarsh followed up these discussions with a letter to Prime Minister

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[483] This position was reinforced by administrators on the health side, who feared that sharing the cost of medical care for the poor would reduce the likelihood of successful introduction of a general medical care program.

Pearson, presenting C. A. P. as complementary to C. P. P., relating it to the elimination of poverty, and setting out the time line as agreed by the strategy group.

Opposition to C. A. P. developed as anticipated by the strategy group. Meetings with the Department of Labour produced a modified proposal for "work activity programs" rather than community work programs. The Department of Health wanted health costs to remain unshareable. The Department of Finance was concerned about the cost of the new program. The Deputy Minister of Welfare reassured the Deputy Minister of Finance of the essential nature of the various costly additions in the new program. Willard emphasized that the major elements in the proposal reflected long standing points of contention with the provinces. The inclusion of cost-sharing for mother's allowance, for example, was essential for the support of the provincial governments, and Willard referred to letters from Newfoundland, Quebec and Saskatchewan. Cost-sharing administration, Willard explained, would strengthen administration and encourage rehabilitation, implying that in the long run this would reduce costs. He described the Department's ambivalence over cost-sharing medical care to welfare recipients, and continued to defend the need for the federal government to ensure adequate standards of assistance across Canada. He reminded his counterpart in Finance of the discussions between Kent and LaMarsh on the War on Poverty. Although the Department of Finance continued to be concerned about the cost-sharing of Mother's Allowance and administration, they decided not to oppose the broad lines of the C. A. P. proposal. Thus the proposal could be presented to Cabinet, and if approved could be used as the basis for further discussions with the provinces.

On April 5th 1965, in the Speech from the Throne, the Canadian Government declared Canada's War on Poverty:

> My government is therefore developing a program for full utilization of our human resources and the elimination of poverty among our people. It will include improved measures for regional development, the re-employment and training of workers, the redevelopment of rural areas, *the assistance of needy people*(author's emphasis), and the establishment of new opportunities for young Canadians, besides strengthening and broadening measures within the federal sphere of responsibility, the plan will be designed to concert them more effectively with provincial programs. Because of the importance of this plan, my Prime Minister will take full responsibility for its coordination. My Government will propose calling a special federal provincial conference to seek full co-operation and co-ordination with policies of the provinces[434].

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[434] Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 5th, 1965.

In the debates that followed, Pearson emphasized the involvement of the provinces in the Canada Assistance Plan negotiations:

> The origin of the Plan goes back to the discussions with the provincial governments concerning the Canada Pension Plan in September of 1963. The need was recognized at that time for an improved public assistance plan, and since that time a number of discussions have been carried forward with the provinces[485].

Support also came from the National Council of Welfare, which included the provincial Deputy Ministers and others in the welfare field. The Council's first meeting in April 1965 had been spent orienting non-government members of the Council to the Department's programs, but the Canada Assistance Plan was also discussed. One new request had been made at this meeting, that provisions be made in C. A. P. to assist voluntary welfare associations. Federal Deputy Minister Willard said this was not yet decided.

A few days later the Welfare Ministers met to discuss C. A. P., and reached general agreement on the basic features of the Plan under which:

> Recipients will be granted assistance on the basis of their needs. The Plan will extend federal cost-sharing to needy mothers, to health costs of recipients, and to expenditures for improving administration of assistance programs and welfare services for recipients[486].

The Welfare Ministers supported the Plan, and proposed it be discussed at the First Ministers' conference in July, with "technical details" worked out in further meetings between administrators. Later in the Parliamentary session the Government reported on this positive reaction from the provincial Welfare Ministers:

> I am happy to be able to report, on behalf of the Minister of National Health and Welfare, that the Plan was given general approval by the Provincial Ministers, who welcomed it as providing a basis for a more flexible approach to public welfare in Canada[487].

Before the July meeting of First Ministers the federal Minister of Welfare wrote to all the provincial ministers, asking for feedback on the C. A. P. proposal. Correspondence with the Alberta minister, Mr. Halmrast, reflects Alberta's concern with services to Indians. As mentioned in chapter IV, the province had been involved since

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[485] Canada, House of Commons, April 6th, 1965, p. 39.
[486] Canada, "Communique for the Press from the Proceedings of the Meeting", *Position Statement of the Minister of National Health and Welfare on the Agenda Items of the Conference of Ministers of Welfare*, April 8th and 9th, 1965.
[487] Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1965, pp. 338 - 339. J. B. Stewart, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State, on behalf of the Minister Judy LaMarsh.

1964 in community development with Metis Albertans, and wanted federal cooperation to extend this to Indians.

The Alberta minister also welcomed the Canada Assistance Plan, because it followed very closely the current welfare practices in Alberta. Halmrast wrote to Willard of Alberta's new rehabilitative and preventive programs. He expected rehabilitation to be shared, and hoped that the proposed preventive program would also be included. Halmrast outlined his government's intentions:

> In addition to the rehabilitation programs covered in Departmental Memorandum 102 it is our firm intention to become actively involved through the municipalities and private agencies in what we refer to as preventive welfare services. Naturally these services will take many forms but we wish to interest municipal government in an activity that will enhance and preserve family living. It is too early yet to really define what these services will be. The certainly will include marriage counselling, family planning, day care centres and other personal recreational and community services that need development. We do see a very real growth in this area in the next five or ten years and sincerely hope that the funds the Province intended to make available to the municipalities will be shareable under your new Assistance Act [488].

The main points about this excerpt are that first, the Alberta Government had a *firm intention* to pursue this new program, regardless of the shareability under C. A. P., and second, that at this point the federal government had not agreed that these programs would be shareable. Alberta's preventive program would be excluded on two grounds – the federal government had at this point not included non-provincial agencies in C. A. P.. Also, the federal government had no intention at this point of including child welfare, day care and other non-financial social services under C. A. P.. The federal minister responded to the Alberta letter, expressing interest in the proposed preventive program, but cautious about its shareability.

During the period of preparation for the Premier's meeting in July the federal government again expanded the provisions of C. A. P.. Responding to provincial criticisms, the federal plan was expanded to cost-share welfare services to those already in receipt of public assistance. Internal discussions of potential problems resulted in the introduction of a loophole through which some of Alberta's preventive program later became shareable. Welfare officials were concerned that someone receiving services while on public assistance would not lose his/her right to those services when

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[488] L. Halmrast to J. LaMarsh, June 28th, 1965. (Correspondence on file, Alberta Social Services and Community Health).

he/she became self supporting, for the services might be crucial in allowing the person to remain self-supporting. The phrase "in need, or likely to be in need" was introduced to cover this group of people intermittently on welfare. The intention in including "welfare services" was therefore related to the elimination of poverty through the prevention of welfare dependency[489]. However, at this stage there was no clear definition of what was meant by a "welfare service".

In July 1965 the First Ministers met to discuss the federal government's War on Poverty, much of which could not be implemented without provincial co-operation. The Minister of Welfare addressed the conference, outlining the provisions approved by Cabinet, including new provisions for cost-sharing welfare services. The ministers requested several additions to the Plan.

1. Premier Robarts of Ontario made a strong plea for the inclusion of child welfare programs[490].
2. Poorer provinces wanted recognition of their limited fiscal capacity. The maritime Welfare Ministers had met in July and agreed upon the need for a differential cost sharing formula under C. A. P. to recognize their need. Robert Stanfield of Nova Scotia, for example, explained that poorer regions needed more welfare programs, and were at a disadvantage under the Plan. Pearson reminded him of the equalization provisions then being considered by the Federal Provincial Tax Structure Commitee [491]. Manning of Alberta supported Stanfield's position.
3. Work activity programs were also discussed, welcomed by some provinces and criticised by others.
4. The Quebec premier Lesage pointed out that his province would "opt out" of the Canada Assistance Plan, since they did not want to subject their welfare administration practices to federal standards[492]. Later in 1965 this position was to

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[489] Tom Kent was involved in the discussions, and suggested some additions to the cabinet submission that would describe situations in which welfare services could assist someone to become self-supporting.
[490] Canada, Federal Provincial Conference, Ottawa, July 19 - 22, 1965, pp. 28 - 29.
[491] The progress of the Tax Structure Committee and its "working arm", the Continuing Committee on Financial and Economic Matters, are outlined for this period in *Federal Provincial Diplomacy*, R. Simeon, (University of Toronto Press, 1972), ch. 4.
[492] Canada, Privy Council, *Federal Provincial Conference*, Ottawa, July 19 - 22, 1965, pp. 53 - 54.

result in the elimination from the C. A. P. legislation of any mention of standards[493], a concession to the provinces that almost led to the resignation of one senior federal welfare official.

The federal minister closed the sessions with commitment to a further meeting later in 1965. In the mean time federal welfare administrators had begun another round of discussions with *their* provincial counterparts. Using the drafting instructions for C. A. P., they visited each province to discuss the details of the program. Many administrators remember these meetings as the high point of their careers. As with the provincial municipal meetings outlined in the previous chapter, these consultations were open, friendly, and more important – they led to new legislation. The provincial officials from Alberta felt that many of their ideas were incorporated in the final form of the Canada Assistance Plan. The process was new, however, and federal administrators felt they were taking a risk, for the legislation had not yet been presented in the House of Commons. But, no paper was ever left behind in provincial offices, and this provided some security. So also did whole-hearted support from their Deputy Minister[494].

These discussions produced further demands for federal concessions, and by the beginning of September 1965 these were presented to the federal Minister in a letter from her Deputy Minister.

1. First he referred to Robarts' request at the July conference for cost-sharing of child welfare and added that discussions at the official level showed that the other provinces also favoured this inclusion. Willard presented a number of arguments in favour of cost-sharing of child welfare, and indicated that the cost would be $15 or $16 million.
2. The provincial request for recognition of fiscal need in poorer regions of the country was also recognised, and a sliding scale for cost-sharing related to regional per capita income was developed.
3. Willard commented that the provinces favoured cost-sharing of welfare services,

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[493] A federal official in interview commented that this instruction to remove the requirement for welfare standards was handed down by the privy council office later in 1965. This particular official nearly resigned over this concession to provincial autonomy.
[494] This general description of federal provincial negotiations was confirmed in interviews with bureaucrats in both Edmonton and Ottawa, and conforms with that given by Rand Dyck in "Poverty and Policy Making in the 1960's", (unpublished thesis, Queen's University, 1973).

but debated their calculation of costs.

He asked LaMarsh for direction on whether he should prepare a memorandum to Cabinet on the cost-sharing of child welfare and/or on the sliding scale to assist poorer regions. He reminded the minister of the need to reach a decision on these two issues before she met again with her provincial counterparts.

The 1965 General Election

Almost simultaneously with Willard's letter to his minister, Prime Minister Pearson attempted to end his minority position in the House of Commons by calling a snap election. There was no discussion of C. A. P. at the Cabinet level until after the election, but correspondence continued between welfare administrators. A series of letters, for example, was exchanged between officials in Ottawa and Alberta about the province's proposed preventive programs. Ottawa was not prepared to share the costs of social services unless the recipients of services could meet a needs test, and only if the services were given by (or requested by) a designated social assistance agency. The Alberta Deputy Minister, Duncan Rogers, wanted to discuss the matter further, but:

> In the meantime, however, the matter of your sharing will not be a deciding factor in whether or not the Province undertakes such a program. We are going to have to try and sell the program on its own merits and will sort out the matter of sharing afterwards[495].

This extract again shows that Alberta persisted in designing legislation broader in terms of reference than that of Ottawa, and that "leadership" (at least in the case of Alberta) was not with the federal government.

In the fall election of 1965 another Liberal minority government was elected. Preparations continued for a meeting of Welfare Ministers, initially in November 1965 but then postponed to January 1966. In October 1965 C. A. P. was reviewed by the National Council of Welfare at its second meeting. A number of other areas were also discussed, including research, training for social workers, and the War on Poverty. Discussion of C. A. P. emphasized the need for a cost-sharing formula that would recognize the needs of the poorer regions. Program director Norman Cragg responded to discussions of cost-sharing services of private agencies by restating the federal

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[495] D. W. Rogers to Dr. R. Splane, "Re: Canada Assistance Plan", September 22nd, 1965.

position that this would not be possible[496].

In November 1965 Cabinet discussed a memorandum on C. A. P., attempting to resolve the issues of cost-sharing child welfare, a differential cost-sharing formula to help poorer regions, and the basis for cost-sharing administration. The document was referred by Cabinet to a Committee of Officials of the Departments of Finance, Health and Welfare and of the Secretariat of the Privy Council. This group reported to Cabinet later in December, recommending that a formula recognizing the incidence of need was unnecessary since a new equalization formula was being worked out, recommending that child welfare not be shared, and that only new administrative costs beyond the base year of 1964 - 65 be shareable.

In January 1966 the provincial Welfare Ministers met to review the Canada Assistance Plan. In November they had all received a reference paper describing the provisions of the Plan, which were again outlined to them by the new Minister of National Health and Welfare, Alan MacEachen. The Provincial ministers made a strong and unanimous case for full and immediate coverage of all child welfare costs, emphasizing the necessity of strong child welfare programs in breaking the cycle of poverty. The sharing of costs for only those children who were already wards would not serve to strengthen family life.

The Ministers from the Maritime provinces again cited their own fiscal inability to pay for welfare services. Ontario and Quebec requested further help for private agencies. Several other provinces requested that a broader range of community development services be shareable under the Plan. Ontario requested that capital costs be shareable. Quebec suggested the integration of the Welfare Grants Program under C. A. P. and British Columbia asked to be allowed to continue residence restrictions.

As a result of the pressure from these provincial governments[497] another submission was made to Cabinet reintroducing a cost-sharing formula to recognize the need of poorer regions, and including child welfare as shareable. A more flexibile arrangement for cost-sharing assistance to private agencies was introduced so that the private Children's Aid Societies could be supported in Ontario. This provision also

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[496] Canada, *Minutes of the Second Meeting of the National Council of Welfare*, October 18th - 19th, 1965, pp. 6 - 7.

[497] Ontario's Children's Aid Societies were also active in pressuring for cost sharing of child welfare.

expanded the cost-sharing available to Alberta, both for the child welfare services that became totally provincial in 1966, and for the new program of preventive services operated by municipal and private social agencies. Cabinet approved both proposals, but later removed the variable cost-sharing formula when a new equalizing formula provided additional funds to the poorer provinces.

Cost-sharing of medical care to the poor was also reconsidered. Memoranda on both C. A. P. and on medicare were ready for Cabinet at the same time. Had a general medical program been approved first by Cabinet then there would have been no need for the medical care provision in C. A. P.. As it happened C. A. P. was considered first, so medical care was left in the program, but never used.

The Canada Assistance Plan of 1966

Both federal and provincial governments had gained something in these comparatively conflict-free negotiations. Ottawa had a national welfare program, a long-term goal of federal welfare administrators[498]. Federal politicians had another element essential to the credibility of their War on Poverty. The content of the legislation, however, was not quite as federal administrators had hoped.

1. Quebec had opted out of the plan, receiving tax points instead. However, this distinction was not essential as the province liked the Plan, met all its conditions, and submitted claims in the same way as the other provinces[499].
2. The elimination of residency restrictions was to be achieved. These had already been eliminated in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Alberta, but by 1967 Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Ontario had also conformed.
3. The federal officials had sought to ensure that welfare appeal systems be introduced in all provinces as a condition of cost-sharing. These were slow to develop[500], however, and the federal government was unwilling to force the issue.

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[498] R. Splane wrote in 1976 that his "...credo, and one I would ascribe in varying degrees to other members of the groups....until about the mid-sixties it consisted almost entirely of the belief that, in the interests of all Canadians, and particularly those least advantaged, a high priority should be given to the development of a comprehensive, nation-wide social security system". R. Splane, Op. Cit..

[499] Splane, in correspondence with Leslie Bella, 1977.

[500] In November 1976 Dr. Splane addressed a national workshop on welfare appeal systems and recalled this as "one of the most important goals of the Canada Assistance Plan". The C. A. P. legislation had required that welfare appeal machinery be established "within one year", but inadequacies existed in many provinces into the 1970's.

4. An attempt to broaden the "welfare" field, to expand into economic intervention[501], had failed. Community work programs had been rejected as a valid concern for a Department of Welfare, with a more residual "work activity program" approved.
5. The federal administrators failed to implement a universal standard of adequacy in welfare programs across Canada. That would have been too much of an intrusion into provincial jurisdiction.

But, the program *was* in place, and although it cost-shared nothing that was not already being done by at least one provincial government, it did provide incentives for improvement where the development of welfare services was retarded.

Provinces seeking cost-sharing for existing programs found the C. A. P. negotiations highly successful. Steadily over three years many of the welfare innovations in the provinces were included under the C. A. P. umbrella; needs tested assistance, mothers' allowances, supplementation for those in employment, work activity programs, rehabilitation, funds for private agencies, child welfare and various other welfare services. The introduction of each new provision can be traced to the pressure from provincial governments, to their wish to obtain cost-sharing for existing services[502].

One obvious conclusion is that in the welfare field the federal government followed where certain provincial governments led. This does not negate the effects of federal legislation such as C. A. P., in stimulating welfare innovations in regions that were behind, but the federal government found it difficult to lead if a provincial government was not already out in front. This case analysis of the Alberta welfare reforms of the 1960's shows that federal government initiatives did *not* stimulate those in Alberta, but rather that initiatives in the provinces of Ontario and to a lesser extent on the Prairies dictated the content of the new federal program. Federal initiatives were not therefore a

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[501] Using Anthony Downs territorial analogy for competition between expanding bureaucracies, *Inside Bureaucracy*, (Little Brown, 1967), ch. 17.

[502] Alberta's minister of welfare, L. C. Halmrast, remembers that the provincial ministers would describe what they were doing and ask for cost-sharing: "They used to pay attention. We sat around in a circle. The ministers were all in the inner circle and then the deputies sat directly behind you in case you needed some assistance because questions would be asked you from the federal group. They would want to know about various programs, why you were requesting more federal assistance in some of these programs so you had to justify what you were doing and say "well we are expanding this area. There's a need in this area, a greater need now and we must do something about it." And in order to meet that need we'd need some more federal money in order to implement it and see that the job was being done. And they were very good in most cases. If they thought it was worthwhile then more money would be available to us."(L. C. Halmrast, in interview with Leslie Bella, 1977).

major causal variable influencing the consolidation and expansion of Alberta's welfare state in the 1960's.

Political Resources and C. A. P. Negotiations

In the two previous chapters it has been shown that both the pressure groups and the municipal governments lacked the capacity to influence the provincial policy process. In the case of the pressure groups the problem was lack of institutional capacity and credibility. The municipal governments had the institutional capacity to influence the province, but because of their weak constitutional position lacked political resources. The federal government's lack of influence over provincial social policy can also be explained in terms of the comparative weakness of political resources[503]. In the negotiations over the Canada Assistance Plan the provincial governments had more resources with which to influence federal policy. Also, in developing their own social policy the provinces were constitutionally autonomous of the federal government. The result was strong provincial influence over federal policy, and (in the more prosperous provinces) little federal influence over provincial policy. This comparative strength existed in the C. A. P. negotiations, but was not as evident in other contemporary negotiations.

1. The first and major factor strengthening the provinces was, as is suggested above, the constitutional jurisdiction of the provinces for welfare. Unlike pensions, where a constitutional amendment had granted the federal government some limited authority, welfare remained an undeniably provincial responsibility. Thus, when a province objected to a provision standardizing welfare across the country, that provision was taken out of the legislation.
2. A second factor that strengthened the provincial position was the federal *commitment* to develop national legislation. This commitment became a liability to federal negotiators, who were reluctant to forfeit the opportunity to fulfill their commitment. A series of concessions to the provinces was essential to retention of

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[503] R. Simeon also regards political resources as crucial determinants of the outcome of federal provincial negotiations. *Federal Provincial Diplomacy*, Ibid., p. 266.

their support [504].

3. A factor which weakened the federal position was the minority position of the federal government. The federal Liberal government felt somewhat insecure about its ability to get legislation through the House of Commons[505]. The New Democratic Party generally supported the C. A. P. legislation, but wanted to use the occasion to get better pensions for the elderly. Stanley Knowles moved an amendment to give increased payments to the elderly, using the findings of the recently released Senate Committee Report on Aging to support his case. The N. D. P. appeared prepared for a filibuster, but with the promise of future supplementary assistance for the elderly they were eventually persuaded to back down.

Provincial support for C. A. P. was used in its defence before the House of Commons and its Committees. The Deputy Minister argued before the Standing Committee on Health and Welfare that the provinces had been negotiating in good faith for two years, and that the federal government "could not back out now"[506]. Introducing the legislation in the House of Commons the Minister of National Welfare also referred to the extent of provincial support:

> The resolution deals with an area that has been the subject of extensive federal provincial discussions over the past few years. It is also an area in which there is a remarkable degree of agreement on the need for action and the essentials of the approach that should be taken.... this is a program which carried the endorsement of all provincial governments at the federal provincial conference earlier this year[507].

Later in the session, in moving second reading of the C. A. P. Bill, he emphasized provincial support of the program. He cited new legislation introduced in Alberta and Ontario "in response" to the promised C. A. P., although it has been demonstrated here that at least in the case of Alberta the decision to introduce welfare reforms had been independent of the federal government's new legislation. MacEachen reminded the House that he had:

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[504] Another less likely factor was the spill-over effects from other federal provincial negotiations. The health officials were attempting to develop a medicare program, and it is possible that concessions on C. A. P. were granted in return for provincial acceptance of C. A. P.. However, there was little overlap of personnel in the two sets of negotiations, and welfare officials aware of the medicare negotiations focussed primarily on the cost-sharing of medical services for those on assistance.

[505] The fracas over the first budget, presented by Walter Gordon, and the scrambled negotiation over the pension plan had shaken the confidence of the Pearson government.

[506] Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Health and Welfare, Minutes Proceedings and Evidence, June 30th, 1966, p. 509.

[507] Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 14th, 1966, pp. 6407 - 6408.

> Already referred to the support and endorsement of the plan that has been given by the provinces and to one example – that of Ontario – of steps being taken by provinces in anticipation of this legislation. I could cite many other examples. The province of Alberta has adopted legislation for the development of preventive welfare services in the community[508].

Provincial support for C. A. P. assisted the federal government in the House of Commons, and the federal government appears to have felt that provincial support was essential to the success of the program. of the provinces. The position taken by Quebec, for example, was a potential threat to the federal program. The provision for national "standards" was eliminated because of Quebec's opposition. However, two other factors *weakened* Quebec's influence in the C. A. P. negotiations. By the time C. A. P. negotiations reached their final stages provisions for Quebec to opt out of this and other federal programs had also been developed. Quebec's acceptance of the C. A. P. terms was not therefore essential to the program's success.

4. Another factor which strengthened the provincial position in the C. A. P. negotiations (in comparison with those on C. P. P.) was the balance of administrative skills. In the pensions debate only Quebec and Ottawa had negotiators who really understood the complexities of pensions programs. The other provinces had neither the competence nor the interest[509]. However, all provincial governments had some experience of welfare administration and most could field competent and trained negotiators. Thus in the C. A. P. negotiations the other provinces had more administrative resources vis-a-vis Ottawa, and vis-a-vis Quebec, than in the C. P. P. negotiations.

5. Last, and contrary to Simeon's contention[510], the provinces did strengthen their position by "ganging up" on Ottawa. Interprovincial communication about welfare services had existed for some time at the administrative level[511]. The Maritime

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[508] Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 27th, 1966, p. 6926.
[509] Simeon, *Ibid.*,, p. 216.
[510] *Ibid.*, p. 229.
[511] There was a custom for Alberta's welfare administrators, for example, to tour the country and review programs in other provinces, before introducing new legislation of their own. The Social Allowance Program introduced in Alberta in 1961 owed much to ideas current in Saskatchewan, and to the Canadian Welfare Council's 1958 report *Social Security for Canada*. The child welfare legislation of 1966 was put together by collecting the best aspects of child welfare legislation across Canada. In Alberta only the preventive social service program of 1966 was purely an indigenous invention. (Alberta interviews, L. Bella, 1977).

Welfare Ministers developed a joint position on a cost-sharing formula that would recognize their need. Then, in 1966, *all* the Welfare Ministers forcefully presented the need for cost-sharing child welfare and jointly persuaded cabinet to make this concession, in order to retain unanimous support for the plan.

Ottawa retained some resources. The federal government retained the power of the purse, and this was particularly important for the less prosperous provinces. But Ottawa's position was not strong enough in relation to the provinces to retain in the Plan the provisions to ensure national standards. Also, the federal government was not strong enough to implement the Plan without considerable concessions and expansions to meet provincial requests and demands. The Canada Assistance Plan is federal legislation, and did spur the development of social welfare programs in areas of Canada where their growth had been retarded. However, the legislation contained nothing that was not already being done by several provincial governments, and these inclusions were the result of provincial pressure, not predetermined federal policy.

Scholars have emphasized the importance of federal leadership in "sustaining the welfare state in Canada."[512] But, as the case of the Canada Assistance Plan demonstrates, the reverse may be true. Under certain circumstances policy leadership can come from the provincial governments, and through the process of executive federalism be expressed in federal legislation. By tracing the "causal chain" between welfare reforms in Alberta and in Ottawa it has been shown that federal initiatives did not "cause" those in the province of Alberta, but rather federal policy was stimulated and changed to conform with provincial government requirements.

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[512] D. V. Smiley, "Federal Provincial Conflict in Canada", J. P. Meekison, (ed.), *Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality*, (3rd edition), (Methuen, 1977), p. 3.

VII. THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY PROCESS

This chapter assesses the impact of the final and most crucial link between social and economic change and social policy – that within the public service, as administrators responded to strains placed on their departments by shifts in the broader society. None of the other links were responsible for the welfare reforms in Alberta in the 1960's. Social Credit political ideology linked social and economic change in Alberta in the 1930's to the government policy in the 1960's. The Social Credit government's perception of threat from the left also affected their development of social policy. But neither of these party-based links caused the expansion of provincial social welfare programs between 1960 and 1966, an expansion that was in opposition to traditional Social Credit ideology. The impact of pressure groups has also been shown to have been minimal. The pressure groups lacked the symbiotic relationships with government associated with institutionalization. The municipalities were admitted to preliminary policy discussions before the reforms of 1966 were announced. But this involvement was intended to create an illusion of influence, to avoid public opposition. The federal government initiatives have also been reviewed, and did not stimulate reforms in Alberta. Instead the federal government responded to *provincial* initiatives, including those of Alberta.

In the early-sixties a number of changes associated with urbanization and prosperity increased the demands upon the province's Department of Welfare. With fewer people living on farms, more workers were dependent upon wage employment, and therefore vulnerable to unemployment. Marriage breakdowns were more frequent, and more single parent families needed assistance. Illegitimacy was also increasing, with many children surrendered for adoption. Such changes affected the case loads of the provincial department, and administrators were aware of the inadequacy of existing services. This chapter begins with a description of the extent of the demands upon the Department, and the way they were perceived by senior administrators.

Two models could account for the response of administrators to such strains. These two models, the rational/comprehensive model and the marginal/incremental model, are often presented as competing normative models. As outlined below, and as applied to the policy making activities of the Department of Welfare, they become complementary *explanatory* theories, with their relative importance varying with the

degree of consensus on policy goals. In 1966 when administrators and politicians agreed on the goal of reducing child welfare intake, a package of reforms with that objective, and a package more comprehensive and rational than incremental, was possible. The package was administratively rational (focussed on achieving the goal) and *politically* rational. Each element was justified by reference to rising child welfare rates, but each also had the political function of purchasing the support of individuals or groups that might defeat or obstruct the package.

When policy makers agreed on the goal, therefore, the policy making process was more rational and comprehensive. However, when politicians and administrators *differed* on the goal of policy, as they did in the case of relief to the indigent and the desirability of a provincial welfare state, even though the reforms had been conceived as a whole by senior welfare administrators, they were introduced in a series of marginal increments. The absence of consensus prevented the rational/comprehensive reforms sought by welfare administrators in the public assistance area. Conversely, when the politicians introduced their own rational/comprehensive plan of Human Resource Development in 1967, they by-passed their own welfare-oriented human service agency, and created a new one.

A. Macro-Processes and Social Breakdown

During the 1960's Alberta became more urban than rural; shifted away from farming and towards various middle class technical and professional occupations; and experienced an economic boom. Various kinds of social breakdown were associated with these changes, increased the demands on the human service systems in the province, and straining them beyond their capacity. Most crucial in impact upon the provincial Department of Welfare were the increase in illegitimate births and in family breakdown.

Illegitimacy

Illegitimate births in Alberta were increasing geometrically during the early 1960's, and nearly doubled between 1960 and 1965 (see Diagram 7.1). An analyst of illegitimacy in the province describes this increase as the result of the concurrence of a period of economic prosperity with the sexual norms of a new youth culture.

> The dramatic increase *(in illegitimacy)* between 1960 and 1970 is also partly explicable by the fact that illegitimacy tends to be high during periods of economic prosperity; the increase may also be partly attributable to shifting sexual mores, particularly the liberalization of social attitudes to sexual relationships and the emergence of a distinctive youth culture with strong norms for informal sexual relationships[513].

As the provincial government was already responsible for supervising adoptions, and since many of these babies born out of wedlock were being surrendered by their parents, provincial child welfare intake was increasing.

Child Welfare Intake

While these illegitimate babies contributed to increasing child welfare caseloads, "neglected" children apprehended by local governments were also coming into the care of the province. Until 1957 the municipalities had been responsible for supporting any children taken from their families and into the care of the state. In 1957, however, the province assumed responsibility for supporting these children[514]. Since they still had to pay 40% of the cost of relief payments, this new arrangement encouraged municipalities to apprehend the children of indigent families rather than support them financially. This further increased child welfare rates, flooding the Department in the early 1960's. John Ward, Director of Child Welfare for part of this period, commented:

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[513] M. E. Manley Casimir, *Public Attitudes to Illegitimacy in Alberta*, (Alberta Department of Health and Social Development, 1973), p. 8.
[514] M. Lobb, "A Short History of Welfare in Alberta", (Alberta Department of Health and Social Development, undated mimeo), p. 6.

Diagram 7.1

Illegitimate Births in Alberta, 1951 - 1976[111]



[111]Canada, Statistics Canada, Vital Statistics, Vol. 1, 1973, Births, (Cat. 84 - 204), pp. 67 - 68.

Diagram 7.2

Children in Care in Alberta, 1961 - 76[iii]



[iii] Alberta Social Services and Community Health, *Annual Reports*, 1956 - 1(Previously Department of Public Welfare, Department of Social Development, and Department of Health and Social Development).

Diagram 7.3

Child Welfare Intake in Alberta, 1961 - 1976[117]



[117] Alberta, Department of Social Services and Community Health, *Annual Reports*, 1956 -. (Otherwise known as Department of Public Welfare, Department of Social Development, and Department of Health and Social Development).

> There was nothing the matter with the kids. They are just innocent victims. We were faced with municipalities being responsible for the child till he became a ward, and of course they saw an awkward problem in their community and they saw the solution of it as making them wards and shunting the whole thing onto the province[518].

This tendency was somewhat reduced when the province provided more generous cost sharing for municipal public assistance in 1960, decreasing the municipal share to 20% and increasing the general standards of assistance under a new Social Allowance program. However, this structural flaw in the child welfare program, and the rising rate of illegitimacy contributed to increased child welfare rates.

In 1960 there had been just over 3,000 children in care of the province, but by 1965 this number had doubled (see Diagram 7.2). Even corrected for the general increase in the number of children in Alberta, this increase is still substantial (63%)[519]. This increase in the numbers in care was a reflection of increased intake (see Diagram 7.3), which reached nearly 1,000 a year by 1967[520]. The senior welfare administrators knew of the problems that these numbers were creating for their Department, and of the human tragedies behind each apprehension. Their concerns were expressed eloquently in speeches made by the Deputy Minister and his colleagues in the early 1960's[521]. Notes prepared by John Ward for the Minister's address to the Legislature on the state of his Department in 1966 also commented on the nearly 1,000 new wards that had been accepted that year by the government, and on the indictment of society's support systems that this represented[522]. Deputy Minister Duncan Rogers spoke to the Canadian Welfare Council in 1967, and also summarized the Department's concern about increasing child welfare rates.

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[518] Ward, in interview, 1977.
[519] From 5.57 children in care per 1,000 children in the population in 1960 to 9.04 children in care per 1,000 children in the population in 1966. Data on the number of children in care taken from *Annual Reports* of Alberta Department of Welfare (subsequently known as Alberta Department of Social Development, Alberta Health and Social Services, and currently Alberta Social Services and Community Health).
[520] Data from *Annual Reports* of the Department, but non-existent prior to 1961.
[521] Duncan Rogers commented of his own speeches "I used to sweat blood over those things. It didn't come easily. Anyhow, they would be worth reading through because I put a lot of effort into them. Historically they will be vaulable, though I don't think they were worth much as a speech. This was part of the way you got your message across." Some of these speeches were already referred to in chapter IV as part of the Department's attempts to "sell" the need for child welfare reforms.
[522] On file, Alberta Social Services and Community Health.

> That there is a need is only too painfully apparent to Departments such as ours. I averaged the intake of government wards in Alberta for two consecutive months. Here's what I found – one hundred and four babies surrendered for adoption. In addition one hundred and forty children of all ages were judged neglected and made wards of the Crown. Assuming this to be a fair average it means that in the next twelve months the Department must be prepared to receive in excess of 2,600 children of all ages, all dispositions, and try to do something with them. To vizualize that many children coming into care each year with the human tragedy for the human child and family that is involved, is indeed a staggering thought, and an equally bitter indictment of our social well being.
>
> And then too we must remember that these children are only those sufficiently suffering neglect to be made wards. An estimate that an almost equal number of unmarried mothers kept their babies, and for better or worse that hundreds of children are by our standards living in the early stages of neglect. I could add to these totals the monthly intake of children who are dependent on mothers applying for social allowance, in a seemingly never-ending tragic procession of broken homes, broken marriages and separations, desertions or other manifestations of family breakdowns[523].

Such speeches were more than a public relations effort to "sell" reform. They reflected sincere conviction about the need for reform, after years of signing away parents' rights to children and children's rights to parents. Thelma Scambler operated the new Information and Referral Centre funded jointly by the City of Edmonton and the Province as a measure to prevent child abuse. She remembers the impact of these accumulated tragedies upon Duncan Rogers' thinking.

> I recall sitting in meetings with Duncan Rogers, whether chatting with him or in coffee dates, and he would be saying
>
> "Thelma, there's got to be something more than we have now to offset this".
>
> At that time the crying need was the number of children he was accepting into care each month. I can recall being in his office as these things had to be signed right after work. John Ward, as chairman of the Child Welfare Commission signing "John Ward" through piles of things, and the Child Welfare Commissions meeting weekly or more often, and then Dunc countersigning. Duncan would say:
>
> "Thelma, do you realize this month I have accepted into care *two hundred and twenty seven* infants! We are going to have to build almost slots into buildings to put them in if this continues."
>
> This is how disturbed and upset he was becoming[524].

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[523] D. W. Rogers, "Address to the Canadian Welfare Council, Funds and Councils Division, Annual Conference", Quebec City, 1967.

[524] Thelma Scambler, in interview, 1977. Scambler's memories are similar to those of Ward, McFarland and of Rogers himself, although Scambler's verbalization in interview was more vivid.

Diagram 7.4

Divorce Rate in Alberta, 1951 - 76[343]



[343] Statistics Canada, Vital Statistics, Volume II, Marriages and Divorces, 1975, (Cat 84 - 205), pp. 28 - 29

Diagram 7.5: Welfare Rates in Alberta, 1958 - 1974[444]



[444] Beneficiaries under Unemployment Assistance and Canada Assistance Plan as Percentage of Total Population 1958 - 74. Canada, *Social Security National Programs*, Statistics Canada, Cat 86 - 201, 1976, pp. 604 - 605. This data is not entirely suitable for analysis of the Alberta situation because of discrepancies between federal and provincial programs during the period. However, data generated by the government of Alberta for the same period is fragmentary.

Marriage Breakdown

In addition to this increasing child welfare caseload, the Department was also experiencing the results of other social changes in the province. Marriage breakdown was already increasing, as a result of the processes of urbanization and industrialization. Sociologists have observed that the shift towards urban living and towards wage employment outside the home removes some of the functions of the family, particularly its functions as an economic unit[527]. The family's only remaining function is that of providing companionship and happiness, and when these functions are not performed in a way satisfying to family members they feel more prepared to dissolve the family[528].

Shifts in economic prosperity may also influence marriage or family but the relationship here is not as certain. Economic crises, which threaten the breadwinner's capacity to provide, may also weaken the family. Welfare policies, by supporting the single parent family, but not one in which the breadwinner remains, may also encourage family breakdown[529]. However, prosperity may have the same effect, making it possible for a single parent to support his/her children outside an unsatisfying marriage.

Although divorce was negligible in the 1960's in Alberta in comparison with today, the rate was increasing, and desertions and separations were bringing more women and dependent children onto provincial and municipal caseloads. Diagram 7.4 shows the steady increase in divorce rates for Alberta from 1959 to 1968[530], and in Diagram 7.5 this is shown as reflected in the welfare rate in the province. These increases were of concern to provincial officials, though less so than the increases in child welfare intake. Marriage breakdown, they thought (some now admit, naively) could be prevented by the expansion of social services such as counselling, and by humane public welfare policies which would assist families in need without damaging the dignity of the breadwinner.

Unemployment

Unemployment is another form of social breakdown usually described as associated with urbanization. The substitution of a wage-based economy for an

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[527] W. F. Ogburn, "Why the Family is Changing", H. L. Ross, (ed), *Perspectives on the Social Order*, (McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 299 - 304.
[528] D. E. Poppin, *Communities*, (Macmillan, 1972), pp. 136 - 137, pp. 174 - 75.
[529] A. W. Dobelstein, *Politics, Economics and Public Welfare*, (Prentice-Hall, 1980).
[530] The jump in 1968 is in response to new Canadian legislation governing divorce.

entrepreneurial (if subsistence) farming economy increased the worker's vulnerability to unemployment[531]. However, in the buoyant economy of Alberta unemployment rates were low. Though the rate increased from 1.0 in 1958 to 4.3 in 1965, this was lower than in most other Canadian provinces[532].

The senior welfare administrators were concerned that the unemployed should be supported adequately to meet the needs of their families. This, they believed, would prevent unemployment from contributing further to marriage breakdown or to child abuse. Their primary concern, therefore, was to extend sufficient help to those that needed funds, therebye forestalling other problems. This focus on the preventive and supportive character of public assistance contrasted starkly with the position taken by the policy makers at the *political* level. The Social Credit welfare minister, his Cabinet colleagues and the Social Credit caucus viewed public assistance as *to be prevented* rather than as a means of prevention. This discrepancy was to determine the structure of the micro-policy process.

Duncan Rogers also believed that the development of the *provincial* rather than municipal welfare state was necessary to solve the problems of child abuse, illegitimacy, inadequate financial support, unemployment and marriage and family breakdown. Only then would there be guarantees of humane and adequate financial assistance, to protect the dignity of wage earners and the well-being of their families. Only then would families receive the services they needed at home, without undue recourse to apprehension of their children. Only the province, he believed, had the necessary resources and the jurisdiction to do this job.

> I suppose in very simple terms what we thought was that the province would and should assume the cost and responsibility for what I call basic services. Child welfare and public assistance primarily, and maybe rehabilitation; these high costs services, taking care of casualties as they come and rehabilitating them, should be provincial[533].

As commented by one rueful municipal administrator -"Dunc, he was a grand old centraliser!". In Rogers' words:

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[531] J. J. Rice, "Social Policy, Economic Management and Redistribution", G. B. Doern and P. Aucoin, *Public Policy in Canada*, (Macmillan, 1979), pp. 106 - 131.
[532] Canada, *Canada Year Book*, 1965 - 1975. "Canadian Labour Force Statistics.
[533] Duncan Rogers, in interview, 1977.

> One could be accused, I suppose, of withdrawing responsibilities from the municipalities, or on the converse, of centralizing them. There's a tendency for bureaucrats to do this. But what we wanted was a uniform administration across the Province, so that someone in Fort McMurray could be dealt with the same as somebody in Lethbridge[534].

Here, though, the administrators differed from the politicians. The administrators sought to build a provincial welfare state, and the politicians to prevent it. This discrepancy in goals, like the differing perceptions of the function of public assistance referred to above, influenced both the structure of the micro-policy process and its outcome.

B. Rational and Incremental Models of the Policy Process

A model is not attainable in reality, but an abstraction, a pure and extreme form used to analyze an impure real world[535]. Models of the decisions process are of this type, extreme and abstract versions of decisions processes as they occur in the real world, used to improve decision making (normative models) or to enhance our understanding of the causes of certain decisions (explanatory or causal models). The model, however, would never be found in its pure form in the real world, but rather reality would be found to variously approximate the model, depending on actual conditions.

Two models of the micro-policy process could account for the way Alberta's welfare policy makers dealt with the impact of social change upon their Department. They could have followed an incremental model, and made small policy changes in response to the immediate demands upon their Department. Alternatively they could have developed a comprehensive package of related reforms to deal with the emerging and/or underlying problems. Unfortunately, these two models are often presented in the literature as competing prescriptions for planners, rather than as explanatory theories, each of which has predictive value, depending upon the political realities of the situation. The ascendancy of one explanatory theory over the other depends on the degree of consensus on policy goals.

These two decision models, the rational/comprehensive model and the marginal incrementalist model, have dominated decision making theory, particularly in the social

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[534] Duncan Rogers, in interview, 1977.
[535] M. Weber, "Ideal Types and Theory Construction," M. Brodbeck, (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science*, (Macmillan, 1968), pp. 496 - 508.

policy area[536]. The rational/comprehensive model involves a choice of goals, and an evaluation of the implications of all the alternatives for reaching those goals, leading to the choice of one best alternative. The model is therefore described as the "root" method. The incrementalist model is more characteristically described as a "branch" model, allowing a limited range of marginally different feasible alternatives, each only a marginal change from existing practice. One of these limited alternatives will be chosen, and if the decision has unforeseen negative effects these can be corrected in a subsequent marginally incremental decision[537].

As originally developed by Simon[538], the rational/comprehensive model was normative or prescriptive - a method or approach advocated as an effective process of making policy. The model was challenged, again on a normative basis, by Lindblom, who suggested that the rational/comprehensive model was neither feasible nor desirable[539]. The marginal/incrementalist model, he suggested, recognised the importance of feasibility.

As the debate about the relative merits of these two models expanded[540] the basis for their comparison became confused. Did the two models

1. produce goal effective policies?
2. produce feasible policies?
3. or ensure that policies responded to the democratic process.

At this normative level, the strength of the rational/comprehensive model is in goal effectiveness - in producing the best policy to meet an identified goal. The model allows choice of a policy or package of policies to reach a small range of identified goals. This model is valued, therefore, where goal setting can take place - where either there is a consensus on the goal, or where decisions are sufficiently centralized because of expertise and/or the nature of the political system. Goals can then be defined and

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[536] A more recent text on *Planning for Social Welfare*, edited by N. Gilbert and H. Specht (Prentice-Hall, 1977) deals explicitly with these two models as the underpinning of their discussion of the "sociopolitical" and "technomethodological" aspects of planning.
[537] C. E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through", *Public Administration Review*, IX, No. 2, (1959), pp. 79 - 88.
[538] H. Simon, *Administrative Behaviour*, (second edition), (Free Press, 1957).
[539] C. E. Lindblom, Op. Cit.
[540] Y. Dror, for example, responded to Lindblom's recommendations with a paper title "Muddling Through: Science or Inertia", and A. Etzioni developed a combination model described as "Mixed Scanning", F. Kramer, (ed.), *Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy*, (Winthrop, 1973), pp. 142 - 155. The debate continues over the merits of P. P. B. S., Management by Objectives and zero-base-budgeting.

rational/ comprehensive planning allows them to be reached. However the rational/comprehensive model does not guarantee political feasibility where consensus is absent. The strength of the incremental model is in just this area, for policies need not acknowledge an overall goal. Small reforms can be introduced without acknowledging the overall goal and arousing opposition.

While rational/comprehensive models are valued for their goal effectiveness, and incremental models for their political feasibility, the value of both in responsiveness to the democratic process is more dubious. American theorists, based in the polycentric decision processes and the interest group politics of the American political system, value the marginally incremental model as the more democratic of the two processes[541]. As suggested in chapter IV on interest groups, this approach to the study of politics has equated participation of interest groups in the policy process with democracy, neglecting classic democratic theory more concerned with *individual* participation. The incremental model, by maximizing the opportunities to intervene and influence the policy process, is consonant with interest group liberalism, but is less consonant with parliamentary democracy. In this more centralized system, elected representatives are bound by party discipline and policies are implemented by a neutral public service responsible to the party leader, his/her cabinet, and ultimately to Parliament. Under such a system there is more concern with the accountability of the administrators to their political leaders, whose beliefs are assumed to represent the democratic will of the people. In such a centralized system the rational/comprehensive model may be more highly valued as a model to ensure that the policies of elected politicians are carried out, rather than subverted by competing decision centres[542].

Therefore, the preference for one of the two models can be based on three issues – goal effectiveness, political feasibility, and democratic values. These all concern the *prescriptive* value of the two models. The models can also *explain* the process and outcome of policy making. The policy process would approximate the

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[541] A. Wildavsky's analysis of the American budgetary process, for example, praises the democratic values inherent in the multiple access points to that process. "The Political Economy of Efficiency", P. A. R., XXVI, No. 4, (1966), pp. 292 – 310.

[542] Processes such as P. P. B. S., and other rationalised budget processes, appealed to the Trudeau administration in just this area of more secure political accountability. G. B. Doern, "The Politics of the Budgetary Process" G. B. Doern and P. Aucoin, *The Structure of Policy Making in Canada*, (Macmillan, 1974).

rational/comprehensive model under certain political conditions, and the marginal/incremental model under others. These political conditions would be associated with the degree of consensus around policy goals among those with a significant place in the policy process. Whether the number with this significant place was larger (as in Congressional pressure group politics) or small (as is more typical of Canadian parliamentary government) would be less important than the degree of consensus among them.

With consensus, regardless of the polycentric or centralized nature of the process, goal setting could take place and the rational/comprehensive model would be approximated. Under such conditions reform would focus on identifiable goals; decisions would be preceded by a canvassing of alternatives; the final choice would be the "best" way of reaching the goal; and would include an internally consistent package of policies that would represent a significant change from existing practice. In contrast, without consensus, even if there were only two parties significant to the policy process, the decision process would approximate the marginal/incremental model. In such a situation goals would be implicit, and possibly inconsistent; a broad range of alternatives would not be canvassed; the policy choices would not be the most goal effective for any stated goals; and policies would be introduced singly, or in groups that were internally contradictory.

In Alberta during the 1960's the decision process was not polycentric. Interest groups, municipal and federal governments did not have a significant influence on the policy process. The provincial government did not itself operate with a polycentric decision process, but rather as a centralized process which assumed that party M. L. A.'s and Cabinet members, as the elected leaders of the province, imbued the values of its people. A quotation attributed by Municipal Affairs Minister Colborne to Premier Ernest Manning indicates that the Social Credit government believed that it *was* the democratic will of the people.

> Now look, we are a pretty representative group of people of Alberta, and if we are so closely divided on this thing then we can't have a strong consensus, then we had better think about it again. Maybe we'd better sleep on it, and see if we can't come up with something better. If we are divided about 50/50, you can be sure the people of Alberta are also divided about 50/50. [543]

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[543] F. Colborne in interview, 1977.

The Social Credit governments' beliefs in their inherent representativeness, the weakness of interest group politics, and the centralization of the parliamentary system all contributed to a centralized policy process. There were, therefore, two significant parties to the policy process – senior welfare administrators and the provincial Cabinet. Where the two groups were in agreement, therefore, decision-making would approximated the rational/comprehensive model. However, when they disagreed the policy process would be incremental. Furthermore, even if there were disagreement, one group could freeze the other out, to produce policies more rational and comprehensive than marginal and incremental.

Where Cabinet and their senior administrators agreed upon a goal, as in the Child Welfare Reforms of 1966, or where Cabinet was prepared to act without the cooperation of the line departments, as in the Human Resources Development program of 1967, policy development was more rational and comprehensive than incremental. However, where administrators differed from the Cabinet in their perception of goals, as in the development of a provincially operated battery of welfare programs, the grand design of the administrators had to be implemented incrementally, and with some deception. These plans, though rationally related to demands upon the Department, did not meet the goals of the provincial Cabinet.

C. The Incremental Welfare State

From the time of Duncan Rogers' appointment as Deputy Minister of Alberta's Department of Welfare in 1959, until the early 1970's, the provincial welfare state was introduced incrementally. At the beginning of the period the Department of Welfare had 145 staff and no professional social workers. There were no regional offices, and the Department operated from Edmonton using automobiles. The municipalities provided public assistance and child welfare services, with the provincial government sharing some of the costs of the former[544]. Where there was no municipality large enough to provide professional welfare services, relief was granted by town clerks, who were on occasion

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[544] Alberta, Legislature Journal, 1958, Speech from the Throne, February 20th, 1958. M. Lobb, ibid.

both arbitrary and punitive[545]. In many places child welfare services were provided by the R. C. M. P.. Public reaction to the Bompas tragedy of 1958 coincided with the appointment of Duncan Rogers as Deputy Minister, who intended to create provincial programs to prevent such problems.

By 1968 the Department had developed 29 regional offices, with 1,400 staff, although still less than 5% had social work qualifications[546]. The municipal responsibilities for child welfare and public assistance had been assumed by the province, although a vestigial remnant of municipal short-term relief persisted into the Progressive Conservative regime.

This creation of a provincial welfare state took place under a government to whom the welfare state was an anathema, detrimental to man's freedom and independent spirit, socialistic and communistic and altogether to be avoided. While provincial politicians decried the welfare state, provincial administrators installed it. With this conflict in goals, the process of implementation had to be incremental, or "creeping", as was suggested one more rabid Social Credit politician[547]. So, the welfare state was introduced to Alberta in a series of steps, logically sequential, but none individually sufficiently significant to threaten those who feared the welfare state, and intermingled with contradictory but token efforts to "prevent" the welfare state.

Rogers' own background and character, and his close relationships with his subordinates and his ministers, were crucial to the success of reform efforts during his tenure. Shared Christian backgrounds, offices in close proximity, and Rogers' diplomatic and leadership skills, were all important. Rogers described his own background:

> I was in the Air Force during the war years, and then after that I took a degree in education. I never taught a day! I worked for the Royal Trust Company in Calgary, and then in Government service in the Treasury Branches. I was also the son of a manse. My father was a United Church minister, and I suppose my whole life at home associated me with *people*.
>
> I had a concern for people, and whether you have this innately or whether you develop it by association I don't know, but I was not content just with the financial work of the Treasury Branches. I did want to transfer to the Department of Welfare where I could be of more service to people. So I had

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[545] Based on comments from both Duncan Rogers and Dave Stolee in interview.
[546] Alberta, Department of Public Welfare, *Welfare Services*, September, 1968.
[547] A. J. Hooke's reaction to the Department's condition when he succeeded Halmrast as Minister exemplifies Social Credit anti-welfare state attitudes. He was horrified that welfare recipients were described as being "on the payroll"; he tried to fix liens on homes for the amounts families received in welfare, only to be stopped by the threat of lost C. A. P. sharing. He would not sign cheques for the P. S. S. program, or allow welfare recipients to have washing machines. *I Know .....I was There*, (Co-op Press, 1967).

a bit of a missionary outlook[548].

At least part of this concern emerged as a result of Rogers' experience in a clergyman's family during the Great Depression:

> We lived in Carstairs in those days, and I remember the box cars, trains coming through with the men just lying on the top. We were in the manse, and they would all head there for a bite to eat. My mother was so sympathetic, but she had no money. It was a desperate time [549].

In addition to this basic concern for people, Rogers is also credited by his colleagues with an unusual forward thinking ability. He was able to move ahead, rather than just respond to the immediate. In the words of one of his close associates during those years:

> He was a rather unusual deputy minister, working very much in advance, a real thinker, a quiet person that you probably would have difficulty getting to be spontaneous[550].

Rogers' added strength was in the cohesion of the team that he drew around him. He deliberately prevented "empire building", wanting a close and coordinated team.

> Rogers, to his everlasting credit, settled the fate of any remaining empire builders. When Dunc took over and I became assistant deputy we watched closely for empire builders because we had had our fill of them. The history was full of them. We wanted a cohesive team effort, and we didn't want guys going off on a tangent. In the old days it was more like three or four departments than a department with branches. We wanted a tighter ship, and to support one another because so much of the work was interdependent. You can't, for example, operate child welfare services without good public assistance programs[551].

The "empire builders" of the old regime were either retired or chanelled into less crucial areas (Emergency Measures, for example). The new team included, in addition to Rogers himeself, John Ward, John Smith and Bill McFarland. John Ward had been a lay minister with the United Church before becoming the province's superintendent of child welfare, and Bill McFarland was deeply involved in the Anglican church. This shared background, together wih the willingness of the other men to work as Rogers' subordinates, allowed for the development of a close team. In the words of John Ward:

> Rogers and I always got on well together because when he became Deputy I settled it with him. I said "Dunc, I have no designs. I never want to be Deputy. I'm satisfied with what I'm doing."
> Rogers settled the fate of any remaining empire buidlers, and welded together the creative and administratiove abilities of those that were left[552].

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[548]Rogers, in interview, 1977.
[549]Rogers, in interview, 1977.
[550] W. McFarland, in interview, 1977.
[551]J. Ward, in interview, 1977.
[552] Ward, in interview, 1977.

This sense of being part of a team extended to include the minister – at least until the Hooke period of 1967. Mr Jorgensen, a country storekeeper, was minister for the earliest part of the period under study. His senior administrators speak of him with affection and respect as a fine, honest person, accessible and open to suggestion and easy to work with. One administrator described him as a plodder and a religious fundamentalist. He was a member of the United Church, but hardly ever missed a Sunday of Premier Manning's services. Len Halmrast followed Jorgensen as minister, and led the department from 1963 to 1966. We was also respected as honest and unpretentious, and was a sheep farmer active in the Lutheran church. Halmrast described in interview the kind of sharing that used to take place between himself and his senior administrators:

> Sometimes after office hours these men would come in to sit down with me and talk. I had established what they often referred to as an open door policy, so they would come in after hours and this was when we sometimes made decisions on some of the programs we were pursuing, over a cigarette or a cigar. I had quit smoking by that time, but Mr. Ward had these tiny little cigars soaked in wine so I tried one of those a few times[553].

John Ward attributes this close relationship to shared Christian backgrounds, which set a foundation of trust:

> We got on pretty well, Rogers and I, with both Halmrast and Jorgensen, who were pretty serious in their religious beliefs. Rogers and I were probably not as serious in our religious beliefs, but both our backgrounds were out of minister's families – we were both raised in the manse as they say – and they probably extended some trust in us in view of our background. There was a feeling of trust and integrity on both sides[554].

The closeness and cameraderie of this relationshiop was partly due to the close proximity of all the offices. The minister and his senior administrators all worked in the same part of the building. As a result, as commented by one member of the administrative team:

> The relationship of the senior civil servants to the minister is something I've never seen anywhere else. Anyone of the branch heads could wander into the minister's office anytime[555].

The reforms that took place in the sixties were implemented by this small group of men, working for ministers that trusted them. Under Hooke this trust was to be destroyed, and was never quite the same under Hooke's successor Ray Speaker who became minister in 1968. The reforms began in 1959, with Jorgensen as minister and

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[553]L. Halmrast, in interview, 1977.
[554]Ward, in interview, 1977.
[555]W. McFarland, in interview, 1977.

soon after Roger became Deputy Minister.

1. The creation of a system of record keeing and the preparation of a manual of regulations were Rogers' first tasks as Deputy Minister:

> When I came to the Department I was amazed to find there were no policies in writing, very few records, and what there were were not easily obtainable. They were sort of scattered somewhere down in the basement. So for a person with an orderly mind, and coming from a banking background, I set about to organize the administration of the place[556].

2. The second and related task was the creation of regional offices that would bring services closer to people in their communities. By 1965 there were 26 offices, with four more planned, and with staff of 600 compared with 150 in 1955[557].

> When I became Deputy there were two or three things I wanted to do. The very first thing I wanted to do was to open regional offices in Alberta, to bring the services of the Department closer to those who were using them. Again, coming from the (Treasury Branches) I used them as an example. Even yet, if you see a similarity between the way some of the regional offices are run and a banking system, that's it![558]

These two initiatives were essential before Rogers could begin the creation of new provincial programs to replace those of the municipalities.

3. Rogers then developed a new integrated social allowance program, with assistance granted on the basis of need, to replace the existing patchwork of categorical programs. The idea had caught Rogers' eye in a recent publication of the Canadian Welfare Council, and was also being considered in other western provinces.

> The very first thing I wanted to do was to bring a new program of public assistance based on the concept which I had become familiar with from the Canadian Welfare Council, based on need. And so this was really the creation of the new Social Allowance program[559].

This Social Allowance program was introduced in 1960. Cost-sharing for municipalities providing relief was increased from 60 to 80%.

4. An amendment to the Child Welfare Act of 1961 allowed the alternative of non-ward care of children in temporary need, and with the consent of the guardian [560]. This reduced the use of ward care in less serious and voluntary short term situations.

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[556] D. Rogers, in interview, 1977.
[557] D. W. Rogers, "Welfare in Transition", Address to Annual Meeting of Alberta Association of Social Workers, 1965.
[558] Duncan Rogers, in interview, 1977.
[559] Duncan Rogers, in interview, 1977.
[560] Lobb, ibid., p. 8.

5. In 1963 a Welfare Homes Act allowed the province to licence and maintain standards of homes and institutions in the province, and to acquire and operate such places where necessary[561]. To this point such institutions (for the aged and infirm, for unmarried mothers or for children) had been operated by charities, municipalities and religious houses, rather than by the province.
6. In 1964 the province introduced a program of rehabilitation to ecourage welfare recipients to return to the work force and become self supporting[562]. This program was the first "token" anti-welfare state program. No evidence appears in *Annual Reports* of any substantial effort or effect associated with the program.
7. In 1964 a community development program intended to strengthen the independence and self-sufficiency of the province's native peoples was also implemented, under the auspices of the Department of Municipal Affairs. The politicians believed that this program would also prevent welfare dependency, and were horrified when it produced native activism aimed at embarassing the provincial Department of Welfare[563]
8. Under a new Child Welfare Act in 1966 the province assumed all municipal child welfare functions. This takeover was implemented first in the rural areas, and two years later in the two major cities.

Concurrent with the new Child Welfare Act, a new permissive program of Municipal preventive social services funded 80% by the province was introduced. Although focussed on community services that would support the family, this program was seen by Social Credit politicians as an anti-welfare state designed to get people off welfare. Municipalities that participated in the new preventive program were reimbursed for an additional 10% of their relief costs (90% total).

These reforms of 1966 were more than incremental. The programs were an integrated package, with the single goal of reducing child welfare caseloads. Alternative Child Welfare Acts and various alternative structures for the new municipal program had been canvassed[564]. The preventive social service program was itself more rational than incremental. Most of the agencies funded under P. S. S.

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[561] Lobb, ibid., p. 8 - 9.
[562] D. W. Rogers, Address, 1965, Op. Cit.
[563] Colborne, in interview, 1977.
[564] Macfarland, in interview, 1977. Smith, in interview, 1977.

in the first year of the program had already been in existence prior to the introduction of the program. However, over half the *programs* funded were new, and only one of 38 programs had previously received provincial funding[565]. The cost-sharing structure of P. S. S. was similar to that in other provincial programs, but the flexibility was greater under P. S. S.. Budget growth was rapid, starting with $175,000 in 1966, and rising to $1,000,000 in 1968, and nearly $2,000,000 in 1970. However, in the context of the overall provincial welfare budget this was more incremental than rational, for even by 1970 the program absorbed only 2.2% of the Department budget[566].

9. In 1967 the Cabinet introduced a program of Human Resources Development, timed to attract votes in the provincial election. The new program absorbed the troublesome community development program mentioned above, and was designed by the small group of "young turks" around the premier[567]. The program was part of Premier Manning's broader plan for developing social programs more characteristic of the left, but retaining the economic programs of the right. The plan appears to be a response to a perceived threat from the left, and was described by Manning as based in Social Conservatism.

   The program was more than incremental in concept, but was to be handicapped in its implementation by not having the support of the regular line Departments. As a result there were many studies, publications and pilot projects, but little effect on the practices of existing government Departments and programs. The policies were rational/comprehensive, but without the support and involvement of senior administrators, they could not be implemented.

10. In 1970 juvenile offenders again became the responsibility of the Department, rather than the Attorney General.

11. In 1970 the Social Development Act replaced the Public Welfare Act. Under this legislation municipalities were responsible for providing assistance to resident unemployed employables, with the province providing assistance to those not in this category.

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[565] L. Bella, *The Origins of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1978), chapter 2.
[566] L. Bella, Ibid., p. 104.
[567] J. Barr, *The Dynasty*,(McClelland and Stewart, 1974).

12. Remaining municipal public assistance was not taken over until after the Progressive Conservatives succeeded Social Credit in 1971.

With the exception of the package of 1966, each of these steps was more incremental than rational and comprehensive in the extent of planned change. However, the package of 1966 was more than incremental – with a range of programs and policies focussed on the single goal of reducing the number of child in the province's care.

D. The Rational/Comprehensive Reforms of 1966

The more comprehensive package of reforms of 1966 was possible because of the consensus between administrators and politicians on the goal of the reforms – they agreed that child welfare rates had to be reduced. The number of children in care had to be reduced, as did the number coming into care. However, although there was agreement on the goal, differences still existed in the relative emphasis on the various strategies to achieve that goal.

1. The administrators wanted to takeover *all* municipal welfare functions, so that further apprehensions of children would be reduced by:

   A. Eliminating the municipal apprehensions that occurred when parents were without funds, or because it saved funds for the municipality, or because of disapproval of a parent's lifestyle[568].

   B. Provide social services to help parents and their children in their homes, as a substitute for apprehension. A new Child Welfare Act, using the best ideas from various other Canadian programs was drafted to reflect this use of apprehension as a last resort only.

2. The Minister and the senior administrators all believed that the solution to reduce child welfare intake was ultimately in birth control, which still could not be legally promoted. Both intended that family planning would be one of the preventive social services operated by the municipalities[569].

3. The minister, Len Halmrast, wanted to eliminate religious restrictions on adoptions

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[568] John Ward and Bill McFarland both cited this rationale in interview, 1977.
[569] Halmrast understood family planning from the frame of reference of a stock breeder, cut out the weak by preventing them from breeding.

which prevented many children of Catholic parents from being adopted into the more available protestant homes. This had been his objective since he had first held the welfare portfolio in the 1950's, and he accepted it back from Manning on the condition that he could complete the reform[570].

To the extent that there was agreement between the Minister and his advisors, they were able to develop a plan to reduce child welfare rates that was comprehensive and administratively and politically rational. The plan as originally proposed to Halmrast in 1964 included:

1. A new Child Welfare Act, without religious restrictions on adoptions, and taking over all municipal welfare responsibilities.
2. Assumption of all municipal relief by the province.
3. A new program of municipal preventive services cost shared 50% by the province[571].

Had this been implemented, Rogers would have had the tools he needed both to reduce child welfare rates, and to complete the provincial welfare state. However, to ensure implementation the proposals had also to be *politically* rational – they had to gain the support of all those who could reject or impede the reforms.

To ensure implementation the proposal had to have cabinet support, and the Minister's own cabinet colleagues immediately let him know that there was opposition to the removal of the religious restriction on adoptions. Colborne, then a Catholic, opposed the changes, and after fierce discussion Manning came up with his usual reaction to issues that divided Cabinet. He postponed the decision, and asked the minister for a compromise proposal that would meet with Cabinet's (and by implication, the electorate's) approval. Halmrast thought about it, and came up with the idea of a Commission, to include a Catholic, that would sell the reforms to the people of Alberta (see chapter IV). The administrators also assisted, by taking speaking engagements whenever they could.

In addition to this public campaign on the controversial religious issue, the administrators were also concerned about the more touchy issue of the municipal takeover. They knew that if public support mobilized against the takeover the likelihood of it being approved by a government that really did not want a welfare department at all

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[570] Halmrast, in interview, 1977.
[571] D. Rogers to L. Halmrast, Nov. 26th, 1964, A. S. S. C. H. files.

was very slim. So they began a series of private discussions with municipal welfare administrators, giving them the illusion of influence over the design of the new preventive program (see chapter VI). The new program saved face and position for the municipal welfare administrators, and these preliminary discussions made the takeover a little more palatable by giving municipal administrators advance knowledge that would enable them (if they wished) to capture the P. S. S. funds for their own municipal agencies.

In selling the reforms the administrators used the evidence of the coming C. A. P. program as an influx of dollars that would release Alberta funds for new uses, such as the preventive program. Speeches to the municipal administrators apparently began with the comment that Alberta was getting extra funds because the federal government was going to cost share child welfare, and Rogers wanted the administrators to "help him spend it"[572]. The timing of the attributed quote is wrong, however, for the municipal meetings were over before the federal government decided that child welfare would be shareable. However, similar comments by Rogers are documented in his letter to the chairman of the Caucus Welfare Committee, where he uses the general argument of savings under the new federal legislation in support of the new preventive program[573].

These comments contrast with those made by Rogers in his correspondence with his *federal* colleagues. In letters to the federal government Rogers insisted that Alberta would press forward with P. S. S. and other reforms, regardless of progress of C. A. P. [574]. Rogers was using the policy initiatives of each level of government as a lever against the other, with the intention of furthering his *own* policy objective of expansion of Alberta's provincial welfare state.

The policy makers, both politicians and administrators, manipulated all the traditional input channels to government, all the links discussed in previous chapters, in their attempt to obtain political acceptance of the 1966 reforms[575]. They created a Commission to educate the public and to arrive at predetermined conclusions. They addressed public meetings to convince of the need for reform. They negotiated privately

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[572] S. Bishop, in interview, 1977.
[573] D. W. Rogers to Mrs C. Wood, June 21st, 1965.
[574] See chapter VI.
[575] This reversal of the linkage processes is a major focus of the next and concluding chapter.

with municipal administrators to neutralize potential opposition. They phrased the title of the new program of municipal social services to attract the support of Social Credit politicians who wanted to *prevent* the welfare state. The program package was both administratively rational (focussed on the goal of reducing child welfare rates) and politically rational (structured to gain the support of those who could reject or obstruct the reform).

But, to the extent that the minister and his administrators disagreed on the nature of the problem and on the goals of the reform, that rationality was to fail, and to become incremental. The reform package had been discussed at Caucus Welfare Committee, in caucus, and had been presented to the municipalities in a circular[576]. Then, an Annual Convention of the Social Credit League had discussed welfare, and again denounced the welfare state[577]. Finally, in December 1965 the proposals were again reviewed by Cabinet, and for the first time the Ministers faced head-on the takeover of all municipal welfare functions. Severe misgivings appeared, and the Minister asked his Deputy Minister Duncan Rogers to revise the proposal. Rogers prepared a new proposal under which the province would take over all municipal responsibilities for child welfare, but municipal public assistance programs were to be retained, though with provincial cost-sharing increased from 80% to 90%. The new preventive social service program was restructured to provide 80% provincial cost-sharing, as opposed to the original 50%. However, the Deputy Minister remained convinced that his original proposal had been better, for under the new one the existing "cumbersome" duplication of administration would persist. He regretted the lack of complete goal effectiveness in this modified less than comprehensive package of reforms[578]. Cabinet, however, accepted this new proposal in January of 1966[579], and it was described in Municipal Circular No. 13[580].

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[576] Municipal Circular No. 12, October 25th, 1965, *Re Preventive Welfare Services.*
[577] Report of the Thirty First Annual Convention of the Social Credit League, November 24th and 25th 1965, p. 16.
[578] Duncan Rogers to L. C. Halmrast, December 30th, 1965.
[579] To Rogers from Halmrast, January 5th, 1966.
[580] January 17th, 1966, *Re: Preventive, Public and Child Welfare Services.*

E. The Administrative Policy Process as Linkage Process

This chapter had shown that social and economic changes in Alberta in the 1960's were causally linked to policy making through the response of administrators to the failure of their services to meet new and emerging demands. The rise in illegitimacy, associated with Alberta's prosperity, and with the mores of the youth movement, brought floods of children into the care of the province. A structural flaw in existing child protection services, which encouraged municipalities to apprehend children rather than support their families, exacerbated the problem. Increases in marriage breakdown, and to a lesser extent in unemployment, also increased demands on the province's public welfare system.

The provincial administrators saw the solution of this problem in the creation of a centralized provincial welfare state, which would provide a comprehensive and integrated program of income support and social services. The uneven and at times non-existent municipal welfare programs would have to be replaced by provincial programs provided through a network of provincial regional offices. This was the goal to which Deputy Minister Duncan Rogers and his colleagues worked throughout their decade at the head of the province's welfare agency.

This goal, however, could not be explicit, for it conflicted with the Social Credit government's perception of the welfare state as undesirable. Social Credit philosophy held that welfare was destructive to man's independence and initiative, and should be prevented. It could not be used to prevent or to stave off other social problems associated with indigence, such as marriage breakdown or child neglect. Also, the development of a provincial network of programs, replacing those of local communities, conflicted with another Social Credit belief, the anti-statist belief in small government and hence in strengthened local autonomy.

As a result of this conflict in goals between politicians and administrators the provincial welfare state was introduced incrementally to Alberta, in a series of small steps towards an implicit goal. Only in one instance, where the Minister and the senior welfare administrators shared the objective of reducing child welfare intake, did the decision process and its outcome approximate the rational/comprehensive model. Even here, however, the package of reforms was weakened (from the administrator's

perspective) because the Cabinet balked at taking too large a step towards enlarging the provincial welfare state.

The provincial welfare state in Alberta was created incrementally, by administrators attempting to respond to the demands on their service system, while also working for a government that abhorred the welfare state. Social Credit ideology prevented the Cabinet from taking any leadership in the process, with the single exception of the reforms of 1966. In that year, however, an alliance of administrators and politicians *reversed* many of the normal political linkage processes, and manipulated them in order to introduce a package of policies that approximated both administrative and political rationality – a package of policies intended to reduce child welfare caseloads in the province, and ultimately effective in that purpose[581].

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[581] The goal effectiveness of these reforms is the subject of L. Bella, *The Development of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1980.)

VIII. EXPLAINING PUBLIC POLICY

A number of explanatory theories have been applied to the development of the welfare state in Alberta, which occurred under a Social Credit government to which the welfare state was abhorrent. In this concluding chapter these various theories are summarized, and their application in preceding chapters is reviewed. This analysis leads to conclusions about the explanatory utility of the theories, and about the nature of Alberta's "right-wing" welfare state.

Simeon has suggested that single case studies have limited value in theory development, tending to be isolated, and focussed on the unusual rather than the typical, and not to be cumulative[582]. An attempt to overcome these problems has been made in this thesis by studying the pattern of welfare policies developed over a decade, rather than the unusual or the unique. Also, a variety of explanations have been applied to the same phenomenon, so that the relationship between various explanations can be investigated.

Explanations of public policy are nested, with each level or group of theories setting the context within which the next level operates. At the first and broadest level of explanation are the environmental theories, which explain public policy as the result of changes in economic, demographic and mass-level cultural variables. At the second or intermediary level are the political explanations, according to which public policy is the result of political processes set in motion by broader social changes. These political linkage explanations include the activities of parties, pressure groups, and the processes of intergovernmental relations. A political process identified as crucial in this case study is the reaction of administrators to the stresses placed upon their Department by broad social changes in Alberta.

At the third or micro-level, policy is explained as the result of the decision processes through which policy makers attempt to deal with the information, support and demands that reach them from the environment. Two models are used to analyze these micro-processes, the rational/comprehensive model and the marginal/ incremental model. Actual decision process approximate one or other of these models, depending on the degree of consensus on policy goals.

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[582] R. Simeon, "Studying Public Policy", *C. J. P. S.*, IX, No. 4, (1976), pp. 548 - 580.

An explicit application of the Eastonian model leads to assumptions concerning the direction of the relationship between these three levels of explanation. Social and economic variables are linked to the micro-processes by intermediary, political or linkage processes. However, this case analysis has shown that the direction of some of these links can be reversed. The links were manipulated by policy makers to produce support for their preferred policies. The result therefore gives more significance to the role of those *within* the political system.

These reversed processes produced a version of the welfare state in Alberta that was largely the creation of welfare administrators. In the face of opposition from the ruling Social Credit government, the programs that made up the welfare state were introduced incrementally, interspersed with token measures to "prevent" the welfare state, and with some deception on the part of welfare administrators. The right-wing ideology of Social Credit slowed down the introduction of the province's welfare state, but did not prevent the development of programs that welfare administrators perceived as essential in an urbanizing and prosperous province.

Macro-processes

Macro-level explanations of public policy are those which account for the form and content of policy by showing the relationship between the characteristics of public policy, and various characteristics of the broader society. Changes in Alberta's economic structure produced class shifts, away from an entrepreneurial and farm base towards the dominance of the urban middle class. Social Credit had been based in the rural and small town petite bourgeoisie, whereas its Progressive Conservative successor is based in the urban middle class. The growth period of the Progressive Conservative Party in the 1960's coincided with that of the welfare state. The petite bourgoisie that had supported Social Credit declined absolutely, and as a proportion of the total population. The service sector expanded in the 1960's, and there were marked but less extensive increases in the professional/technical and associated clerical occupations. Urbanization, increased incomes and an aging population were also evident in Alberta in the 1960's.

The province's political culture has been described as populist, with public attitudes including a belief in the free enterpise system, anti-Statism and hostility to

external sources of power (i.e., Western Alienation). The social and economic characteristics, and shifts in those characteristics are the context for public policy making. The various causal chains linking social change to policy change have been the subject of this thesis.

Linkage Variables - The Causal Chains

1. The Political Party

The political party is usually described as providing interest articulation and aggregation, gathering the concerns of the electorate, organizing them and directing them to policy makers. However, as this function is now shared with the media, with pressure groups and with the civil service, it is now diluted[583].

The party has been shown here to remain an important link between society and the policy process. Social Credit Party of Alberta came to power because of shifts in Alberta's economic conditions, with an ideology reflecting the interests of the class that formed the core of party support. The party arose in the 1930's, with an ideology that met the need of small scale entrepreneurs for a panacea for their economic problems. The economic relation between hinterland Alberta and central Canada led Albertans to support a provincial government that could represent their interests without internal opposition opposition[584]. This ideology, in turn, affected the policies and programs of Social Credit when in government. Thus, the party was the product of economic and class variables, with party ideology reflecting the interests of the class in which the party was based.

Two mechanisms for party influence have been discussed here. The first occurred directly through the party itself, with party members and leaders making policies consistent with their beliefs about society and government. Social Credit rhetoric is right-of-centre anti-socialist and anti-statist. The unravelling of the causal chain associated with the reforms of 1966, has shown the significance of this ideology in the

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[583] F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, *Canadian Political Parties*, (Prentice Hall, 1975) pp. 149 - 166. J. Meisel, "The Decline of Party in Canada", H. G. Thorburn, (ed.), *Party Politics in Canada*, (4th ed.), (Prentice-Hall 1979), pp. 119 - 135. A. King, "Political Parties: Some Skeptical Reflections", R. C. Macridis and B. E. Brown, (eds.), *Comparative Politics*, (4th ed.), (Dorsey Press, 1972), pp. 233 - 251.

[584] T. Levesque and K. Norrie, "Overwhelming Majorities in the Alberta Legislature", Unpublished Manuscript, (Department of Economics, University of Alberta, 1977), pp. 19 - 20.

policy process.

The second occurred when the government party responded to a perceived electoral threat. In spite of class shifts and increasing diversity in the province, opposition to Social Credit was not strong (with the exception of Aberhart's election of 1940) until the mid-sixties. Then the rural/urban balance shifted to the disadvantage of the rural-based Social Credit party. Social Credit interpreted byelection results as a threat from the left, to which the government was already over-sensitive. The government responded to this threat by adopting some "socialist" programs, leaving both the party and the electorate confused. The void to the right created by this shift by Social Credit has now been filled by the Progressive Conservatives.

2. Interest Groups

The decline of political parties in the process of interest articulation and aggregation has been attributed by some to the increasing significance of the role played by interest groups and by the media in the policy process. The collection and organization of the concerns of the electorate, and channelling them through to policy makers is now, according to some scholars, dominated by interest groups, by the media and by the public service. This conclusion about the Canadian political process has been shown to have resulted from overextended comparisons with the American political process. Several examples of Canadian pressure groups studies have been described, to assist in assessing the importance of the pressure group phenomenon in Alberta.

Interest groups concerned about the development of Alberta's welfare state included the native peoples, the social welfare profession, private counselling agencies, and the day care and child welfare lobbies. With the exception of the native groups (which did not influence general welfare policy), all these interest groups were based in the urban middle class. These urban areas of Alberta had most need for welfare services, and were therefore most likely to generate pressure groups concerned with expressing these needs to government. The government's own child welfare inquiries (such as the Howson Report of the 1940's and the Patterson Commission of the 1960's) also performed as pressure groups, though more typically within the Canadian tradition of a pressure group created by and in a symbiotic relationship with government. The major newspapers of Edmonton and Calgary also supported welfare reforms, and are

therefore included in the discussion of pressure groups.

Pressure group activity, however, was not a significant link between the social and economic change and welfare reform. The social work profession was more concerned with its status than with social reform. The counselling agencies and the day care lobby were involved *after* the fact, attempting to get funds for their own programs. Only the major newspapers, with a long history of acrimony with Social Credit, were concerned with broader changes. The inquiries and Commissions were established by government, in part in response to the accusations of the press (particularly the Howson Report), or with the intention of stimulating or simulating public support for the reforms preferred by policy makers. This linkage process was the reverse of that assumed from the Eastonian model.

3. The Municipal Governments

In the Canadian context , including Alberta, the influence of local governments is reduced by their constitutional dependence on the provincial governments. This reduces their resources in intergovernmental relations. The significance of their role was increased by urbanization which concentrated an increasing proportion of the electorate in two major urban areas; by the position of municipalities as the administrators of existing social welfare programs; and, by the Social Credit government's preference for "local autonomy." Under Social Credit in Alberta the municipalities acted in a way analogous to institutional pressure groups (for the larger cities) or to a mature pressure group (through the Union of Alberta Municipalities, U. A. M., representing the smaller municipalities) with their administrators having early access to, and appearing to influence the provincial policy process.

4. Provincial/Federal Relations

The constitutional responsibility for health and welfare in Canada has generally been recognised as provincial, but the federal government has introduced a series of shared-cost health and welfare programs. Old age assistance and pensions for the blind and the disabled were introduced in the early 1950's, and hospital insurance and unemployment assistance were established as shared-cost programs in 1956. Three major programs were ntroduced in the mid-sixties, the Canada Pension Plan, the Canada Assistance Plan and Medicare.

The provinces are generally treated as responding to federal initiatives with expandsions of their own programs[585]. However, the social welfare initiatives of the mid-sixties in Alberta were not a response to the federal government's new Canada Assistance Plan, but rather Alberta was generally ahead of Ottawa, moving into new areas of social services. Federal initiatives responded to *provincial* initiatives, rather than *vice versa*.

A comparison of spending on social services by the two levels of government in the sixties showed that spending in Alberta "took off" before that of Ottawa, so the province was in the lead. Also, analysis of federal provincial diplomacy confirmed that the provincial government influenced Ottawa, rather than vice versa.

5. The Administrative Policy Process

None of the political processes described above was *the* causal factor in the welfare reforms in Alberta in the early 1960's. The final and most crucial link between social and economic change and public policy occurred within the public service, as administrators responded to strains on their Department.

Changes associated with urbanization and prosperity increased the demands upon the province's Department of Welfare. More workers were dependent upon wage employment, and were vulnerable to unemployment. Marriage breakdowns were becoming more frequent, and more single parent families needed assistance. Illegitimacy increased dramatically, with many children surrendered for adoption. The caseloads of the provincial department increased, and administrators were aware of the inadequacy of existing services. In 1966 administrators and politicians agreed on the goal of reducing child welfare intake, and reform was more comprehensive and rational than incremental. The package was both administratively and *politically* rational. The elements all contributed to reducing child welfare rates, and also had the political function of purchasing the support of individuals or groups that might defeat or obstruct reform.

When politicians and administrators *differed* on the goal of policy, as in the case of relief to the indigent and the desirability of a provincial welfare state, reforms were

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[585] R. Dyck "The Canada Assistance Plan: The Ultimate in Cooperative Federalism", *C.P.A.*, IXX, No. 4, (1976), pp. 587 - 602. R. Splane, "Social Policy Making in the Federal Government: some Aspects of Policy Making in Health and Welfare Canada", S. A. Yelega (ed.), *Social Policy Making in Canada*, (Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1978), pp. 209 - 226.

introduced in a series of marginal increments, even when conceived as a whole by senior welfare administrators. The absence of consensus prevented the rational/comprehensive reforms sought by welfare administrators in the public assistance area. Conversely, when the politicians introduced their own rational/comprehensive plan of Human Resource Development in 1967, they by-passed their own human service agency with its welfare perspective, and created a new one explicitly committed to the objectives of their new program.

A. The Reversal of the Linkage Process

The policy makers, both politicians and administrators, manipulated all the traditional input channels to government, all the linkage mechanisms discussed in previous chapters, in their attempt to obtain political acceptance for the package of reforms introduced in 1966. The Minister of Welfare created a Commission to educate the public and to arrive at predetermined conclusions. The welfare administrators addressed public meetings to advocate reform. Municipal administrators were neutralized in private negotiations. The administrators used provincial/federal relations as a political resource in the provincial policy process. And, they named the new program of municipal social services to attract the support of Social Credit politicians, including their own Minister, who wanted to *prevent* the welfare state.

Federal Proposals as a Political Resource

The provincial welfare administrators used the evidence of the coming C. A. P. program as a political resource to support their own proposals within Alberta. The new federal program, they claimed, would release Alberta funds for new uses, such as the preventive program. Meetings with the municipal administrators, for example, apparently began with the comment that Alberta was getting extra funds because the federal government was going to cost share child welfare, and Deputy Minister Duncan Rogers

wanted the administrators to "help him spend it"[586]. Similar arguments by Rogers are documented in his letter to the chairman of the Caucus Welfare Committee[587]. This contrasts with comments made by Rogers in his correspondence with his *federal* colleagues. To Ottawa, Rogers insisted that Alberta would press forward with P. S. S. and other reforms, regardless of progress of C. A. P.. Rogers was using the policy initiatives of each level of government as a lever against the other. As suggested in other studies of federal-provincial relations[588] the opportunity for extensive private negotiations at the administrative level may increase the influence of administrators over the outcome. The result is a decline in *political* control of the policy process, particularly if administrators use the arguments of each level of government as a lever against the other.

The Municipalities

The meetings held by Rogers with the senior social welfare administrators from Edmonton and Calgary provided them with an illusion of influence. Both United Way representatives and municipal administrators perceived this series of meetings as a sincere attempt to consult and involve them. To Rogers, however, these meetings were intended to gain support and avert opposition, not to change the proposals.

Many aspects of P. S. S., for example, had already been decided, if not formalized, before these consultations. Over a year earlier, in 1964, Rogers had already described the program to his Minister. He already knew that municipal councils would be responsible for the program; that the legislation would be permissive; that private agencies would be allowed to receive funds and that the program should in some way "tie in to" the United Way structure. Rogers already knew that he did not want to fund sectarian agencies, or to undercut the United Ways. Before the first meetings with municipal administrators he had summed up their purpose as the gaining of support, rather than the design of the program. The reorganization proposed in 1965 included the provincial takeover of both municipal child welfare and municipal public assistance. The municipal administrators from Edmonton and Calgary would lose a major part of their

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[586] S. Bishop, in interview, 1977. The timing of the attributed quote is wrong, however, for the municipal meetings were over before the federal government decided that child welfare would be shareable.
[587] D. W. Rogers to Mrs C. Wood, June 21st, 1965.
[588] D. V. Smiley, *Canada in Question*, (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976), pp. 59.

Department's functions under the reorganization, and could be expected to oppose the changes. The United Ways would have been concerned about the availability of new sources of government funding to their member agencies, fearing this might undercut their own authority. All those involved in these meetings had something to lose from the proposals, but through consultation Rogers sought to gain their support. Rogers' approach was typical of that used by public administrators who seek to neutralize pressure groups concerned about forthcoming policy proposals[589], and reverses the more traditional concept of the pressure group as an input mechanism.

These meetings did not result in any major changes in the reforms of 1966, but the illusion of participation *was* useful in obtaining the support of these municipal social welfare administrators (both public and private sector). Rogers had maximized his own chances of gaining the support (or at least neutralize the opposition) of this crucial group of adminisrators.

Pressure Groups

A major characteristic of Canadian pressure group activity has been the attempt by government to develop and manipulate pressure groups in support of government initiatives. The Alberta child welfare reforms of 1966 exemplify this approach by government to pressure group activity. Halmrast's welfare reforms met with opposition, both in cabinet and in the community. The first time he brought the proposal for removing the religious restriction on adoption to Cabinet, opposition was sufficiently effective that it was decided to "let it rest for a while". So, the Minister proposed a Commission to study child welfare in the province. Halmrast told the Commission that he wanted their report to support a change in the adoption law to allow children of Catholic parents to be adopted into protestant homes. The committee did a "sales job", as intended. The senior provincial administrators also made many public addresses. The Director of Child Welfare, for example, publicised the problems of child abuse and the scarcity of adoptive homes. While not effective in stifling all opposition, this public relations work by the Minister, his Commission and his senior administrators stimulated (or simulated) sufficient public support that the reforms were accepted by Cabinet, and were

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[589] H. J. Dawson, "National Pressure Groups and the Federal Government", Pross, *Ibid.*, pp. 29 - 58.

implemented.

Political Party

While administrative policy makers were able to manipulate, and in some instances reverse the intergovernmental and pressure group processes, the Social Credit politicians were less manipulable. The influence of Social Credit ideology continued to affect significantly the form of public policy. Social Credit ideology, with its emphasis on anti-statism, individualism, the work ethic and Christian charity, led the Social Credit government to retain municipal programs, and to favour programs to "prevent" the welfare state by strengthening both local government and individual initiative.

In addition, Social Credit ideology influenced the government's response to electoral threat. Antipathy for socialism and for the "socialistic" welfare state led the Social Credit government to over-react to a perceived threat from the left, with a shift towards the social policies advocated by the left[590], while retaining free enterprise economic policies. The electorate, convinced by years of anti-socialist Social Credit rhetoric of the evils of socialism, responded to this shift by electing in 1971 another party of the right.

In the case of Social Credit the political party, cabinet and party convention linked class variables to policy. That link, however, was not in the traditional party roles of interest aggregation and articulation. Instead, the party's ideology, based in the class *origins* of the party, influenced *contemporary* policy shifts.

B. Explaining Public Policy

Simeon comments on the capacity of case studies for proving or disproving theories[591]. A case study can provide evidence to support a theory, but can never *prove* it. A case study can, however, *disprove* a theory, or at least produce evidence of the limits to its applicability. This case study has been structured so that the applicability of a variety of theories can be tested, and potentially refuted. Both the general Eastonian

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[590] The Human Resources program of 1967, and Manning's proposals for political realignment.
[591] R. Simeon, Op. Cit.

framework and a number of linking theories are applied, with the potential for any of these to be refuted in the empirical analysis of the causal chains of the policy process. Each of these theories has been applied in the analysis of the causal chain between independent environmental variables and dependent policy variables. The usual applications of Eastonian theory are based on the impact of demands upon the policy system. This analysis has shown that bother support, and what are described by Easton as "withinputs" can be crucial in determining policy output:

> In so far as things happening within a system shape its destinies as a system of interaction, it will be possible to take them into account as they are reflected through the inputs of members of the system. It does not seem reasonable to speak of these events as inputs since they already occur within the system rather than outside. For logical consistency we might call then "withinputs"[592].

In this case the significance of both governing party ideology (part of the support system) and administrative policy process (withinputs) are at variance with the more usual applications of the Eastonian model. In terms of the support system:

1. Party ideology did influence government policy, but this was not a link between policy and contemporary class or cultural patterns in the province. Social Credit ideology was based in a provincial class structure and economic situation as it had existed in the 1930's, three decades before that under study. There was a time lag in the relationship between changes in economic conditions and class structure, and the reflection of that shift in government ideology and public policy.
2. Political competition affects policy, but the crucial variable here is the *perception* of competition, not objective measures of class-based shifts that could change the electoral fortunes of political parties. Ideology influences perception, and in this case resulted in a distorted image of political competition.

And in terms of withinputs:

3. Policy makers may manipulate and reverse the processes through which society is supposed to influence government. This reversal occurred in this case in deliberate attempts by politicians and administrators to influence public opinion, through public speaking and the creation of a Commission. Administrators also manipulated both federal/provincial and provincial/municipal relations, though more covertly, to produce their preferred policy outcome.

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[592]D. Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, (Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 114.

4. Administrators were a major force in the policy process. They manipulated politicians, producing token programs consonant with governing party ideology (i.e., to prevent the welfare state) while also building government programs in conflict with that ideology (i.e., constructing a provincial welfare state).

These findings lead to the suggestion that the usefulness of the Eastonian model in this case study is restricted to aspects of the model that generally receive less attention – aspects described by Easton as the "support" structure and as "withinputs".

The Right-Wing Welfare State

This case study has focussed on the creation of Alberta's version of the right-wing welfare state. By the end of the 1960's that welfare state included financial assistance and child welfare programs, delivered through regional offices throughout the province. The programs had been introduced incrementally over a decade, with the only large scale reforms being in 1966. With the exception of these child welfare reforms, the welfare state was introduced in marginal changes by administrators responding to the demands placed upon their Department by social changes in the province, but intended to culminate in a provincial welfare state. These marginal reforms were interspersed with token moves to "prevent" the welfare state, moves that appear to have been intended to deceive the Social Credit government rather than to implement its philosophy.

Once during this decade of growth of Alberta's welfare state, however, the politicians and administrators did work towards the same policy goal, the reduction of child welfare caseloads in the province. The administrators used this opportunity to work with their minister to produce a package of social welfare reforms that was more than incremental, a package of reforms all focussed on the agreed objective of reduced child welfare intake. These reforms were effective in reducng the rate of apprehension of children in the province[593]. Even here though, agreement was not total, and in the final policy the reforms did not include all the measures considered by administrators as essential in dealing with the province's child welfare problems. The right-wing ideology of the governing party reduced the growth of Alberta's welfare state to an incremental process, with even the measures of 1966 less than provincial administrators considered

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[593] L. Bella, *The Development of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program*, (Department of Recreation Administration, University of Alberta, 1980), pp. 11 – 12.

desirable for completion of a humane and consistent provincial welfare state.

Development of the province's health and welfare programs in the first decade of Progressive Conservative government reflects patterns established earlier under Social Credit. Crisis management, particularly in child welfare, still continues. Under the Progressive Conservative government first elected in 1971 the trend to centralization of social programs continued, as various municipal programs came under provincial control. Rapid growth of the provincial Department of Welfare continued, providing the services taken over from municipalities, with insufficient trained field personnel and inexperienced or untrained middle and senior management. These weaknesses, exacerbated by recurrent crises and by philosophical differences between managers and their ministers, resulted in disabling mistrust between senior administrators and the minister. These problems produced a battery of programs without underlying philosophy or plan, inadequately staffed, and without either resources or leadership.

Most of the roots of these problems lay in the history of Alberta's "right-wing" welfare state. Crisis management in child welfare dates back to the Whitton report of 1947 and to the Bompas tragedy of 1958. Both incidents took a form similar to the crises of the seventies. Tragic incidents were revealed, given attention in the press, and various public interest groups call for reform[594]. The government then funded some kind of commission or inquiry, which sometimes resulted in increased funding to treatment services. There is, however, no overall plan or philosophy governing expansion.

The trend to centralization of welfare programs and services dating to the beginning of the 1960's has continued under the Progressive Conservative government elected in 1971. Under Social Credit, however, this centralization had been slowed by the party's preference for local autonomy. The Progressive Conservatives, on the other hand, showed little concern for strengthening the municipalities. They developed a province-wide kindergarten program to replace the municipal pre-school programs developed under the Preventive Social Service Program. The remaining municipal public assistance programs were also taken over, with one residual exception. A province-wide home care program standardised a network of services that had originated under P. S. S. as municipal initiatives. A new provincial day care program of portable subsidies removed

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[594] See the series written by Wendy Koenig in the Edmonton Journal, 1979 - 81.

municipal responsibilities in this area also. A recent review of the remaining municipal social service sector funded under the Preventive Social Service Program has resulted in a declared intention to strengthen local autonomy in the program, but the legislation tabled in the Legislature in 1981 showed few differences.

The rapid growth in provincial program responsibilities necessitated staff expansion, with many of those hired for social work positions lacking training or experience. Job dissatisfacton also resulted in rapid turnover, as staff attempted to work with inadequate resources and leadership. Promotions to middle management and beyond were rapid, with resultant weakness at the higher levels of the Department. With each new transfer of responsibilities (child welfare, public assistance, day care), the problem worsened, with the increased likelihood of crisis and tragedy.

Through the 1970's and into the 1980's these crises have met with a responsive press, similar to the reaction to Charlotte Whitton's findings in 1947 and to the Bompas tragedy in 1958. The results in the 1970's have been similar to those in the 1940's and 1950's – additional funds to bolster obviously inadequate services to put out brush fires. The more recent poor press has exacerbated existing tensions between senior administrators and their minister, resulting in a disjointed welfare state, inadequately staffed and with insufficient and poorly distributed resources. Under Social Credit, briefly, Alberta's politicians and welfare administrators had worked together to introduce a collection of internally consistent reforms – but apart from this short interlude Alberta's right-wing welfare state has been introduced incrementally by politicians desperately trying to cool public protests about specific incidents and tragedies. Under Social Credit there had been a brief period when reforms were planned and internally consistent, though affected somewhat by the lack of consensus between administrators and politicians. However, in the first decade of Progressive Conservative government, Alberta's right-wing welfare state was inconsistent, inadequate and unplanned.

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